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ABSTRACT
This thesis engages with the ideological implications of the concept of 
globalization. Working with a neutral, inclusive definition of ideology, 
it takes ideologies to be constellations of mutually defining political 
concepts. The analysis centres on the question of whether long­
standing ideological currents have been capable of absorbing the idea 
of globalization in ways that do not undermine their integrity or 
whether, as some scholars have argued, they have been disrupted by 
the force of a new entrant to the extent that they no longer make sense. 
On the basis of conceptual analysis applied in five chapters to six 
ideologies or ideological families: classical liberalism, socialism (in 
three variants), national populism and fascism (as two members of the 
so-called ‘extreme right’), and anarchism and ecologism 
(comparatively), I conclude that no such ideological mpture has 
occurred. While conceptual shifts are to a greater or lesser extent 
identifiable in each of the cases analyzed, the changes have occurred 
within existing ideological configurations and according to their 
logical or functional requirements. The idea of globalization has not 
destabilized any of those conventional clusters sufficiently to render 
them incoherent. On the contrary, they remain meaningful as distinct 
sets of political beliefs and as such play an important part in the debate 
on globalization.
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INTRODUCTION 
GLOBALIZATION: THE BUZZWORD
In this short introduction I situate the subject of the present study -  broadly definable as 
the effect of the concept of globalization on ideology -  within wider debates surrounding 
the reality of globalization as a process and its impact (or lack of it) on social life and 
inquiry. I also offer a preliminary explanation of the key assumptions of this thesis and I 
signal more specific arguments to be developed in subsequent chapters.
Background: the globalization controversy
Globalization is an idea whose time has come. (Held et a l 1999, p. 1)
[Gjlobalization is everything and its opposite. (Friedman 2000, p. 406)
The analysis presented in the following chapters is not concerned directly with the vast 
controversies regarding the existence, the chronology, the causes, and the outcomes of 
globalization understood as an aggregate of economic and political developments. 
Instead, the questions that this study addresses refer to the meanings of globalization that 
circulate in the ‘noosphere’, to how they are generated and mobilized in political 
argument, and to the extent to which their mobilization results in shifts and tensions 
within conventional ideological structures and families. Yet, while this thesis focuses on 
globalization as a political concept, the question needs to be contextualized against the
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backdrop of broader debates which have surrounded globalization as a process since the 
end of the Cold War.
The last two decades have been marked by important, interconnected technological, 
political and economic changes. Technologically, this period has witnessed rapid 
developments in the means of communication, including satellite-based mobile phone 
systems, transoceanic television transmissions and, most important of all, the internet. 
This technological innovation has played a major role in political events, from the 
collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and its Central and Eastern European 
satellites to the meteoric rise of international organizations worldwide. Economically, 
the disintegration of the model that had for seventy years posed a challenge to capitalism 
has left the latter triumphant, at least for the time being. At the same time, the capitalist 
system itself has also been altered in comparison with the social-democratic type 
dominant in most of the post-Second World War period in Europe and, to some degree 
at least, also in the United States. The possibility of cheap communication in real time 
across any distance in combination with the reduction of trade baniers enabled 
outsourcing of significant segments of production. The resulting extension of economic 
operations to worldwide scales has facilitated a more effective extemalization of the 
costs of capitalist production. The increased mobility of capital, along with the assumed 
weakening of state-managed regulatory mechanisms, has given capitalism a more 
unapologetic face, leading -  as numerous critics have argued -  to grave socio-economic 
problems, such as rising inequality on intra- and inter-national scales, growing
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unprecedented environmental degradation worldwide. The opposition to these outcomes 
of the capitalist economy has in turn been expressed with unparalleled emphasis on 
world-wide solidarities while the organization of the protest has been mediated by new 
technologies which have proved able, now and then, to circumvent control by the 
authorities.
Journalists, politicians and business gurus have rushed to explain this set of diverse 
political and economic developments while social science has become ‘full of 
enthusiasts claiming that a new form of human society is emerging’ (Mann 2000, p. 
1467). In the quest to find a common denominator to explain the transformation the 
concept of globalization has been turned into the buzzword of both public discourse and 
social inquiry, an idea allegedly capable of capturing the meaning of the new realities. In 
relation to technological developments, globalization has thus become linked to what 
Manuel Castells (2001) conceptualized as the ‘space of flows’. In the words of Felix 
Stadler this ‘emerged when it became necessary and possible to integrate entities that are 
physically far apart into the single units than can work in real time’ (Stadler 2001). The 
process of ‘respatialization’ (Scholte 2005), it has been professed, has undermined the 
conventional Euclidean logic and with it the tenitorial ‘space of places’ (Castells 2001) 
marking ‘a new ontology of place/space relations’ (Amin 2002, p. 385) or even ‘the end 
of geography’ (O’Brien 1992). Consequently upon these metaphysical claims, political 
globalization has been defined as a process which turns tenitorial states into ‘unnatural, 
even impossible, business units in a global economy’ (Ohmae 1996, p. 5) and a large
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body of literature has amassed either celebrating or mourning the ‘decline’, 
‘obsolescence’, ‘extinction’, or ‘retreat’ of the state (van Creveld 1999, pp. 336-414; 
Hudson 1999; Khan 1996; Strange 1996). The ‘end of the state’ thesis pointed to ‘global 
civil society’ as a new ‘transnational’ political actor to fill the vacuum left (Falk 1995; 
Kaldor 2003, p. 1) as well as entailing warnings of the dangers of the suspected global 
rule of ‘transnational’ corporations (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994; Korten 1998). In turn, 
in the economic sphere globalization has been credited, for better or worse according to 
the leanings of particular commentators, with the creation of a single global capitalist 
economy in which those corporations operate (Dicken 1998; Greider 1997; Luttwak 
1999; Scholte 1997), while from a different (but equally sweeping) point of view it has 
been dubbed the harbinger of the end of capitalism itself (Dmcker 1993).
In combination, the claims identifying globalization-induced change in various areas of 
social life amounted to the suggestion of a major paradigm shift with globalization in the 
very centre of this transformation:^
 ^ Inevitably, some theorists went further than others in claiming that an epochal rupture 
has taken place. Thus while some, like Giddens, saw globalization as ‘the expansion of 
modernity’s internally referential systems’ (Giddens 1991, p. 225) or ‘heightened’, 
‘super’ or ‘reflexive’ modernity, others announced the end of the modem era. Martin 
Albrow for example proclaimed that ‘modern age has been supplanted’. Accordingly, 
globalization ‘is the termination of modem ways of organizing life’ for it ‘has altered the 
framework of human action’ and ‘usher[ed] in a new age’ (Albrow 1996, pp. 20, 100, 
85, 106).
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[A] new centuiy begins at a moment when eveiything seems in 
question. What gives contemporary change its power and momentum 
is the economic, political and cultural change summed up by the term 
“globalisation”. It is the interaction of extraordinary technological 
innovation combined with world-wide reach, driven by global 
capitalism that gives today’s change its particular complexion. It has 
now the speed, inevitability and force that it has not had before. 
(Hutton and Giddens 2000, p. vii)
Wide-ranging postulates that ‘the world we live “in” today is different from that of 
previous ages’ (Giddens 1991, p. 225) have led to wholesale metatheoretical claims 
concerning human sciences themselves. Globalization has been declared ‘the central 
thematic for social theory’ (Featherstone and Lash 1995, p. 1) and the stress on its 
novelty has entailed the assumption that existing ways of conceptualizing social realities 
are inadequate in new circumstances. Roger Burbach thus followed his assertion that 
‘globalization marks an entirely new epoch in the world’s economic history’ with the 
claim that ‘it requires a shift in our Weltanschauung, the very way we view the world, its 
politics, societies and economies’ (Burbach 2001, p. 21). Such opinions were 
widespread. For example, in the first issue of the Globalizations journal it is stated: 
‘[w]e cannot make sense of globalizations through conventional analytical and 
disciplinary frameworks’ (Petersen 2004, p. 50). A similar position was taken by Martin 
Shaw who called for ‘the global transformation of the social sciences’ (Shaw 2003), 
while another well-known globalization theorist, Jan Aart Scholte declared:
Globalisation calls into question the adequacy of comparative politics 
and international relations as methods to understand the organisation 
and exercise of power in social life. The growth of a global dimension 
of social relations can even cast doubt on the very project of political 
science and the academy’s practice of disciplinaiy divisions more
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generally. Contemporary accelerated globalisation gives ample cause 
for a paradigmatic shift in social analysis. (Scholte 1999, p. 9; and see 
Scholte 2005 for his own attempt to make this shift with the use of new 
vocabulaiy of ‘supraterritoriality’)
The radical nature of the pronouncements alleging the eroding impact of globalization 
on governance, economy and social inquiry provoked an equally staunch reaction from 
commentators sceptical about the reality, or novelty, or depth of the transition and 
therefore unconvinced about the explanatory power of the concept of globalization. 
Justin Rosenberg’s declaration ‘that the “age of globalization” is over’ (Rosenberg 2005, 
p. 3) and that it is now appropriate to write its ‘post-mortem’ exemplifies an unequivocal 
rebuttal of the validity of globalization-based explanations. Other theorists suggested 
‘overselling’ or ‘sinking’ of globalization, or the ‘collapse of globalism’ (Stieglitz 2006; 
Ferguson 2005; Saul 2005).
The sceptical argument highlighted continuity ftrom two overlapping but analytically 
distinct perspectives. On the one hand, it placed emphasis on the continuing significance 
of the institutions or ideas that the postulations of a new paradigm condemned to the 
dustbin of history. On the question of the allegedly qualitative spatial change, the 
sceptical position maintained that ‘globalization is a reconfiguration of existing 
understandings rather than the radical break’ and that ‘territory remains of paramount 
importance’ (Elden 2004, p. 8). Consequently, the case has been made for the lasting 
necessity of territorial statehood, state-managed welfare programmes and nationally- 
based partisan politics (see for example Garrett 1998; Hay 2006; Weiss 1998; and
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contributions to Boyer and Drache 1996). Complementing this emphasis on continuity 
of established political and economic arrangements, another sceptical approach has 
aimed to identify in the past processes analogous to those shaping the world today and 
by doing so to put in doubt the qualitative natui e of the change purported by the other 
side of the debate. Rosenberg thus maintained that deterritorialization is not a new 
process and reminded his readers that Marx had aheady written of ‘the annihilation of 
space by time’ (Rosenberg 2005, p. 12). With regard to international relations, Stephen 
Krasner dismissed the claim that globalization is the factor which erodes the sovereignty 
of the nation state. State sovereignty, Krasner contended, ‘has always been problematic 
and could never be taken for granted’ (Krasner 1999, p. 34). In another widely-cited 
sceptical contribution, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson argued that ‘globalization’ is 
merely an intensified, but not unprecedented, internationalization (Hirst and Thompson 
1999). The same authors insisted that trade openness (a crucial point in the globalization 
thesis) was ‘not much different in the mid-1990s than it was at the end of the belle 
époque' (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 62).
A similarly sceptical position has also been voiced in reaction to the demand of ‘a newly 
conceptualized global social science’ (Riggs 2001). As with other aspects of this debate, 
so also in this case, the emphasis has been placed both on the continuing relevance of the 
existing models of social inquiry, as well as on the precedents of the ‘eurekas’ of today’s 
globalization theory in long-established analytical models, for example, as I have 
already noted, in Marxism’s deep-seated appreciation of the significance of
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deteiTitorialization and other spatial phenomena induced by modem capitalism 
(Rosenberg 2005), In keeping with the sceptical account, the notion that a paradigm shift 
is now necessary is flawed at its root for it takes the process of globalization for granted 
and so depoliticizes the concept. Consequently, according to Rosenberg, theorists of 
globalization became its ‘ideological amplifiers’: ‘[ijnstead of deconstructing the 
popular Zeitgeist, they elevated it to the role of an intellectual Weltgeist' (Rosenberg 
2005, p. 7). At the same thne, in line with the sceptical position, the metatheoretical 
reorientation which has taken place in connection with the assumption of globalization 
has been not just unnecessary and unconvincing, but also beneficial to the dominant 
neoliberal policy, whose parameters it has unwittingly accepted (Kiely 2005).^
The globalization question has also reached the theory of ideology, that is to say, the 
area to which the present study contributes. The aim of the cursory remarks above 
concerning the state of the globalization debate at large has been to situate the hitherto 
less developed literature on the impact of globalization on ideology against the 
background of the broader controversy and to demonstrate that claims analogous to
 ^Allan Scott elaborated on this allegation and asked a series of questions suggesting not 
only the inflated nature of some metatheoretical claims of globalization theory but also 
their problematic political implications: ‘Is social science as prone as political punditry 
to interpreting globalization as historically inevitable and unstoppable? [...] have the 
social sciences in their diagnosis of late- or post- modernity, of which the theory of 
globalization is a key element, been sufficiently aware of the extent to which 
globalization is a political project! [...] are we assisting the process of globalization by 
providing people with persuasive arguments to the effect that little can be done in the 
face of these enoimous economic, political and social developments?’ (Scott 1997, pp. 
2-3)
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those examined in the present thesis have been articulated in other areas of human 
sciences. While discussion of the different views concerning the interplay between 
globalization and ideology is left to the next chapter, I want to use the remainder of this 
introduction to explain my broad orientation on the question and especially the fact that 
my position does not necessitate a sceptical turn (if the latter is to be understood as the 
denial of globalization) even though it does oppose inflated claims postulating a radical 
ideological break with the past.
Ideology: continuity or change?
The ideological impact of globalization has not been discussed as extensively as its other 
implications, but the Ihnited debate which has taken place occurred amid the widespread 
zeal for conceptual innovation that has permeated large sectors of social sciences. 
Consequently, the dominant view has been that globalization is a fundamentally 
destabilizing factor in relation to the patterns of ideology. This opinion was expressed 
for example by two well-known theorists, David Held and Anthony McGrew, when they 
complemented their obseiwation that ‘the very idea of globalization appears to disrupt 
established paradigms and political orthodoxies’ with the claim that ‘the dominant 
ideological traditions of conseivatism, liberalism or socialism [do not] offer coherent 
readings of, or responses to, a globalizing era’ (Held and McGrew 2000, p. 2). Roger 
Burbach similarly linked his assessment that ‘modem political systems fail us in every 
major region of the world’ to the end of ideology as we know it (Buibach 2001, p. 71). 
Similar arguments are discussed tliroughout this thesis in greater detail but for the
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present it is worth noting the parallels between these claims and the contentions that 
have often been made in relation to globalization’s impact on other areas of social life 
and thought.
Binary conceptualizing is one element that has been as common in assessments of the 
implications of globalization for ideology as it has been in evaluations of globalization’s 
effects on economics, governance or identity. Thus, whereas the supposedly global 
markets of today have been opposed to the previous, nationally-managed, economies 
and the allegedly globalized politics of today has been contrasted with the former era of 
statism, so, likewise, ideology has been conceived as now drawing on a completely 
novel context of global ideas in contradistinction to the nationalist concepts of the past. 
The national orientation of ideology -  it has been maintained -  is now destabilized by 
the ‘global imaginary’ which, in a colourful description, ‘erupts with increasing 
frequency within and onto the familiar framework of the national, spewing its fiery lava 
across all geographical scales’ (Steger 2008, p. viii). Consequently, and in parallel to 
previously discussed claims that international politics can no longer be conceived in 
terms of interstate relations, or that national management of the operations of capitalism 
is no longer feasible, it likewise no longer makes sense to speak of ‘liberalism’ or 
‘socialism’ as meaningful belief systems. In place of those archaic categories a novel 
vocabulary is needed in order to ‘translate the dawning global imaginary’ (Steger 2008, 
p. 12) and capture the ideological debates of the new era.
1 0
Introduction
In the present study I take issue with the strong claim of globalization-induced 
ideological mpture and consequent irrelevance of the ideological currents with which 
modem societies have been conversant for decades if not centuries. Just as the assertion 
of an ideological break repeats the logic peimeating other areas of the all-change thesis, 
so the opposite case that I make here may be elaborated in a way reminiscent of the 
stmcture of the sceptical argument. My defence of the significance of conventional 
ideological clusters in the following chapters is thus twofold. On the one hand, I 
demonstrate the enduring presence in today’s political discourse of ideological 
interpretations that have long been seen as defining the major ideological currents. On 
the other hand, I show that allegedly new globalist commitments had their precedents in 
past expressions of some major ideologies while the rejection of global universalism has 
had an equally long history in other ideological currents. It is not the case that in the past 
all ideologies were uniformly imbued with the “imaginary” of the national and it 
likewise does not make sense to view them as equally conditioned by the processes that 
are nowadays associated with globalization. The long genealogy of ideological 
interpretations now linked to globalization would also suggest that even if the process of 
globalization, or its current scale or pace, is unprecedented, globalization as an idea or 
project has been around for a long time, albeit under different names, such as ‘world 
society’, ‘humanity’ or ‘humankind’ (Kilminster 1997, p. 262).
It should be emphasized, however, that in spite of those stylistic parallels between my 
argument and the sceptical position, the case I make for the continuing relevance of
11
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traditional political ideologies does not automatically imply a sceptical viewpoint on the 
reality or import of globalization. My line of reasoning is different. Instead of rendering 
a hypothetical epochal transformation (or a hypothetical lack of such transformation) to 
be the starting point of my analysis, I examine a selection of representative types of 
interpretations of globalization which are articulated in a diverse range of ideological 
forms, from the most momentous instances of political theory to the most ephemeral 
piece of online journalism. What I see as my objective here is to identify how major 
conventional ideologies have reacted to tlie rise of the new concept and to explain why 
some of them have found it easier than others to absorb it and so to position themselves 
on the new conceptual framework.
It is already clear, on the basis of what I have said so far, that this study adopts an 
‘inclusive’ approach to ideology where, in keeping with Martin Seliger’s classic 
formulation, ideology is defined as ‘set of ideas by which men [sic] posit, explain and 
justify ends and means of organized social action, and specifically political action, 
inespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given 
social order’ (Seliger 1976, p. 14). As I explain in Chapter I, the inclusive understanding 
of ideology dissolves the link between ideology and domination or/and distortion that is 
of key importance in restrictive, critical conceptions articulated especially from a 
Marxist perspective. The inclusive model is neutral as between ideologies (such as 
liberalism, socialism or fascism) as specific exemplifications of the generic term, and it 
does not ‘privilege’ any system of beliefs as being of a different, non-ideological, land.
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The neutral position thus assumes, in the words of one critic, that ‘politics and ideology 
are inseparable. All political action is ultimately oriented towards the preservation, 
reform, destruction or reconstruction of a given order, and hence all political action is 
necessarily guided by an ideological system of beliefs’ (Thompson 1984, p. 79). In 
accordance with the neutral approach, my discussion is focused on a broad range of 
belief systems, all of which are classified as ideologies, even though they position 
themselves in radically different ways vis-à-vis the present political and economic order.
Employing the terminology of Michael Freeden (1996), the method of inquiry which is 
used in this thesis can also be described as ‘morphological’ in that it takes ideologies to 
be constituted by sets of mutually defining concepts. In other words, to anticipate the 
clarification which I provide in Chapter I, this way of thinking posits that combinations 
of concepts form morphologies, or organic conceptual structures, where the 
interpretation of any concept determines the intei-pretations of other concepts, and where 
therefore no concept takes on its full meaning in isolation. Consequently, to take hold of 
the possible connotations of globalization and their impact on ideological systems, the 
concept needs to be studied in relation to broader ideational contexts where it is 
anchored in distinct sets of normative beliefs, concerns and priorities, whether clearly 
formulated or merely implicit. But, while the analytical starting point in each of the 
ideological cases discussed is therefore a particular ideology-laden reading of 
globalization, the objective, as I have already indicated, is not primarily a comparative 
exploration of the meanings of globalization within different idea environments but an
13
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assessment of the contemporary relevance of long-established ideological categories. 
Subsequent chapters thus discuss a selection of instances of major ideological families -  
liberalism, socialism, national populism, fascism, anarchism and ecologism -  in each 
case evaluating the ability of these time-honoured belief systems to integrate the concept 
of globalization into their overall morphologies while maintaining recognizable 
ideological profiles.
The liberal family is represented here by the current that is commonly held to be the 
hegemonic interpretation of globalization. In Chapter II I demonstrate that this 
ideological cluster -  usually described as ‘neoliberalism’ -  has a long history: its core 
ideas feature in major examples of nineteenth century classical liberalism and 
continuities are evident not just in specific socio-economic proposals but also in the 
general view of human nature informing those more detailed concepts. By postulating 
that classical liberalism is the category which describes in the most accurate way the 
mainstream political interpretation of globalization, my analysis clashes with the notion 
that new-fangled ideological labels are needed to capture the logic of today’s dominant 
political discourse. In the course of my discussion of classical liberalism I elaborate the 
case against one attempt at conceptual innovation, namely, Manfred Steger’s proposal of 
reconfiguration of political positions centred on the category of ‘globalism’. According 
to the morphological perspective, which is adopted here, to speak of a specific ideology 
-  such as liberalism or socialism -  as a separate belief system, a particular constellation 
of concepts must be identified as distinct fi*om other constellations, as relatively
14
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comprehensive, that is to say, making some sense of all key political concepts, and as 
displaying some degree of staying power and pervasiveness in time and space (Freeden 
1998, pp. 749-750). I demonstrate in that chapter that ‘globalism’ fails as a candidate 
ideology when tested against these three criteria and therefore does not qualify as a 
political ideology in its own right. Instead, I argue, ‘globalism’ classes as a set of 
interpretations located within the wider conceptual structure of classical liberalism and is 
imbued with meaning by its ideological host.
Liberal globalism has been challenged by other models of globalization. Socialism is 
often taken to be a coherent, alternative but equally globalist, vision. This is a 
problematic assumption. Socialism is, generally spealdng, a universalist ideology, but 
the extent of its globalist commitments will differ between (as well as within) particular 
socialist currents. Chapter III reduces the diversity of socialist positions to three ideal 
types of Marxism, democratic socialism, and social democracy and demonstrates that 
their understandings of globalization are divergent. This should not be surprising, I 
maintain, for these currents have broader concerns, the articulation of which will in each 
case depend on socio-political circumstances. Globalization is merely one concept which 
they need to take into account in their reading of political realities, and one that is 
inevitably affected by specific inteipretations of other concepts. For this reason, 
globalization on its own is not reliable as a core on which an ideology might depend. 
This is further evidence that ‘globalism’ is unlikely to make sense as a separate 
ideological category.
15
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Liberalism and socialism both have their origins in the modernizing dynamic of the 
Enlightenment and its turn against the feudal period with its rigid and hierarchical 
structures. This genealogy determines the broadly globalist course taken by the two 
belief systems, even though the respective variants of globalization that they endorse are 
radically different. The globalist projects of liberalism and socialism have not remained 
unchallenged, however. The antiuniversalist and anti-Enlightenment position is 
exemplified in Chapter IV by national populism and fascism as ideologies that deny 
meaning to concepts such as humankind and consequently oppose economic, social and 
political projects concerned with global objectives. Yet, while these positions are 
radically antiglobalist, an interesting development has recently taken place within fascist 
ideology, at least in its European variants. The conceptual jframework of fascism -  an 
ideology which has usually been associated with ultranationalism ~ has ‘moved 
upwards’ to the continental level so that European fascism now defines itself as a 
defender of European identity. This case might be used to vindicate the claim that the 
national is no longer privileged as a reference point in constmcting ideas and identities. 
However, at the same time, the fascist example shows that the modifications that 
ideologies are now undergoing are not necessarily disruptive to their more central 
features. ‘International fascism’ operates on a new scale but remains as exclusionary as 
fascism has always been. In other words, while its ideological patterns have been 
‘stretched’ in reaction to the perceived irrelevance of the national scale, fascism’s 
distinct ideological identity has not been undermined in the process.
16
Introduction 17
The hegemonic liberal concept of globalization is thus challenged by the alternative 
global vision of socialism as well as by ideologies arising from an opposite movement 
towards exclusion based on particularities of culture or race. The dominant model is also 
opposed from a third direction, which is localist and in important respects situated 
beyond the concerns typical of conventional partisan politics. Anarchism and ecologism 
both reject the versions of modernity, and now of globalization, promoted by liberals 
and socialists. Their vision is one of small-scale, autonomous communities as the 
remedy to mechanization, alienation and social and environmental degradation brought 
about by structures and institutions operating on large scales. Anarchism and ecologism 
are often seen as ideological partners in the vanguard of the anti-globalization 
movement. However, while the similarities between them are significant, I am sceptical 
about the possibility of anarehism’s and ecologism's long-term ideological convergence 
on the question of globalization. As I demonstrate in Chapter V, the concept of 
globalization is understood within its host ideologies in ways which depend on their core 
concepts and long-term priorities. In the case of ecologism, the core idea of ecocentrism, 
namely, a postulate that the interests of the whole of nature should be placed above those 
of humanity, contributes to the strength of the ecologist version of localism. On the other 
hand, the anarchist insistence on individual freedom acts as a conceptual constraint in 
this respect. The resulting models of loealization may overlap in certain respects but 
they will also inevitably collide, not just on the question of a required degree of 
localization, but also with regard to the values that are to guide localized communities. 
Thus, analogously to ‘globalism’, which in isolation from additional qualifiers is a
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relatively ‘empty’ term, ‘localism’ also fails to make sense when detached from values 
and ideas to steer enactment.
The thesis thus foeuses on a wide range of established ideologies. The case studies 
include both pro- and antiglobalist positions as well as currents scattered all along the 
conventional ideological spectrum. Nevertheless, in the interest of coherence judicious 
decisions had to be made and some interesting cases have been left out. The most 
substantial omission refers to conservatism which is not discussed in its own right. The 
explanation of this exclusion lies in the fact that traditional conservative ideology has 
not generated the volume of interpretations of globalization that would be comparable to 
the relevant outputs by the cuiTents discussed in this thesis. Therefore, were it to be 
included, the discussion of conservatism would have been disproportionate in relation to 
other chapters. Conservative threads are nevertheless identified within the dominant 
form of classical liberalism with which outgrowths of conservatism have combined to 
produce a contentious ideological field sometimes called neo-conservatism. On the other 
hand, the traditional conservative critique of the Enlightenment has common 
characteristics with national populist and fascist positions discussed in Chapter IV and 
the historical sketch offered in the opening sections of that chapter covers consei*vative 
nationalist ideas. The analysis of ecologism in Chapter V also points out the 
conseiwative aspects of this ideology and examines their implications for the type of 
localism that ecologists advocate. In other words, while conservatism as such is not 
analyzed in a separate chapter, a distinctly right-wing version of antiglobalism, to which
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conservatism contributes its acclamation of particularistic organic attachments, is not left 
out.
The second exclusion concerns my discussion of social democracy. This discussion is 
limited to traditional variants of social democratic ideology whieh accentuate the 
continuing primacy of the state as a locus of political action and identity and so overlap 
with the positions that I have defined above as ‘sceptical’. I do not engage at length with 
the current of ideas often labelled as global social democracy, a novel ideological 
adjustment within social democratic ideology which expands the notion of a social 
democratic ideal by proposing its extension on a global scale. This global rearticulation 
of policies that were foimerly applied to just the national dimension is undoubtedly an 
important development, but similar shifts are discussed in this thesis in relation to other 
ideological constellations, for example fascism or anarchism. Elaborating on the 
advance from national to global social democracy would have made my tripartite 
comparative analysis of socialist currents excessively complex, while contributing little 
new substance, other than reinforcing the point made in other chapters.
Ultimately, a justification for these and other exclusions^ lies in the already emphasized 
purpose of this study, which has not been designed as an inventory of ideological
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 ^ Cases could also be made for the inclusion of ideologies which are partial or issue- 
focused, such as feminism. However, the thesis is focused predominantly on the 
question of relevance of the major comprehensive ideologies, since most of the claims 
which suggest ideological rupture are made in relation to these established currents.
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decontestations of globalization but as a voice in the discussion of the nature of ideology 
and its condition at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The ideologies included in 
this thesis as case studies are examined in order to test my key hypothesis, that is to say, 
the continuing presence of major ideological families in political conflicts and debates of 
today, including those ranging over the meaning, the implications, and the future of 
globalization. Developments in the sphere of ideology will verify or refute my claim that 
the conventional ideological morphologies remain functional as broad and flexible 
templates that help draw the battle lines in contests over the concept of globalization. 
But even if aspects of my assessment are disproved in the course of time, I hope that this 
study will still have made a contribution to the contemporary debate on the state of 
ideology at the alleged dawn of a new era.
CHAPTER 1 
GLOBALIZATION AND IDEOLOGY: EFISTEMOLOGY, 
METHOD, AND A PRELIMINARY MAPPING OF THE DEBATE
The purpose of the present chapter is to explain the epistemological premises of this 
thesis and its methodology in relation to relevant theoretical debates. In the first part of 
the chapter I explain my approach to political concepts and my understanding of 
political ideology. The question of sources used in the thesis is also addressed alongside 
the criteria and tools employed for the purpose of classifying the research material. In 
the second part I provide a preliminary mapping of literature concerned with ideological 
implications of globalization.
PART 1. POLITICAL CONCEPTS AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES
In the course of this thesis I examine globalization as a political concept acquiring 
distinctive meanings within political ideologies and I evaluate its impact on those 
j|| systems of beliefs. It is therefore necessary to explain how the broad theoretical
approach adopted in this thesis affects how political concepts and political ideologies are 
understood and analyzed. Broadly speaking, there are two rival epistemological 
perspectives as far as political concepts, such as liberty, equality, justice or 
globalization, are concerned. The position of essentialism aspires to define any political
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concept in a way that is valid for all instances of the concept in question. On the other 
hand, the approach of lelationism is that political concepts do not have definite 
meanings, but that they acquire them eontingently on the linguistic, conceptual, 
axiological and social contexts in which they are employed. I am now going to discuss 
the implications of the two perspectives in order to point out the advantages of 
relationism as a broad epistemological framework adopted in the present inquiry.
Approaches to political concepts (1); essentialism
Essentialism goes back to the philosophy of Plato. The Platonic ontology assumed the 
existence of two realms: the temporal world hosting mutable and temporary objects as 
well as imperfect conceptions and the eternal world of permanent ideal forms of things 
and concepts. The relationship between the two realms was understood by Platonism as 
one between a perfeet model and an inadequate copy. Reconstruction of pure forms (or 
concepts) from imperfect conceptions was however deemed to be possible. It was 
attainable through establishing what the imperfect conceptions shared, that is to say, 
tlirough discovering the essences that reflected the originals (Gaus 2000, p. 7). The 
differences between conceptions, on the other hand, were to be discarded as distortions 
of the ideal forms. This essentialist method is well exemplified in a Platonic dialogue on 
justice recalled by Gerald Gaus. The dialogue is between Socrates and three other 
Athenians, each of whom comes from a different social milieu and therefore has 
different, socially conditioned, opinions about justice. Socrates refutes one by one his 
interlocutors’ views of justice by pointing out logical problems that are evident just
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under the surface of their arguments. While Socrates demonstrates the flaws of those 
conceptions, he also uses them to reconstruct what he considers to be a definitive model 
of justice, that is to say, one that transcends class-based or interest-driven views and 
hence identifies the essence present in all possible examples and interpretations of 
justice (Gaus 2000, pp. 7-8).
Contemporary essentialism likewise sees the role of scholarly investigation in terms of 
‘tidying up’ confused interpretations that surround political concepts and providing clear 
understandings for effective scientific communication. Essentialist approaches are 
manifest for example in John Rawls’s argument supporting one conception of justice as 
ultimately rational, Felix Oppenheim’s endeavour to identify the parameters of social 
freedom, Norberto Bobbio’s distinction between the concepts of the left and the right or 
Ruth Zimmerling’s undertaking to provide conceptual clarity with regard to power 
(Rawls 1971; Oppenheim 1995; Bobbio 1997; Zimmerling 2005). These theorists 
maintain that it is possible, and also highly desirable, to arrive at a consensus on 
theoretically constructive, if perhaps never ultimately conclusive, definitions of any 
political concept: ‘problems arising from a lack of conceptual precision can [...] be 
solved through proper analysis in every particular case’ (Zimmerling 2005, p. 20). Lack 
of clarity is on the other hand perceived as a problem, as is evident for example in 
Zimmerling’s discontent with the absence of consensus on the meaning of the concept of 
globalization as having ‘necessarily detrimental consequences for the possibility to 
compare and assess empirical statements about the actual state of globalization, not to
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speak of the formulation of well-founded conclusions about causes and effects’ 
(Zimmerling 2003, p. 63).
Generally speaking, the essentialist method applied to an examination of the concept of 
globalization would proceed from a scrupulous investigation of the existing notions of 
globalization to the construction of the definition against which propositions concerning 
causality and effects would be evaluated. As such, I do not see the essentialist 
framework as helpful in achieving my objectives in this thesis. I do not think that the 
concept of globalization is most usefully approached in abstracto, as a paradigmatic 
model alienated from its role in political discourse. Such a representation of 
globalization would be bound to be too arid and too general to provide an in-depth 
understanding of the reasons for the heated debate that the concept of globalization 
provokes and for the concept’s importance at the intersection of political thought and 
political action. My discussion is focused on globalization as an ideological controversy 
and not globalization as an empirical phenomenon in need of a clear definition. I 
therefore side with the currently prevalent relationist way of thinking about political 
concepts which maintains that the way to an optimal understanding of those concepts 
does not lead through defining their essences but through analysing them in their social 
and ideational contexts as well as in the mutual relationships that they form.
24
Globalization and ideology 
Approaches to political concepts (2): relationism
The term relationism is generally associated with Karl Mannheim’s sociology of 
knowledge. Mannheim, whose theory provided a spur to the development of a neutral 
understanding of ideology, asserted that ‘there are spheres of thought in which it is 
impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing independently of the values and 
position of the subject and unrelated to the social context’ (Mannheim 1985 [1936], p. 
79). While thus rejecting essentialist epistemology, Mannheim did not preach relativism; 
on the contraiy, he hoped that his relationist approach was a means of emancipation 
from the self-defeating scepticism of relativism as well as from the ‘older static ideal of 
eternal, unperspectivistic truth’ (Mannheim 1985 [1936], p. 300). By postulating that 
‘truths’ — including those that pertain to political concepts — must be examined in 
connection with the frames of reference in which they are set, Mannheim implied that it 
is possible to scmtinize them, if only within their inevitably particular contexts 
constituted, on the one hand, by the values and positions of the subjects formulating the 
‘truths’ and, on the other hand, by the social situations in which those ‘truths’ are 
produced.
The relationist methodology has been elucidated further, albeit not necessarily under this 
very name, in several theoretical contributions pertaining specifically to the question of 
political concepts and cumulatively expanding the parameters of what is understood as 
the context that imbues those concepts with meaning. Tlie question of the impact of an 
individual’s values on his or her readings of political concepts has been taken up by the
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notion of essential contestability. The thesis was coined by W.B. Gallie in 1956 and 
since then has been widely refened to in political theory (see for example Connolly 
1983; Gray 1977; Lukes 1974; MacIntyre 1973). Gallie maintained that political 
concepts have ‘no clearly definable general use which can be set up as a correct or 
standard use’ (Gallie 1955-1956, p. 168) but are essentially contestable due to their 
normative character. As John Gray, representing at one time a version of the essential 
contestability thesis, explains: ‘the major part of what makes a concept essentially 
contestable is that criteria for its correct application embody normative standards, and 
that disputes about the propriety of these standards cannot be settled by rational 
argument alone’ (Gray 1977, p. 339). The origin of essential contestability is thus 
located at the interface between concepts and their producers-cum-consumers. In other 
words, politieal coneepts ‘involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of 
their users’ (Gallie 1955-1956, p. 123) because the users are inevitably committed to 
different normative positions.
While duly concerned with the impaet of individuals’ axiological views on their 
readings of political concepts, Gallie does not accentuate the contestation resulting from 
interaction between the concepts themselves. This question is addressed by a later 
exponent of essential contestability, William Connolly, who introduces a more dynamic 
perspective into this debate by insisting that political concepts are ‘cluster concepts’ 
with ‘open connections to other political concepts’ (Connolly 1983, p. 14). Connolly 
maintains that ‘to define a concept is necessarily to connect it with several others that
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need clarification if the first is to be clear, and those others in turn are connected to a still 
wider network of concepts deseiwing equally close attention’ (Connolly 1983, p. 1).
This assumption also guides the adherents of the paradigm of ideological morphology 
who focus on the relationships between political concepts within political ideologies as 
their most typical host structures. Michael Freeden, the leading articulator of this 
position, examines ideology as first and foremost a creation eonsisting of political 
concepts that ‘acquire meaning [...] by means of their particular stiiictural position 
within a configuration of other political concepts’ (Freeden 1996, p. 4). Thus 
understood, ideology may be analytically disaggregated into core concepts, namely 
‘ineliminable key concepts that it is deemed to have in actual political usage’, adjacent 
coneepts, which ‘flesh out the core [...] restrict its capacity for multiple interpretations 
and pull it in a more defined direction’, and ‘more specific and detailed’ peripheral 
concepts (Freeden 2003a, p. 61).
While this is a structuralist perspective, it is also a dynamic one: it does not present 
ideology as an inert aggregate of interdependent concepts but as a fluctuating system 
where ‘each component internets with all the others and is ehanged when any one of the 
other components alters’ (Freeden 1996, p. 67), and where patterns of inter-conceptual 
relations do not necessarily follow a predictable or consistent logic (Freeden 2003b, pp. 
4-5). Moreover, while accentuating the moiphological dimension, Freeden recognizes 
that the conceptual arrangements within political ideologies are not just patterned by the
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internal logic of the given ideological system but are also synchronically and 
diachronically contingent on the social milieus in which these systems are operational.'* 
Accordingly, whereas political concepts cannot be defined conelusively, the range of 
meanings that can legitimately be linked to any of them is limited (Freeden 1996, pp. 
66-67). Concepts form configurations with other concepts within political ideologies, 
but they also need to make sense for their target audiences. It follows that the variety of 
senses that may be meaningfully conveyed by political concepts or ideologies is 
constrained by social conventions. Those conventions are themselves deteimined by 
historical circumstances and so by linking political concepts to their socio-cultural 
environments, Freeden situates them in a diachronic, historical perspective.
Taken as a whole, relationism is a useful framework for studying political concepts. 
Reference to morphological, cultural and historical dimensions enables examination of 
concepts within their empirical contexts while at the same time avoiding the claim that 
the concepts themselves are empirically given. While the quest for their essences is thus
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The interaction between social contexts and linguistic meanings was earlier explored 
within the tradition of analytical philosophy (Austin 1962). Inspired by the ideas of the 
late Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1963) analytical philosophy considers language 
to be socially embedded. Accordingly, words obtain distinct meanings not merely in 
relation to the networks of relationships that they form with other words within language 
as has been accepted since the establishment of structuralist linguistics by Ferdinand de 
Saussure (de Saussure 1986) but also with reference to everyday contexts in which they 
are employed. Words make sense as long as they are used a propos, that is to say, on 
appropriate occasions and according to public, socially constructed, conventions. Just as 
‘moving a bishop’ has a particular meaning in the context of rules of chess, a meaning 
that would not be relevantly encoded by someone not familiar with the game, so all 
linguistic utterances acquire sense within what Wittgenstein called ‘language games’, 
namely, the situations in which they are produced and consumed.
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relinquished, the study of concepts within both iiitra-ideological, i.e., morphological, as 
well as socio-historical, contexts provides vital insights into the patterns of political 
thinking at different levels of articulation.
The epistemological model that I adopt in this thesis relies on the cumulative 
contributions of relationist thinlcers from Mannheim to Freeden. The relationist approach 
is applied to the study of the concept of globalization in the diversity of forms it assumes 
within different ideological environments as well as to the analysis of the impact of this 
concept on identifiable ideological clusters. My aim in the following chapters is to 
capture a number of broad types of reasoning involved in several distinct ideological 
interpretations of the question of globalization. I will thus be refening to sets of related 
ideas, values, beliefs and attitudes but I am not going to attempt a systematic or precise 
ordering of all the concepts involved. Accordingly, my analysis will not proceed in the 
manner adopted by Freeden in his own work, namely, from core to adjacent to 
peripheral concepts. Instead, I will analyze decontestations of the concept of 
globalization in connection with only the most relevant core concepts of the discussed 
ideologies and my argument in each of the discussed cases will be focused on the most 
representative ways of reasoning about globalization.
Elements of diachronic analysis will also be included in the study. Unlike age-old 
concepts such as liberty, equality or justice, globalization is a recent invention that has 
not accumulated diverse usages across time. It would have seemed therefore that there is
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neither need nor possibility to complement the morphological analysis of the concept of 
globalization with a broader historical dimension. However, as I explained in the 
Introduction, while globalization is a new idea, it is related to longer-established 
political concepts which have been equally potent in inciting ideologies to formulate 
relevant nonnative judgements as well as policy solutions. Modernity is one example of 
a concept antecedent to globalization and there is marked continuity between reactions 
to modernity formulated by political ideologies a century ago and policies advocated by 
the same ideologies in the face of globalization today. The diachronic aspect of my study 
will consist in uncovering such continuities.
The morphological approach is particularly useful when analyzing theoretical 
arguments. In this form of ideological discourse eoncepts are defined more or less 
clearly and are employed deliberately to defend a set of relatively precise claims. The 
structure of theoretical argument can be analyzed in a systematic way as connections 
between concepts are relatively explicit. But theoretical argument is not the only form of 
ideological communication. Any political controversy, and especially one as important 
as globalization, becomes a subject of narratives that tell stories about events and 
processes, as well as individuals or groups participating in them, in ways that carry 
imprints of particular values and beliefs. As Christopher Flood points out, some of these 
narratives are perceived as valid in the eyes of their receivers and may consequently 
acquire the status of political myths (Flood 2001, 2002). Globalization has been the 
foeus of many eompeting ‘mythopoeic’ and ‘ideologically marked’ narratives (Flood
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1996, p. 43) and these will also be discussed when they provide useful illustrations of 
the logic of a given ideological position.
Delineating the ideological decontestations of globalization
As already stated, the hypothesis that I intend to substantiate in the present study posits 
that in exploring the ideology-laden readings of the concept of globalization it is 
illuminating to use existing ideological structures as operative categories. In other 
words, the assumption that I explore in this thesis is that conventionally delineated 
ideological families are still helpful, if inevitably approximate, indicators of distinct sets 
of political worldviews that are likely to be reflected in specific instances of positions 
that individuals or groups take on the question of globalization.
Consequently, in the successive chapters of this thesis I operate with the established 
categories of classical liberalism, socialism, national populism and fascism, and 
ecologism and anarchism, and in each case evaluate the degree of relevance and 
coherence of those currents in relation to the problems posed by the new and pei*vasive 
concept. The problem with which I am consequently confi onted is one of how to draw 
the lines between those ideological families, what criteria to use to separate out a set of 
discourses under one of those key labels, and how to use such broad and generalized 
categories as tools in researching the politics of the idea of globalization — an immensely 
diverse ideational territory that has proved capable of hosting exotic alliances which 
have temporarily masked ideological contradictions.
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Ideological typologies are normally mapped on the basis of three eriteria that are 
employed in this thesis in different proportions. The first two measures are self- 
definition and other-definition. Accordingly, a preliminary way to define the ideological 
gestalt of a given reading of globalization is to identify the self-understanding of the 
group or the individual that has produced that interpretation as well as establish whether 
it is recognized by others as in fact representing that ideological tradition (Manning 
1976, pp. 139-140). This method is helpful in attempts to draw the approximate 
boundaries of a given ideology: ideologieal peripheries, or outer limits, are marked out 
by those interpretations that are regularly claimed by more than one ideological tradition 
(Flood 2001, p. 23).
The two criteria of self-definition and other-definition must always be considered but 
they also need to be treated with caution. They are susceptible to the limitations of 
human judgment as well as to political fashions producing ideological neologisms and 
recurrently pronounced ‘ends of ideology’. The latter trends cannot be ignored 
altogether as they themselves make up an ideological signum temporis by manifesting, at 
a given point in time, the common perceptions of a relative weight and relevance of 
particular ideologies. However, neither should ideological fashions be seen as 
automatically conclusive for they may have a propensity to cause excessive proliferation 
of overly narrow or extremely broad, overlapping, and usually ephemeral categories. 
The category of ‘globalism’, whose various incarnations will be discussed in this tliesis, 
provides an evocative illustration of how these problems may limit the viability of a new
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vocabulary. In addition to the criteria of self- and other-definition any ideological 
classification would therefore also need to pass a morphological test. However, due to 
the highly malleable nature of ideological moiphology, the conceptual anangement of 
any ideology cannot be specified in a precise way.  ^An analyst is thus forced to dispense 
with hope for a clear-cut template applicable to a variety of ideological inteipretations 
and capable of compartmentalizing them into instantly recognizable categories. The 
process of classification is instead one of estimation and approximation and uses an 
apparatus of soft methodology. It has become commonplace in the morphological 
approach to rely on two methodological tools to vindicate categories as broad as the 
main ideologies. One instrument is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family 
resemblances’, the other — Max Weber’s ‘ideal type’.
The idea of ‘family resemblances’ helps to group infinitely diverse interpretations of 
political concepts into broad classes. Family resemblances occur when different readings 
of a concept have sufficient overlaps to be recognizable as a constellation. 
Consequently, ‘the interest in conceptual investigations is not to see what all members of 
[a] constellation share, but to chart out the relationships among them and to see precisely 
how the constellation hangs together’ (Gaus 2000, p. 19). Family resemblances prove to 
be a useful tool in the classification of responses to globalization given by traditional 
ideologies. Ideologies are not monolithie doctrines but umbrella terms for potentially
33
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pp. 6, 87, 88 and Freeden 2005, pp. 132, 133, 142.
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unlimited numbers of variants and inteipretations. Family resemblances ‘allow both for 
the shading off of one family into another and for a loose range of occupants of each 
family’ (Freeden 2003b, p. 3). The Mai-xist conception of globalization, to take one 
example, is itself a generalization from manifold Marxian, classical Marxist, and neo- 
Marxist notions. The generalization is, however, legitimate for the Marxist concepts of 
globalization display noticeable family resemblances that make them distinct from rival 
conceptions, even though the difference may be one of degree rather than of kind.
The notion of an ideal type is another practical means of imposing some nominal limits 
on a fluid territory that defies crude classifications. Ideal types were introduced to social 
sciences by Max Weber. Weber accepted that scholarly analysis is unable to reflect the 
infinite variety of social phenomena and has to limit itself to a provision of general, 
abstract, and approximate models. Weber’s ideal type neither eonfonns to its referent in 
great detail nor stands for an average exemplar. Rather, an ideal type is constmcted on 
the basis of the most typical features, none of which has to be present in all instances of 
a referent to which an ideal type refers. In the words of Lewis Coser:
An ideal type is an analytical construct that serves the investigator as a 
measuring rod to ascertain similarities as well as deviations in concrete 
cases. [...] An ideal type never corresponds to concrete reality but 
always moves at least one step away from it. [...] It is constructed out 
of certain elements of reality and forms a logically precise and 
coherent whole, which can never be found as such in that reality. 
(Coser 1977, pp. 223-224)
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This thesis turns to ideal types and family resemblances whenever it needs to categorize 
and make comparisons. It tries to avoid offering ideational constructions that are 
oversimplified, while at the same time it is wary of converse problems caused by a 
rampant multiplication of categories which leads to detail-overload and thus prevents 
any meaningful comparison or distinction. Ideal types and family resemblances are 
helpful in this respect in that while they imply that it is not practical to search for 
essences of ideological categories, they at the same time make it possible to weight the 
relative proportions of distinct ideological influences in any argument or narrative about 
globalization, and so they pave the way to legitimate conclusions.
Sources
The theoretical model that I employ can be described as inclusive, morphological and, 
for lack of a better word, ecumenical in its approach to the forms of ideological 
communication. The threefold characteristics of the model determine the selection of 
sources that substantiate my key claims with regard to the case studies of major political 
ideologies.
An inclusive understanding of ideology is usually set against restrictive conceptions, 
notably Marxian and Marxist, but also conservative.^ An inclusive, neutral definition of
 ^An informative account of Marx’s theory of ideology is available in a book by John 
Thompson (Thompson 1990, pp. 33-44). This book also offers a contemporary critical 
conceptualization of ideology from a post-Mai%ist perspective. It can be complemented 
by an earlier contribution by the same author (Thompson 1984). An example of a
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ideology by Seliger has already been cited in the introduction to tliis study. There are 
plenty of definitions by other theorists that follow broadly the same logic (for example 
Cliristenson 1972, p. 1; Goodwin 2007, pp. 28-29; Heywood 2007, pp. 11-12; Vincent 
1995, p. 16). An inclusive approaeh, in a minimal formulation, applies the term ideology 
to any system of political beliefs that is comprehensive and coherent enough to give an 
adequately full account of a given political reality, either existing or anticipated, and to 
offer a strategy to preserve or attain its preferred political anangements. Any such 
system will be considered an ideology regardless of whether it is perceived as being 
right or wrong, fair or unjust, realistic or incongruent with reality. What this means for 
the present study is that any ideological system is equally worth the analysis. Tliis thesis 
thus considers at least one representative of five major ideological families, each of them 
offering a vast supply of textual sources that have some bearing on the question of 
globalization.
In its turn, a morphological perspective on ideology assumes that all fonns of political 
discourse, from the most sophisticated to the most primitive can be analysed as 
ideology-laden. This morphological stance contradicts the essentialist distinction 
between political philosophy and ideology whereby philosophy is characterized as
conservative account is available in an article by Kenneth Minogue (Minogue 1993). A 
synthetic discussion of ‘inclusive’ and ‘restiictive’ definitions is provided by Mathew 
Humphrey (Humphrey 2005).
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‘wholly synchronic, reflective, self-critieaP while ideology is identified with the sphere 
of superstition and myth (understood as distortion) and dismissed as ‘crude, unrefiective, 
and irrational’ (Vincent 2004, p. 72). From the morphological point of view, political 
philosophy, like ideology, is built of inter-reliant political concepts and is dependent on 
cultural and historical contexts (Freeden 1996, pp. 41 and 44; Freeden 2005, pp. 12 and 
19; Freeden 2006, p. 15). Political philosophy therefore cannot claim to be value-free: 
while they may deny an ideological bias, political philosophers are affected both by 
particular ideologies as well as by the ‘total ideology’, i.e., the dominant vision of the 
world, what Mannheim called Weltanschauung (Mannheim 1952). In other words, ‘even 
when engaged in professional political thinking political philosophers also contribute to 
the construction of ideologies’ (Freeden 1996, p. 45) and so both types of sourees -  
‘philosophical’ and ‘ideological’ -  may be subjected to the same type of examination.  ^
The implication of this assumption for the present thesis is that a distinction between 
primary and secondary sources of information is futile as well as unjustified (Freeden 
2005, p. 12). Accordingly, the contributions examined in the following chapters include, 
next to one another, articulations in the form of sophisticated theoretical analyses as well
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 ^ The uttermost concession that can be made on this question from a morphological 
point of view is to accept that ideology may take different forms -  ‘esoteric’, where it 
‘requires study and meditation’, and ‘exoteric’, where ‘a certain measure of 
simplification, translation (faithful or otheiivise), omission, and addition is necessary’ 
(Hagopian 1978, p. 401). However, in those different appearances political 
communication remains committed to particular ways of reading political reality and to 
given sets of values and priorities and so is susceptible to ‘ideological infection’ 
(Goodwin 2007, p. 15).
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as a more diffuse partisan literature typified by bald and emotional terms of political 
activism and contained in a variety of manifestoes, pamphlets and other miscellaneous 
documents produced by political movements, thinlc-tanks, networks and fellow- 
travelling intellectuals.
Finally, the third aspect of my approach -  its ‘ecumenism’ -  implies that nairatives in 
the form of stories offering accounts of processes, events or actions may provide 
effective vehicles for the diffusion of ideological meanings and so are as worthy of the 
analytical effort as is theoretical argmnent (see Flood 1996, 2002). It follows that 
mytliopoeic narratives add a further dimension (and further volume) to the miscellany of 
sources examined in this study.
The combined inclusive, morphological and ecumenical stance suggests a potentially 
unlimited reservoir of sources when applied to the analysis of the meanings of the 
concept of globalization within major ideological families. It thus poses the question of 
manageability. Indeed, even excluding the seemingly most transient interpretations, the 
corpus of literature on globalization that has been generated from within the diversity of 
ideological positions, by ‘political philosophers’ as well as ‘ideologues’, and in the form 
of both theoretical arguments and mytliopoeic narratives, has expanded dramatically in 
the last decade or so, thus putting an even approximately comprehensive overview of 
this literature beyond the capacity of any single study if not single lifetime. In this 
situation, the fact that my linguistic competencies limit the sources discussed here to
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those available in English could be seen as a blessing in disguise but that limitation does 
not solve the problem of overabundance.^
Yet, while the immense volume of the debate exceeds what can be discussed in one 
place, it is not impossible to examine a representative sample of the most typical 
arguments and stories contributed by the contestants, either individuals or groups, 
who/which are generally recognized as prominent articulators of the major ideological 
positions. The underlying assumption that guided my attempts to render the outcomes of 
this research both representative and manageable has been that the findings about the 
ideological readings of globalization could be legithnately concluded once data 
saturation became evident, that is to say once it was possible to identify a repertoire of 
ideas and arguments reproduced time and again within each of the ideologies discussed 
in this thesis. It follows that while several interesting but peculiar readings of 
globalization in the ideological traditions under discussion might not have been 
scrutinized the most typical interpretations have been mapped.
The method of analysis and the question of objectivity
An increasingly dominant tendency in political science is to study ideology by using 
quantitative methods. While appreciating the merits of quantitative analysis -  especially 
the fact that it allows for processing of large bodies of material and thereby makes some
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* The contributions in my native language, Polish, have not been sufficiently significant 
or distinct to merit their inclusion just on the basis of their accessibility.
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types of extensive statistical and comparative analysis possible -  I posit that the present 
study requires a qualitative approach. As I explained above, this thesis aims to infer the 
meanings attached to the concept of globalization on the basis of its connections with 
other concepts within political ideologies. These connections are sometimes made in an 
explicit way, but may also be intertwined with other ideas in disparate aiguments only 
partially related to global issues. The quantitative method -  effective as it is in relation 
to the types of questions which can be answered in terms of for example word and 
collocation frequencies -  is less suitable for the purpose of uncovering such implicit, 
often hidden, conceptual associations.
What is more, this study takes account of both complex articulations of political theory 
as well as of exoteric, possibly ‘primitive’, and ephemeral political propaganda. 
Quantitative methodology is highly efficient in analyses concerned with policy-related 
aspects of political discourse that are usually stated in election manifestos and other 
programmatic documents (see for example Harrison and Bruter 2008 or Petiy and 
Pennings 2006) but its application is more problematic in studies which examine 
ideological production across a wide range of types of material and which aim to convey 
not just the logic but also the tone of ideological argument. In cases where the focus of 
the analysis is on ideological nuance as expressed in a diversity of forms quantitative 
analysis may produce an impoverished image of ideology.
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Ideological material in this thesis is thus subjected to a qualitative analysis which 
consists in close reading and conceptual examination. Attention is paid to the structure 
of argument concerned with globalization, to conceptual morphology, i.e., the 
connections that the concept of globalization forms with the core concepts of the main 
ideologies, and to historical continuity with the coneepts which in the past caused 
ideological reactions anticipating those triggered by the idea of globalization. The 
texture of the ideological communication is also noted, when appropriate.
The adoption of a qualitative method poses a question of objectivity. Qualitative 
research inevitably involves judgements by the researcher in the selection of sources and 
depends on the interpretation by the researcher subject to the eventual appraisal by 
others. If all political thought is susceptible to ideological bias then the inteipretations 
contained in this thesis cannot claim to be exceptions. Following the relationist 
perspective that I adopt, I do not claim to occupy a neutral position outside the so-called 
hermeneutical circle. But although I do not see it as my task at this point to delve into 
the question of the objectivity of cognition, I posit, following Heidegger, that ‘what is 
decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way’ (Heidegger 
1962, p. 195). The right way in this case is to abandon an intentional advocacy of a 
given position and refrain, as far as possible, from making normative judgements about 
the value or fairness of the ideological positions examined. If in the process of such 
ostensibly impartial analysis my claims happen to privilege a particular view, whether 
on isolated occasions or more consistently, this should be considered an unintentional
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deviation from the epistemological ideal and a by-product of perhaps inevitable 
ideological bias, but not a deliberate ideological involvement with a given standpoint.
PART 2. GLOBALIZATION AND IDEOLOGY: STATE OF THE ART
In the second part of this chapter I offer a brief review of the hitherto limited literature 
that has a bearing on the question of ideology and globalization, and on that background 
I formulate my preliminary claims on the subject. It should be noted that, due to the 
highly contested nature of globalization and the more or less explicitly normative goals 
of globalization studies, the boundaries between primary and secondary sources are 
blurred. Consequently, some of the contributions considered below are treated as 
primary literature in the course of later discussion.
From globalization as an idea to the ideology of globalization -  a preliminary 
mapping of the key debates
This thesis benefits from the insights of three strands of literature. The first current 
offers a broad recognition of globalization as an ideational phenomenon and has 
therefore prepared the ground for the conceptual analysis of the idea of globalization. 
While similar contributions are discussed later as primary sources (see section on social 
democracy in Chapter III), the overall logic of this scholarship is briefly summarized 
below. The second literature engages with the issue of the desirable response to 
globalization. It is concerned with globalization mainly as a process, as against
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globalization as an idea, but it pertains to the subject of ideology in that it considers the 
question of whether conventional political ideologies, or indeed any ideology, provide 
adequate means for effectively managing or confronting globalization or some aspects of 
it. This literature has a partisan edge and is usually generated from within the arena of 
political activism. It would normally be classified as comprising primary sources but 
since the conclusions of this thesis clash with the major claims featuring in that literature 
it is also discussed in the present section. Finally, the third range of interpretations 
embarks on a territory most akin to the interests of this thesis in that it addresses the 
impact of the concept of globalization on traditional ideological morphologies and either 
defends or questions the relevance of conventional ideological constellations. The most 
important of these contributions, that is to say, the one articulated by Manfred Steger, is 
scrutinized in Chapter II in relation to classical liberalism. The more general remarks 
presented here provide a preliminary justification for the employment of established 
ideological types as markers suitable for mapping the diversity of conceptions of 
globalization.
Literature M: Globalization as a process and a concept
The semantics of the concept of globalization have hitherto been far less debated than 
the causes, effects and dynamics of globalization as a purportedly factual process. 
However, while the field is thus far relatively underpopulated, the need to make a 
distinction between globalization as a structural process and globalization as a concept 
has already been put forward by several authors. Particularly important in this respect is
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Roland Robertson’s now classic intioduction to the subject (Robertson 1992). It stands 
out among major early contributions to globalization studies as one emphasizing both 
‘the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a 
whole’ (Robertson 1992, p. 8) and as thus offering a framework for understanding the 
history of globalization in its twofold trajectory: as a material development and as a 
social awareness of the existence of this process. The explicit recognition of the mental 
side of globalization has subsequently been upheld by other studies and the field 
continues to grow (see for example Agh 2000; Amoore and Dodgson 1997; Dirlik 2000; 
Fiss and Hirsch 2005; Hay and Marsh 2000; Hay 2006; Hirst and Thompson 1999; 
Kayateldn and Ruccio 1998). In the words of its adherents, this line of inquiry focuses 
on ‘discursive and ideational processes in the mediation of globalizing tendencies’ (Hay 
and Marsh 2000, p. 7), on ‘how the material process and symbolic construction of 
globalization are related’ (Fiss and Hirsch 2005, p. 32) or, to put it emphatically, on how 
‘globalisation as epistemology leads to globalisation as epoch’ (Amoore and Dodgson 
1997, p. 179).
The most influential genre in this literature is typified by its critical intent to lay bare the 
hegemonic discourse of globalization as one generating predictable negative outcomes. 
Elements of critical discourse analysis are thus frequently adopted in this current in 
order to reveal the ‘framing’, ‘sense-making’ (Fiss and Hirsch 2005) or, more 
characteristically, dissimulative functions of the concept of globalization. This literature 
has a polemical, if not outright partisan nature. Analysts associated with social
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democratic politics have been particularly prominent in this vein of theorizing about 
globalization (this literature is therefore discussed in greater detail in conneetion with 
social democratic readings of globalization). They have been anxious to challenge what 
they perceive as the paralysing impact of the discourse of globalization on policies of 
redistribution and to reaffinn the continuing capacity of the welfare state to alleviate the 
externalities of the market. In other words, the concern of this strand of thinking has 
been with ‘the ways in which the discourses of globalization [...] create or, alternatively, 
obscure the possibility of intervening to shape contemporary economic and social 
events’ (Kayatekin and Ruccio 1998, p. 76). Some of those critiques have rejected the 
reality of globalization, presenting it instead as a sort of myth (in the conventional sense 
of a false, illusionary account of reality), rhetoric, or ‘teleology that tends to produce the 
idea of the “death of politics” as well as the demise of the nation-state’ (Amoore and 
Dodgson 1997, p. 179; see also Hirst and Thompson 1999 and Wade 1996).
This literature is undoubtedly valuable but its perspective differs from one adopted here 
in two important ways. Firstly, as I already explained, the intentions of this thesis are not 
critical even if the outcomes of the analysis may potentially have some such 
implications. I analyze the conceptions of globalization which are located within the 
parameters of the ‘hegemonic’ discourses in the same way as I approach the rival 
conceptions and counterclaims made by the critics of that hegemony. Secondly, my 
discussion differs from the studies concerned with the role of a particular discourse of 
globalization in producing a certain set of tangible political outcomes in that my
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argument is not intended to be straetured upon a parallel analysis of the meaning of the 
concept and its implications for political developments. Instead, I use a predominantly 
semantic rather than functional analysis: I focus on the conceptions of globalization in 
their own right and not in order to expose their role in determining the choices made by 
political actors in the real world. Where this thesis includes elements of analysis of the 
relationship between material and ideational realms it is interested in the inverse 
direction of impact, namely, in how social contexts affect the concept, and not vice 
versa.
Literature #2: Globalization as the (New) End o f Ideology
The second range of literature does not usually doubt the reality of globalization, or at 
least of a systemic change under possibly a different name, and it aims to engage with 
the process either in order to manage or (more often) to challenge it. This literature has 
been growing largely in response to a series of protest events -  most notably in Seattle 
(1999), Prague (2000), and Genoa (2001) -  which assembled a huge diversity of gi'oups, 
from trade unions to anarchist and ecologist movements, to elements of the extreme 
right (Sakai 2003; Berlet and Lyons 2000, pp. 342-343) and stood up to institutional 
representatives of the global free-market agenda in the form of the World Trade 
Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. World Soeial 
Forums, which met annually since 2001 as gatherings of diverse non-governmental 
organizations and social movements critical of the neoliberal consensus provided
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another spur for the expansion of academic, as well as partisan, interest in alternatives to 
the globalization of free-market capitalism.
Inspired by expressions of political activism, this literature has tended to foeus on the 
forms of antineoliberal movements and on their strategies of organizing protest (see for 
example Della Porta 2007; Dissent 2005; Kingsnorth 2003; Klein 2000; Klein 2002; 
McDonald 2006; Mertes 2004; Notes from Nowhere 2003; One-Off Press 2001; Shepard 
and Hayduk 2002; Starr 2000 and 2005). However, while sociological aspects of this 
politics of resistance have been thoroughly and insightfully discussed, the ideological 
premises guiding the movements in question have been either neglected or 
conceptualized in ways that are problematic as far as the model of ideology adopted here 
is concerned. More specifically, where the question of ideology has been addressed at 
all, this has usually been on the occasion of putting its relevance into doubt, of claiming 
that ‘the movement’ has somehow beeome ‘post-ideological’.^  Benjamin Shepard and
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 ^This critical understanding of the concept of ideology displays elements of the logic of 
the recuning ‘end of ideology’ thesis. The original assertion of the death of ideology 
was put foiivard in the 1960s by Raymond Aron, Seymour Martin Upset, Daniel Bell 
and others in the context of a broad eonvergence of mainstream politics on the principles 
of the welfare state (Aron 1962; Upset 1960; Bell 1960). The end of ideology claim 
enjoyed a heyday again in the early 1990s owing especially to the impact of Francis 
Fukuyama who declared ‘an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism’ and 
thus the end of ideological debate (Fukuyama 1989, p. 1; see also Minogue 1993). 
Contrary to those two instances, the most reeent verdiet of the end of ideology that has 
been made in connection with globalization does not assume the exhaustion of ‘utopian’ 
or ‘radical’ politics. But it bears a resemblance to the previous obituaries of ideology in 
that it postulates the irrelevance of ideology in the sphere of political practice; in this 
case the practice being defined as a widespread resistance to capitalist globalization (that
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Ronald Hayduk, the editors of a collection of reports on ‘urban protest and community 
building in the era of globalization’, illustrate the dismissal of ideology when asserting 
that ‘the movement’ ‘has no ideology, just many points of view’ (Shepard and Hayduk 
2002, p. 262). Simon Tormey develops a similar opinion in his Anti-capitalism: A 
Beginner’s Guide:
[M]any groupings within the anti-capitalist movement are evidently 
either non-ideological or post-ideological. This is to say that there are 
groupings that are quite explicitly opposed to the idea that what the 
movement needs is an alternative vision of how the world should look. 
(Tormey 2004, p. 75)
Post-ideology claims have also been made in relation to speeific political positions 
engaged in the contestation of globalization. Thus, for example, Giorel Curran has 
devoted a whole book to the idea that anarchism -  one of the key influences in Seattle 
and on other ‘anti-globalization’ occasions -  has now become post-ideological (Curran 
2006). Post-ideological anarchists — we are told -  ‘reject doctrinaire positions and 
sectarian politics prefening to mix their anarchism with an eclectic assortment of other 
political ideas and traditions’ (Curran 2006, p. 2). In suggesting that post-ideological 
anarchism has been able to free itself from ‘ideological conformity’ (CuiTan 2006, p. 6), 
Curran’s argument illustrates the reasoning which is common in the literature 
preoccupied with popular challenges to neoliberal globalization. In that literature
its adversaries also categorize as ‘neoliberal’ or ‘coiporate’ to distinguish it from 
potential alternative variants).
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ideology is identified with rigidity. Adjectives such as ‘doctrinaire’, ‘sectarian’, 
‘conformist’, ‘vanguardist’, and ‘orthodox’ are used to describe politics that is 
‘ideological’. On the other hand, ‘general spirit’ and ‘inspiration’ are said to characterize 
the ‘vibrant’ ‘post-ideological’ positions that are credited with the ability to challenge 
global capitalism (Curran 2006, pp. 1-16).
What is usually posited as a unifier of different ideologies into one ‘anti-globalization’ 
front is not commonality of a positive vision but either single eoneepts isolated from 
wider interpretations or, more typically, methodological similarities and shared targets. 
Curran onee again provides a relevant example by putting foiward a construction that 
builds upon an isolated concept to vindicate the affinity of anarchist and radical 
ecologist interpretations and their ability to form a united front against globalization. To 
discuss this construction in detail would form too long a digression but a brief comment 
is in place.
The pertinent argument opens as follows:
While deep ecology does not claim any direct anarchist roots, it 
identifies hierarchy as culprit in environmental ruin. Its conception of 
hierarchy may be novel and applied relatively exclusively, but it 
highlights a hierarchy of value wielded by the poweifril over the 
powerless -  with inert nature as the most subjugated. (Cunan 2006, p. 
114)
Having established that a radical current of ecologism declares a foim of hierarchy to be 
a problem, Curran then assumes that this current partakes in, or at least comes very near
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to ‘post-ideological’ anarchism. The problem is that the critique of hierarchy that is 
present in this variant of ecologism is at odds with anarchist interpretations in that it is 
concerned with relations between species, not within any of them. In fact, as I am going 
to show in detail in Chapter V, hierarchy between human beings may be postulated in 
ecologism as necessary to prevent humans from oppressing nature. The idea is of course 
incompatible with the anarchist belief that hierarchical anangements in society 
inevitably generate human domination of other species. In other words, as this example 
shows, the mere presence of a eoneept within a given ideological structure is not a 
measure of that structure’s kinship with other moiphologies that also include the 
concept.
Cunan actually acknowledges tliose nuanced differences: ‘while deep ecology may rail 
against the operation of hierarchy against nature, it can overlook its operation within 
humanity’ (Cunan 2006, p. 114), and yet she does not see them as preventing deep 
ecology’s membership in ‘anarchist politics’. By ‘politics’ Curran means the sphere of 
political strategy; this makes Curran’s argument particularly useful as an illustration of 
the practice, common in the literature on the alternatives to globalization, of elevating 
operative components of ideologies (explanations of the optimal ways to aehieve 
political goals) to the status of classificatory tools to the neglect of more fundamental 
conceptual diseontinuities. In view of that, Curran posits that what constitutes post- 
ideological anarchism is its ‘temperament’ which ‘rejects “roadmaps” of prescribed
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visions in favor of “toolkits” for discovering them’ (Curran 2006, p. 231). As a result, 
she places a hotchpotch of diverse positions in the ‘post-ideological’ anarchist territory.
In a broadly similar way -  that is to say, by way of elevating political strategies to the 
status of markers of political positions -  other authors explain the move ‘beyond 
ideology’, that they believe to have occuned, by pointing to new forms of network- 
based organization. Aceordingly, networks are the means to transcend ideological 
discrepancies by converging on one ‘no’ (Kingsnorth 2003) that unites otherwise 
heterogeneous expressions of resistance to the neoliberal fonn of globalization within 
the ‘movement of movements’ (Mertes 2004) or ‘coalition of coalitions’ (Klein 2001, p. 
81):
One of the basic characteristics of the network form is that no two 
nodes face each other in contradiction; rather, they are always 
triangulated by a third, and then a fouifh, and then by an indefinite 
number of others in the web. [...] They displaee contradictions and 
operate instead a kind of alehemy, or rather a sea change, the flow of 
the movements transforming the traditional fixed positions; networks 
imposing their force thiough a kind of irresistible undertow. (Hardt 
2002, p. 117)
Overlaps in organization, methodology, and tactics have thus been used as evidence that 
there is room for a unified movement against the neoliberal model of globalization. Yet, 
while the postulate of liberation fiom the ideologieal straiglitjacket was intended to be 
politically empowering, the classificatory problems that it has posed continue to cause 
concern not just to scholars but also to activists themselves. From the conceptualization 
of the miscellaneous range of political projects offered by enemies of globalization in
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terms of one broad movement of opposition, or ‘one world with many worlds in it’ 
(Klein 2001, p. 89), resulted political as well as terminological controversies that now 
permeate ‘the movement’. On some occasions all opponents of the neoliberal form of 
globalization have been labelled as ‘antiglobalists’ causing unease among M am st and 
other internationalist critics who define themselves as antieapitalist or, at least, 
antineoliberal, but who reject the label of ‘anti-globalization’ as rendering them 
vulnerable to charges of isolationism (for example Callinicos 2003; Hardt and Negri 
2000; Klein 2001). Conversely, appellations such as ‘globalization-ffom-below’ or the 
‘global justice movement’ have been applied indiscriminately to a huge variety of 
positions, some of which do not identify with any global project (see for example Esteva 
and Prakash 1998).
These controversies demonstrate that ideological identities are not just a matter of 
academic interest. Ideological labels may be empowering when they are seen as linked 
with momentous intellectual achievements or decisive, positively valued, political 
events. Alternatively, they may be disabling when they are associated with negative 
contexts. How those contexts are interpreted in any given instanee will of course depend 
on the ideological perspective in question. What is empowering for one ideology -  for 
example its progressive history embodied in a series of revolutions -  may be seen as 
delegitimizing from a different ideological angle -  for instance from the point of view of 
a belief system that prides itself on its persistent defence of established institutions. 
Legitimizations that will serve one ideology well may thus be haimful to another system
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of beliefs. From this truism follows an equally obvious conelusion, namely, that 
alliances between ideologies may not be in the interest of one or more parties involved, 
and so are likely to be volatile, even if the ideologies in question happen to have the 
same enemy, such as, in the cases discussed, the globalization of neoliberalism.
In this thesis I thus take issue with the claim that the cuirents of opposition to neoliberal 
globalization may forgo the differences that divide them for the sake of abolishing the 
proeess. Any instance of contestation of globalization is dependent on the broader and 
competing ideologies that such discourse inevitably inliabits. Thus, while not necessarily 
combined with open admission of ideologieal adherence, heated and bitter divisions on 
the issue of globalization have been abundantly expressed along recognizable lines 
separating major ideological territories.^® I return to this question in Chapter V where I
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See for example Albertani 2002; De Angelis 2001, pp. 109 and 124; K 2001, pp. 32- 
33; Tommy 2001, p. 105 and Katsiaficas 2001 for an anarchist perspective; Callinicos 
and Gonzales 2002 and Sakai 2003 for a revolutionary socialist stance; George 2004 for 
a démocratie socialist view; Fabel van den illegal 2000 for a critique of the strategy of 
ecologism. The continuity of contention between distinct ideological positions in ‘the 
movement’ against neoliberal globalization has also been noted by several academic 
commentators. For example, Mark Rupert notes that ‘[IJong-standing questions between 
anarchism and other forms of left politics now echo through the global justice movement 
[...] the movement has been divided by disagieements that center on the question of 
refoiming, reconstructing, or abolishing global economic institutions in the course of 
constructing future possible worlds’ (Rupert 2004, p. 127). Similarly Curran -  somewhat 
inconsistently in the context of her insistence on ‘post-ideological’ politics -  
acknowledges that ‘old ideological battles, fought under the rubric of new forms, are still 
clearly visible’ (Curran 2006, p. 32). Curran explains: ‘[a]n embrace of diversity and a 
shared aversion to globalization does not deter a vigorous internal eontest on the best 
way forward [...]. More recently, the questions of political direction, strategy and 
relationship to the state [...] have led to a sharper division [...]. Wliile they may not 
specifically describe it this way, the tension resonates a contest for the forum’s
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present a comparison of the ecologist and anarchist positions on globalization. The fact 
that these positions are divergent and on several accounts practically incompatible 
provides a pungent exemplification of the fact that even close ideological currents may 
find it difficult to establish a eommon interpretative framework on which to construct a 
cohesive alternative to the hegemonic fonn of globalization (Soborsld 2006 and 2007).
Literature #3: Globalization and traditional political ideologies
The angle and the objectives of this thesis situate it within an as yet naiTOW literature 
concerned more specifically with the impact of globalization on the perturbed 
bifurcation lines separating ideological families and on the coherence and relevance of 
thus delineated types. The question on which this debate is focused is one of the extent 
to which the categories that we have become accustomed to when thinldng about 
ideology -  liberalism, conservatism, socialism and so on, as well as their key internal 
currents -  still have any heuristic power, whether they are able to accurately map the 
political reality or characterize responses to political problems. There are two primary, 
opposing considerations here. On the one hand, it is important to discern new ideological 
configurations where they materialize and to be prepared in liglit of their emergence to 
reconsider the topography of the ideological landscape. On the other hand, it is also 
erucial not to go to extremes in the quest to challenge conventional categories. A 
reckless abandonment of familiar labels and a hasty granting of the status of ideology to
anarchical heart -  framed in terms of autonomy (space) and institutionalization 
(movement) and resonating old Marxist/anarchist debates about sti'ategy’ (Curran 2006, 
p. 71).
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new and not yet eligible pretenders is likely to infringe upon the broadly accepted and 
satisfactorily functional understanding of ideology as an ideational construet with a 
considerable degree of staying power and influence. Consequently, it may affect our 
ability to map the political world and to respond to the challenges that it poses (Soborsld 
2009).
Among contributions concerned with the impact of globalization on conventional 
ideological distinctions, Roger Burbaeh’s and Manfred Steger’s exemplify the position 
that emphasizes rupture and destabilization to the effect that ‘fixed zombie eategories’ 
(Steger 2008, p. 14) need to be replaced with concepts able to ‘capture the contours of a 
profoundly altered ideological landscape’ (Steger 2008, p. 248). In his tellingly entitled 
book ‘Globalization and Postmodern Politics’, Burbach asserts that ‘there has been a 
fundamental shift with globalization and [...] the very conceits of modernity need to be 
questioned’ (Burbach 2001, p. 10). He pronounces the advent of ‘a postmodern political 
age’ in which ‘the political ideologies, or metanarratives, that drove the politics of the 
twentieth century [are] largely irrelevant’ (Burbach 2001, p. 2):
[Tjhe tlmee main political ideologies that have driven the Western 
world since the French revolution -  liberalism, conservatism and then 
socialism -  are in disarray or no longer functional. They are unable to 
explain or incorporate the tremendous complexity and diverse realities 
of the contemporary world. (Burbach 2001, p. 71)
Steger makes a similar (but more systematically argued) plea for discarding traditional 
ideological labels such as ‘socialism’ or ‘liberalism’ as ‘outdated’ and condemned ‘to
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political and theoretical irrelevance’ (Steger 2005b, pp. 27, 28). While Burbach 
emphasizes the transition from modernity to post-modemity as produced by the rise of 
globalization and allegedly compromising the validity of modem ideological narratives, 
Steger focuses on the ‘transformation of the ideological landscape as a result of a 
shifting mode of understanding community and people’s place in it’ (Steger 2008, p. 
194). This transformation is said to be caused by a decline of the nation-state and 
nationalism that are nowadays purportedly supplanted by global structures and identities. 
Since the key ideologies ‘were all “nationalist” in the sense of perfoiming the same 
fundamental process of translating the overarching national imaginary into concrete 
political doctrines, agendas and spatial anangements’ (Steger 2008, p. 10) so, according 
to Steger, they are no longer germane nowadays when the nation-state-based ways of 
thinking about political reality are withering. The position that the established 
vocabulary has lost its explanatory potential entails reporting or postulating a 
realignment of traditional ideological positions. The claim that a new ‘ideological 
imaginary’ is needed to make sense of novel circumstances thus brings about newly- 
coined categories -  ‘globalism’ in Steger’s case -  that purport to be more effectual in 
imbuing the concept of globalization with meaning and consequently in elucidating and 
contextualizing analytical and normative debates on the process of globalization.
In opposition to this ‘all-change’ thesis, the continuity position asserts the relevance of 
the familiar political concepts and ideologies and challenges the far-reaching claims to 
novelty put forward by the forecasters of the allegedly new political paradigm;
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The theoiy of globalization is advertised as being distinct from 
preceding theories, and yet its complexity, its incorporation of a range 
of nonnative standpoints and its links with preceding theories are often 
unacknowledged. [...] Theorists of globalization run together 
interpretive conceptual readings of globalization with strong causal 
claims and noimative commitments on its behalf that tend to 
essentialise the notion of globalization and magnify its supposed 
novelty. In so doing they advertise a break with preceding theories and 
theorists while holding theoretical and normative ambitions that 
harmonise with the classic grand narratives of modernity. (Browning 
2006, pp. 87-88, 89)
An affirmative response to the question of whether the traditional ways of conceiving of 
political reality based on eonventional politieal eoneepts and ideologies are adequate in 
today’s cireumstances implies that the concept of globalization may be usefully mapped 
by using the established ideological categories. John Schwarzmantel, while referring to 
postmodernism, makes claims that could be used against the ‘all change’ thesis put 
forward by the advocates of an ideological shift due to globalization. Schwaranantel 
asserts that ‘the tradition of modernity and the ideologies that developed from it are still 
relevant and important to eontemporary politics’ (Schwarzmantel 1998, p. 194). He 
explains:
The ideologies necessary to make sense of the contemporary world 
remain those that originated with modernity. The tradition represented 
by the Left-Right spectrum is still significant, and new ideologies sueh 
as feminism and environmentalism are necessary conectives or 
additions to this spectrum, not replacements for it. Ideas of 
emancipation and social transformation, the critical evaluation of 
social realities and discussion of alternatives to the existing strueture of 
society are all made possible by ideological discourse and the ideas of
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eritique, agency and goal that these modernist ideologies proclaim. 
(Schwarzmantel 1998, p. 198)
The continuity thesis does not assume the conservation of ideologies in fixed forms or a 
statie picture of society in whieh they are operational. But it elaims that the flexible 
durability of the key ideological configurations -  conservatism, liberalism and socialism 
-  is assured by the fact that they fulfil the functional prerequisites of any soeiety, post­
modern as well as modern: ‘the need to create a social order that combines the 
separateness and distinctiveness of individuals and groups with a shared tradition of 
citizenship and community’ (Schwarzmantel 1998, p. 194).
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In his most recent book. Ideology and Politics (2008) Schwarzmantel puts more 
emphasis on ehange in patterns of ideology but he remains convinced that major belief 
systems continue to play an important role amid new, so-called ‘mini’ ideologies. 
Sehwarzmantel suggests that the ‘mini’ ideologies are in mutually enriching relationship 
with the ‘traditional’ belief systems. The ‘mini’ ideologies benefit from this interaction 
by having their unmature and issue-based structures imbued with more general 
meanings deriving from comprehensive political visions offered by the established 
currents. Traditional ideologies, on the other hand, become updated to new 
cireumstances by having to deal with new concerns brought into play by partial 
ideological clusters. Schwarzmantel’s conceptualization assumes a possibility of fusion 
of old and new ideologies into a counter-ideology able to challenge the hegemony of 
neoliberalism. As I have explained in the previous section, I am sceptical with regard to 
the possibility of an integration of distinct ideological positions against the dominant 
ideology. It should be noted that Schwarzmantel himself puts this idea forward as a 
normative, rather than empirical argument (Schwarzmantel 2008, p. 172). Nevertheless, 
while I am doubtful about this aspect of his proposition, I share Schwarzmantel’s view 
that major ideologies need to keep pace with new developments, and that their 
engagement, or interaction, with ‘molecular’ ideologies is one way through which this 
‘updating’ may occur (Schwarzmantel 2008, p. 168).
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In this thesis I offer a conceptual analysis of ideological arguments about globalization 
that sheds light on whether ‘an alternative conceptual morphology has greater 
illuminating power’ (Freeden 2003b, p. 9) than the vocabulary with which we are 
familiar. While it would be naïve to expect this type of analysis to provide a once and 
for all resolution of the controversy, its advantage is that it engages with ideological 
discourse itself, prior to maldng assumptions about the socio-political circumstances -  
such as the end (or continuity) of statism and nationalism or the rise (or otherwise) of 
postmodernism -  allegedly shaping ideological morphologies. In other words, I do not 
need to engage here with, for example, the soundness of the claim that the ‘national 
imaginary’ is in decline or that humankind has entered a new, radically distinct epoch of 
its development. As I argued in the Introduction, many authors argue to the contrary, but 
from my perspective, even if the state and state-based forms of identity are dead, this 
does not mean that ideologies developed at the elimax of statism and nationalism must 
be out of date today. It is perfectly possible that they have been able to evolve to match 
the new set of circumstanees by -  to use Freeden’s terminology -  updating their 
morphologies and refocusing them on new ‘adjacent’ concepts or even by moving some 
concepts from their ‘peripheries’ to their ‘cores’ and vice versa. There is no necessary 
reason why ideologies such as liberalism or socialism should be unable to reinvent 
themselves in new circumstances. Whether they will indeed survive will depend on their 
morphological features. As Freeden puts it:
Ideologies are capable of bending under pressure, and of hosting a 
number of variations on each of their concepts without collapsing.
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However, if completely alien meanings of concepts are hastily injected 
into a partieular ideology, its stmcture may snap. (Freeden 1996, p. 82)
It follows that the task of my analysis is to identify those ideologies, or those areas 
within ideological configurations that have been stmggling to convey a coherent 
message in the face of new conceptual constraints, as well as to nominate those that 
remain robust or have even become reconsolidated in the novel ideational milieu. The 
inquiry into whether the categories that used to map the terrain of ideology are still 
intelligible when applied to the varied inteipretations of the concept of globalization is 
pursued throughout this thesis in relation to leading contributions to the globalization 
debate. These contributions are scrutinized to establish the degree of match or mismatch 
between the decontestations of globalization that they offer and the conventional 
ideological morphologies. This implies, in each case, an engagement with the question 
of the extent to which a particular decontestation of globalization fits within the 
parameters of a given ideology and an identification of the areas of actual or potential 
tension. At the same time, the effectiveness of alternative clusters — such as ‘globalism’ 
-  is tested by relating them to tlie same exemplary accounts of globalization. The 
question to be answered is whether new criteria organize the existing positions in ways 
that are meaningful, namely, that collate related interpretations together in plausible, 
discemibly distinct and, potentially at least, durable categories, or whether what we are 
offered as alternatives to the established types are merely flash in the pan categories 
likely to pass away when a new instance of hip political jargon or a new ideological fad 
takes their place.
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As I made explicit from the outset, the study of a variety of ideologieal interpretations of 
globalization has led me to side with the continuity position. The following ehapters thus 
emphasize, in the words of Freeden, ‘the durability of ideological segments that have 
seemingly been vanquished or become obsolete’ (Freeden 2005, p. 139). This is not to 
imply an inert picture of ideology or to deny change but merely to argue that so far 
change has been discernible within traditional ideological formations while not as yet 
destabilizing tliose veiy fonnations to the extent tliat would render them no longer useful 
as analytical categories. The emergenee of the concept of globalization has replicated 
traditional ideologieal controversies in the context of the new debate according to a 
reconfigured but reeognizable pattern. It has not necessitated a radical reshuffling of the 
terms of ideology although it has undeniably encouraged some fine-tuning of routine 
categories. In the words of Rod Bantjes: ‘[w]e are still playing out the same projects and 
engaged in the same debates as our “modern” forebears’ (Bantjes 2005, p. 14). 
Consequently, the established ideologies have not become irrelevant: they remain the 
key to the understanding of the ideas as well as policies that pertain to the contemporary 
purportedly global circumstance. The following four chapters aim to substantiate this 
case.
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CHAPTER II 
CLASSICAL LIBERALISM:
GLOBALIZATION AS THE LOGIC OF FREEDOM
The remainder of this thesis is devoted to the study of the meanings of globalization that 
can be identified within conceptual morphologies of major ideological families. The 
analysis takes off by advancing an argument according to which the cuiTently 
hegemonic discourse of globalization can be unpacked as integral to a long-established 
logic of liberal ideology.
Defining and delineating the dominant ideology
Wliat is emerging victorious, in other words, is not so much liberal 
practice, as the liberal idea. That is to say, for a veiy large part of the 
world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is 
in a position to challenge liberal democracy. (Fukuyama 1992, p. 45, 
emphasis in original)
We are all liberals now. (Bellamy 1999, p. 23)
That liberalism is today’s dominant ideology is a commonplace assumption shared by 
liberals and their adversaries, although neither the former nor, naturally, the latter 
automatically perceive liberal dominance in as far-reaching terms as does Fukuyama: to 
affirm that liberalism is the dominant ideology is not necessarily to declare its ultimate 
victoiy or the definitive elimination of its rivals. More controversy surrounds the
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questions of what this dominant position entails for liberalism itself and of what it means 
for the enterprise of an analyst of this ideology. In response to the first concern, 
particular attention has been focused on the relationship between liberalism and other 
ideologies -  this relationship has been captured in terms of intensified interactions, 
including both clashes and blending. To be sure, conflicts and cross-pollinations take 
place between competitors along the whole ideological spectrum. Yet, it is indeed the 
case that interactions are particularly concentrated around the fraction occupied by 
liberal ideology. The liberal hegemony means that liberalism’s contenders are compelled 
to articulate their standing on the liberal ideology itself, as well as on the questions that 
the liberal agenda defines as imperative. The fact that liberal beliefs permeate so-called 
common-sense thinking (Bellamy 1999, p. 23; Goodwin 2007, p. 35) may also mean that 
other ideologies find it expedient to adopt liberal ideas and modify them according to 
their own needs, while liberalism may in turn be attracted to these offshoot ideological 
variations.
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The interactions between liberalism and other political ideologies have been discussed 
either in terms of the emanation of ideas from within the liberal centre, that is to say, 
liberalism ‘spill[ing] over into other ideologieal domains’ (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 
p. 52), or as the process of liberalism absorbing external influenees. Both situations have 
worried some commentators. In the former case, liberalism has been presented as 
somehow robbed of its identity, with liberal ideas being supposedly deformed in alien 
milieus. Noiman Barry, who calls himself a classical liberal, describes the state of 
liberalism as ‘precarious’ due to the fact that ‘much of its theoretical armoury [...] has 
been subtly appropriated by exponents of doctrines whose aims are very different’ 
(Barry 1996, p. 1). In the latter type of assessment liberalism has been presented as 
unable to ‘proteet itself because its “immune system” is too weak’ due to it being ‘rather 
loose, tolerant of heterogeneous components, easy to influence, easy to infiltrate by alien 
ideas that are in fact inconsistent with any coherent version of it’ (Jasay 2004-2007). On 
the other hand, commendations of intense cross-fertilization between liberalism and
Classical liberalism j 64
The mutual fertilization between liberalism and other ideologies has equally important 
implications for the study of liberal thought. As noted in a recent political ideologies 
reader, liberalism’s tendency to spill over to other ideologies makes it ‘a notoriously 
tricky business [...] to police its boundaries’ (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, p. 52). Philip 
Cemy puts this bluntly: liberalism ‘means what contrasting traditions say it means’ 
(Cemy 2008, p. 6). When viewed from a very broad perspective two such traditions can 
be identified within the liberal ideology. On the one hand, ‘classical’ liberalism is a 
belief system that emerged on the wave of political and economic revolutions of the late 
eighteenth century. Its most recent expressions are often grouped under the heading of 
neoliberalism. On the other hand, the development of ‘social’ or ‘modem’ liberalism 
took off with a series of contributions by thinkers such as Thomas Hill Green (1836- 
1882), Leonard Hobhouse (1864-1929) or John Hobson (1858-1940) from the 1880s 
onwards.
The controversy pertaining to these two ideological traditions is whether they represent 
two different faces of liberalism or whether only one of them can legitimately claim a 
liberal identity. Modem liberalism overlaps with social democratic ideas and it has been 
argued that modem liberals are not distinct from social democrats and thus are out of
other ideologies are also widespread. Liberalism’s own malleability may then be defined 
as the key to its success: ‘[o]nly by blending classical liberalism with inconsistent 
doctrines could liberalism become a ruling ideology’ (Gaus 2001, p. 30; see also Gaus 
1990, p. 465).
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plaee within liberalism (Barry 1996; Hayek 1991, p. 110; Cohen 1986, p. 79). More 
usual, however, are approaches that define modern liberalism as located within the 
liberal domain but spilling over to the socialist area. On the other hand, some classical 
liberal ideas and their eontemporary outgrowths share common ground with 
conservatism and a case has been made for the exclusion of what is loiown as 
neoliberalism from the liberal tenitory. The intruder has then been denigrated as:
[N]o more than the capitalist shell of that drive to expansion, in which 
the qualitative civilizing force of liberalism, with all its blindness to 
some forms of exclusion of women, non-white societies and the 
abjectly poor, is replaced with a reductive and quantitative economic 
individualism in which constitutional constraints are directed at 
maximizing a personal liberty that cashes out as entrepreneurship. The 
advent of that approach within the eonservative New Right attests to 
its more comfortable classification as a form of conseiwatism, even 
though many of its themes feature in older versions of classical 
liberalism. (Freeden 2001, p. 200; see also Freeden 1996, pp. 276-314)
That disputes arise with regard to the parameters of liberalism is of course an 
unsurprising exemplification of the faet that ideological morphologies are volatile. But 
in the case of liberalism the question of definition is complicated further by differences 
based on distinct geographical conventions. In the United States the term is understood 
as denoting a belief system that -  to use the crude spatial metaphor -  is loeated to the 
left in relation to what passes for liberalism in eontinental Europe. The American way of 
thinking about liberalism may imply an unusual view represented by, for example, 
Noam Chomsky: ‘[i]f you take the ideals of classical liberalism seriously [...] it leads to 
opposition to corporate capitalism’ (Chomsky and Otero 2003, p. 398). This position 
clashes with claims presenting the liberal ideology as inextricably linked to the priorities
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of tlie capitalist system (see for example Arblaster 1984, p. 7; Goodwin 2007, p. 42). As 
Philip Cemy explains, the latter opinion squares with how liberalism is understood in 
most of Europe:
In continental Euiope, where the notion of liberalism has tended to 
retain much of this fundamentally anti-statist meaning, it is seen 
mainly as a political philosophy of the capitalist Right [...] In the US 
in particular, such liberalism is often referred to as “19th century 
liberalism” or “classical liberalism” and indeed has much in common 
with what is called “conservatism” in the Anglo-Saxon world. [...] 
American-style liberalism came to be somewhat analogous to 
moderate social democratic views in continental Europe; however, in 
Europe the development of social democratic ideology and party 
identification was sufficiently strong to resist being subsumed into 
liberalism, which as a label was applied mainly to small European 
parties of the centre-right. (Cemy 2008, pp. 5-6)
Neoliberalism as a contemporaiy adaptation o f classical liberalism 
Bearing in mind that no definition or taxonomy of the liberal ideology will evade being 
approximate and contentious, I limit the following discussion to classical liberalism. 
Contemporary mutations of classical liberal ideas are conventionally captured by the 
teim ‘neoliberalism’. In the present account I use ‘neoliberalism’ as a convenient 
shorthand to indicate chronology but I remain sceptical with regard to claims purporting 
its ideological distinctiveness. Wliile I coneede that neoliberalism reinterprets some of 
the classical liberal ideas (Tumer 2007), I argue that differences between classical 
liberalism and neoliberalism stem from the natural process of classieal liberalism, or at 
least some of its cuiTents, adapting to new political circumstances rather than from it 
producing an offspring subsequently evolving into a distinct ideological framework.
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The nomination of classical liberalism in its contemporary neoliberal form as an 
adequate representation of the liberal concept of globalization may cause two objections. 
Firstly, the neoliberal incarnation of classical liberalism is situated in a precarious 
proximity to conservatism and, as pointed out earlier, some have denigrated it as an 
intruder in the liberal territory (Freeden 1996, pp. 276-314; Freeden 2001, p. 200). 
Secondly, neoliberalism is also often held to be unsophisticated in comparison with the 
complexity of other expressions of the ‘liberal mind’ and therefore incompatible with a 
full-blown liberal morphology. In relation to the first point, I acknowledge that 
neoliberalism contains a fusion of classical liberal and conservative beliefs. Therefore, 
while operating with an ideal type that locates neoliberalism within the liberal ambit, I 
highlight the moments when it drifts more decisively towards a conservative way of 
thinking. On the other hand, the conceptual crudeness of neoliberalism is not 
problematic from the perspective of the present account. The debunkers of neoliberalism 
make an undoubtedly valid point when they maintain that it is extremely reductionist, 
focused on market-related matters to a relative neglect of non-economic questions. 
Adam Smith, so often brought up for pejorative comparisons between the past classical 
liberal thought and contemporary neoliberal contributions, wrote in certainly much more 
nuanced and less reductionist terms than do contemporary neoliberals (Houseman 2003; 
Meeropol 2004; Nolan 2003). But this fact alone neither leaves neoliberalism outside the 
orbit of classical liberal ideology nor renders it undeserving of a morphological 
examination.'^
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It should also be noted that neoliberalism is undergoing a process of transformation
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Liberalism, like any other ideology, has a place for botli refined philosophical insights as 
well as more pragmatically orientated positions engaged with the routine of day-to-day 
politics. That neoliberals are not concerned with the totality of issues that the founders of 
classical liberalism took into account may in some measure result from the fact that 
many of the liberal goals that were imperative in the nineteenth century, specifically 
those implicit in the concept of negative freedom, have by and large been fulfilled (in 
the Western world in any case) and so ceased to resonate with a wider public. At the 
same time, the remaining neoliberal preoccupation, namely the theodicy of the fr ee 
market, is formulated in tenns that have plenty of common characteristics with the 
argumentation of some strands of classical liberal economics while the neoliberal 
outlook is deep-seated in a broader liberal metaphysics that highlights universalism and 
individualism. For the present purpose it is enlightening to analyze the neoliberal ‘global 
imaginaiy’ as providing some indication of how more established liberal interpretations 
narrow down the range of concepts of globalization operative within the parameters of 
the neoliberal fragment of the broader liberal spectrum. At the same time, the 
unsophisticated morphology of neoliberalism may offer an advantage fiom a
whereby it increasingly adopts more complex and nuanced positions. Some analysts 
insist that it is important to discern this internal variety. Cemy frius suggests a distinction 
between ‘regulatory’, ‘managed’, and ‘social’ neoliberalism (Cemy 2008). Moreover, 
neoliberalism intenningles with other liberal positions enriching its own morphology 
and influencing other conceptual configurations in the process. This is evident for 
example in the views of the recent Nobel Price winning economist Paul Krugman. 
Krugman defines himself as a neo-Keynesian but his acceptance of sweatshop practices 
in developing countries as the path leading these countries to economic progress shares 
ground with some emblematic, as well as notorious, neoliberal convictions (Kmgman 
1997).
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methodological point of view for it enables pinpointing of the key directions in which 
neoliberal understandings of globalization unfold, while keeping the present chapter in a 
manageable shape. In any case, it needs to be kept in mind that other liberal 
morphologies may produce different interpretations.'"'
Globalism or classical liberalism?
While there is an ongoing debate on whether the inteipretations of globalization that I 
discuss in the present chapter exemplify the liberal mode of thinking rather than a 
conservative inclination, claims have also been made that labels altogether alternative to 
such conventional categories as liberalism or conservatism are more effective in 
capturing the nature of this ideological field. For example, according to Manfi-ed Steger, 
traditional ideologies are now ‘destabilized by the global imaginaiy’ and hence no 
longer functional (Steger 2008, p. viii). Instead, Steger suggests that the inteipretations 
that I discuss in this chapter are best encapsulated by the category of ‘globalism’ which,
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That liberal territory accommodates divergent, and on some accounts potentially 
conflicting, concepts of globalization should not be taken as attesting to the 
obsolescence of liberalism as an ideological category. Any interpretation of 
globalization depends on broader paths of ideological argumentation and these are 
diverse and multidirectional not just between, but also within ideologies, and especially 
within the ideologies that have been evolving for long enough to have generated an 
abundance of mutations and subcurrents. Consequently, while liberal notions of 
globalization may clash, this fact on its own neither divests them of their place within 
the liberal canon nor undermines the overall coherence of the liberal family. The 
potential liberal identity of a given conception of globalization should instead be gauged 
on the basis of the range and intensity of its logical and functional connections with 
other concepts located within recognizably liberal chains of ideological reasoning.
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he argues, ‘is sufficiently systematic to add up to a comprehensive political ideology’ 
(Steger 2005a, p. 89) and potentially capable of achieving ‘a level of ideological 
dominance unprecedented in modem history’ (Steger 2005c, p. 41). Since Steger’s 
research interests come veiy close to the subject of my own analysis, the discrepancies 
between our approaches have already been discussed, in general terms, in Chapter I. 
Here, I focus on the disagreements that pertain specifically to the current chapter, using 
classical liberalism as the case study to demonstrate the different implications of 
respectively Steger’s and my own perspective.
To reiterate, Steger’s key claim, which he elaborates in a series of articles and books, is 
that there has emerged a new political ideology of ‘globalism’ (see for example Steger 
2000, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2008). Not only does Steger believe that globalism 
‘represents a set of political ideas and beliefs coherent enough to warrant it the status of 
a new ideology’, but he also asserts that globalism ‘constitutes the dominant political 
belief system of our time against wliich all of its challengers must define themselves’ 
(Steger 2005b, p. 12; see also Steger 2005a, p. 6). Steger believes -  incorrectly as I am 
going to show -  that his proposal can be substantiated by listing what he argues are the 
‘six claims of globalism’. Accordingly, the first claim of globalism is that ‘globalization 
is about the liberalization and global integration of markets’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 52-60). 
This is followed by the second claim, which suggests that ‘globalization is inevitable 
and ineversible’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 60-66). Claim number three holds in turn that 
‘nobody is in charge of globalization’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 66-71). According to claim
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four, ‘globalization benefits everyone’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 71—77). Claim five 
complements the latter opinion with the assertion that ‘globalization furthers the spread 
of democracy in the world’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 78-85). Finally, the sixth claim maintains 
that ‘globalization requires a war on terror’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 85-89). Steger argues that 
the six claims of globalism detennine its status as a full-blown political ideology 
according to the criteria endorsed by Freeden, that is to say, as an ideology combining ‘a 
degree of uniqueness and morphological sophistication’ with ‘responsiveness to a broad 
range of political issues’ and ‘ability to produce effective conceptual decontestation 
chains’ (Steger 2005b, p. 15). The claims will be frequently refened to in the course of 
the discussion presented in this chapter and so, for the puipose of convenience, they are 
listed in Fig. 1 below.
Fig 1. Core claims of globalism according to Manfred Steger 
(2005a, pp. 52-89)
Claim one: Globalization is about the liberalization and global
integration of markets.
Claim two: Globalization is inevitable and irreversible.
Claim three: Nobody is in charge of globalization.
Claim four: Globalization benefits everyone.
Claim five: Globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the
world.
Claim six: Globalization requires a war on terror.
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There is much to commend in Steger’s work. He pinpoints narratives of globalization 
that have wide cunency and disentangles them into their logical components. His 
argumentation is based on the analysis of primaiy material derived from journalism, 
coiporate publications, political manifestoes and some bestselling acclamations of 
globalization. However, while appreciating Steger’s contribution to systematizing a 
body of influential accounts of globalization, I take issue with his key conclusion, 
namely, that these interpretations add up to a new political ideology in the full sense of 
the word. From my perspective, the ‘six claims of globalism’ are better captured as 
conceptions that belong to the contentious ideological crossbreed of liberalism and 
conservatism, with most of the discmsive examples cited by Steger falling within the 
contemporary (neoliberal) outgrowth of classical liberalism.
It should be noted that Steger acknowledges that the six claims ‘absorb and reanange 
bits and pieces of several established ideologies’ (Steger 2005b, p. 11; see also Steger 
2005c, p. 41 and Steger 2008, p. 12). He suggests, for example, that there is a linlc 
between ‘globalism’ and classical liberalism but he does not develop this notion further. 
On several occasions Steger also invokes neoliberalism and neoconservatism as playing 
a role but, again, his view on the nature of the relationship between the two currents and 
‘globalism’ is not clear. Sometimes Steger presents neoliberalism and neoconseiwatism 
as giving rise to the two faces of ‘globalism’, that is to say, its respective ‘market’ and 
‘imperial’ variants (see for example Steger 2005a, pp. 15-17). This does not solve the 
problem of the status of neoliberalism and neoconservatism outside of ‘globalism’ or of
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whether it is possible for neoliberalism and neoconservatism to lead mutually 
independent existences. Steger seems to be suggesting that they are inexorably 
connected (see for example Steger 2005a, p. 16). If this is the case, then a question arises 
as to the point at which the combination of neoliberalism and neoconservatism makes up 
the new ideology and as to the element(s) in the blend that are idiosyncratic enough to 
merit distinguishing it as a separate ideological system. After all, the fellow-feeling 
between some currents of neoliberalism and neoconservatism is not new and, 
furthermore, neither is ‘comradeship’ between several variants of more traditional 
classical liberalism and Anglo-American conservatism. In fact, market-orientated, 
laissez-faire currents of classical liberalism have long enjoyed the warm sympathy of 
some conservatives. Moreover, many prominent thinkers -  Hume, Burke, Spencer, 
Hayek, Berlin or Oakeshott, to mention just the most important among them -  combined 
liberal and conservative ideas. Consequently, to present ‘globalism’ as an amalgam of 
neoliberalism and neoconservatism is not to deliver a convincing proof of its ideological 
uniqueness.'^
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On other occasions Steger suggests that ‘market globalism’ combines liberalism, 
conservatism and nationalism (Steger 2005c, p. 43) while elsewhere he adds elements of 
Marxism and social democracy to his ideological brew (Steger 2008, p. 187). It seems 
that he is unable to escape the categories whose irrelevance he professes. They are let in 
through the back door, testifying to the fact that the ideological chimera that Steger 
offers in their stead is not coherent enough to stand on its own feet or be effectively 
analyzed in its own terms.
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Steger has a further answer as to what is the yardstick of the new ideology that makes it 
a distinctive conceptual entity: ‘what distinguishes globalism in the twenty-first century 
from previous free-market ideologies is the sldlfiil attempt of its believers to utilize 
“globalization” as the master concept’ (Steger 2005a, p. 18). Here lies the most 
important disagreement between our approaches in that I do not accept, at least as things 
stand now, that it is legitimate to attribute the power to form new ideologies to the 
concept of globalization. If ideology is to be understood as a conceptual structure that is 
established, distinct and full (Freeden 1998, pp. 749-750) then globalization is not an 
adequate foundation for a new ideological current. The concept of globalization is, first 
of all, too broad and too malleable. There is a potentially unlimited number of 
interpretations of what globalization is, for example whether it is the globalization of 
liberal democracy, class war, or welfare state. Consequently, in isolation from additional 
qualifiers, ‘globalism’ is a hopelessly vague term while to assign it to just one ideology 
is arbitrary in the light of the competing claims to the concept made by ideologies as 
diverse as liberalism, Marxism, democratic socialism and some currents of anarchism. In 
a nutshell, ‘globalism’ is a bendy term, applicable to a range of otherwise different 
positions and as such it does not suffice for a demarcation of a distinct belief system.
What Steger captures under the heading of ‘globalism’ is in my view not a new ideology 
but merely an update of classical liberalism to new circumstances, even if among those 
circmnstances globalization -  both as an allegedly real process and as a particular form 
of social consciousness -  features as the most consequential. The evidence available to
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counter the viability of the claim that a new ‘globalist’ ideology has materialized draws 
on both the self-understandings formulated by the discourses thus classified as well as 
on their morphological features. With regard to the first criterion, that of self-definition, 
the so-called ‘globalists’ are, for the most part, extremely keen on emphasizing their 
classical liberal lineage as well as the fact that their interpretations of globalization fit 
very well within the classical liberal way of thinking.'^ An American economist Jeffrey 
Sachs, known for his ‘shock therapy’ theory that was applied in the early 1990s in 
several countries, notably Poland and Bolivia, as the method of their economic transition 
to free market capitalism, thus exalts ‘our breathtaking opportunity to be able to advance 
the Enlightemnent vision of Jefferson, Smith, Kant, and Condorcet’ (Sachs 2005, p. 
351). A more conservatively-orientated economist Deepak Lai puts forward ‘the case for 
classical liberalism in the twenty-first centuiy’ (Lai 2006). Two renowned 
correspondents of The Economist, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, are even 
more explicit. In their bestselling acclamation of the global economy, A Future Perfect,
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The same authors emphasize the affinity between globalization and the liberal 
ideology when narrating the history of classical liberalism. The classical liberal 
genealogy is then formulated in palingenetic ternis whereby the decline of this ideology 
(subsequent to its successes in the nineteenth century, especially until around the 1870s) 
is followed by the renaissance in the late 1970s and the rapid rise to ideological 
domination in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet system in the 1990s (for example 
Henderson 2001; Lai 2000; Lindsey 2000; Wolf 2005). Thus presented, the 
peregi'ination of classical liberalism in the twentieth centuiy matches the state of the 
global system: liberalism is on the rise in periods of intensified globalization and it 
declines when globalization is in retreat. In other words, classical liberalism interprets 
the histoiy of globalization as its own autobiography.
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they declare their indebtedness to classical liberalism and locate their own interpretation 
of globalization fiimly within the ambit of this ideology:
Globalization offers the chance to fulfill (or at least come considerably 
closer to fulfilling) the goals that classical liberal philosophers first 
identified several centuries ago [...g]lobalization is not just an 
economic process that can be more or less mashed into the mold of 
classical liberal political theory; it marks a significant articulation of it. 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000, p. xxvi)
The fact that the cmrently hegemonic discourse of globalization defines its own 
ideological identity in terms of classical liberalism does not, of its own accord, dispel all 
definitional doubts. But it provides one criterion (self-definition) that can be 
complemented by morphological analysis and the latter confirms regular ideological 
continuities between this set of interpretations of globalization and the arguments of 
classical liberalism, disproving Steger’s claim as to the conceptual distinctiveness and 
durability of ‘globalism’. Thus, on thorough examination, ‘the six claims of globalism’, 
intended to vindicate Steger’s argument that ‘globalism’ is an ideology in its own right 
(see Fig. 1 above) are frequently contradicted by opposite standpoints regularly asserted 
by authors whom Steger would certainly have classified as ‘globalists’. Claim number 
two, namely, that globalization is inevitable and ineversible, and claim number three, 
that nobody is in charge of globalization, are particularly problematic in this respect in 
that they are actually less common in the so-called ‘globalist ideology’ than the contrary 
assertions. The thesis of inevitability and irreversibility of globalization is contradicted 
by, for example, Henderson 2001; Lindsey 2000; Llosa 2000, p. 19; Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge 2000, p. ix; Norberg 2003, p. 273; Owen 2001; and Wolf 2005, while
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globalization’s uncontrollability is challenged by Bhagwati 2004, p. 34; Crook 2001; 
Llosa 2000; Sachs 2005 and Wolf 2005.
Considering first the idea of globalization’s inevitability and irreversibility, a glance at 
the contributions listed above reveals that the claim is rejected due to the constraints 
imposed by broader interpretations operative within this current of thought and ensuing 
from characteristic classical liberal concerns. More precisely, the thesis of the 
in eversibility of globalization has not entrenched itself in this way of thinking because it 
contradicts the liberal emphasis on human agency and freedom of choice, the ideas that 
do not go well together with historical determinism. Thus, for example, Mario Vargas 
Llosa, a Peruvian novelist and a staunch neoliberal politician, rejects the idea of an 
economic destiny by arguing that ‘as nothing in human history is fated or permanent, the 
progress obtained in the last decades by the culture of liberty is not iiTeversible’ (Llosa 
2000, p. 17). What is more, Llosa strives to legitimize his assertion by locating it firmly 
in the context of liberalism:
[0]ne of the most refined (and rare) certainties of liberalism is that 
historical determinism does not exist. History has not been written so 
as to negate any further appeal. History is the work of men, and just as 
men can act rightly with measures that push history in the direction of 
progress and civilization, they can also err, and by conviction, apathy, 
or cowardice, allow history to slide into anarchy, impoverishment, 
obscurantism, and barbarism. (Llosa 2000, p. 19)
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A similar view is upheld by Sachs who maintains that ‘[pjrogress is possible, but not 
inevitable. Reason can be mobilized to promote social well-being, but it can also be 
overtaken by destructive passions’ (Sachs 2005, p. 353).
While these are broad assertions, the liberal rejection of determinism in favour of 
voluntarism is often argued specifically in the context of globalization. Martin Wolf, the 
chief economics commentator at the Financial Times and the author of a well-known 
neoliberal account. Why Globalization Worlcs, concedes that ‘[i]n the very long run, 
where the long run consists of many centuries, the trend towards globalization [...] is 
almost certainly irreversible.’ But at tlie same time he insists that ‘in the “short” run -  
where that run may be a century, or even more -  it is not inevitable at all’ (Wolf 2005, p. 
60). Similarly, Brink Lindsey, the vice president of Cato Institute, a free-market think 
tank based in Washington DC, avows that ‘[gjlobalization is [...] an uncertain and 
uneven process and subject to sudden and traumatic reverses and dislocations’ (Lindsey 
2000, p. 49). The possibility of the ‘end of globalization’ may also be supported with a 
historical argumentation referring to previous retreats of globalization where the process 
is understood as unfolding in several phases, notably in the belle époque that ended 
abruptly in 1914. ‘Can it happen again’ is the question asked, and answered 
affirmatively -  if cautiously -  by Harold James, an economic historian celebrated in 
classical liberal circles (James 2002).
78
Classical liberalism
Another set of arguments has been mobilized within the so-called ‘globalist’ camp to 
reject the claim of globalization’s uncontrollability (Steger’s ‘claim three of globalism’). 
Clive Crook, formerly associated with The Economist and nowadays the Financial 
Times' chief correspondent in Washington, attacks the idea that nobody controls 
globalization:
The crucial point is that international economic integration widens 
choices [...]. When governments claim that globalisation ties their 
hands, because politically it makes their lives easier, they are conning 
voters and undermining support for economic freedom. Whatever else 
that may be, it is not good governance. Whenever governments use 
globalisation to deny responsibility, democracy suffers another blow 
and prospects for growth in the developing countries are set back a 
little further. (Crook 2001)
There are plenty of other examples of arguments that are put forward by contributors 
who would without doubt fall into Steger’s category of ‘globalism’ but who directly 
contradict the uncontrollability thesis. For instance. Wolf, commenting on Crook’s 
assessment, rebuts the view that governments are helpless in the face of globalization. 
He calls this claim ‘an economic swindle’ (Wolf 2005, p. 3). Similarly, a free trade 
economist Jagdish Bhagwati asserts the necessity of control: ‘globalization must be 
managed so that its fundamentally benign effects are ensured and reinforced. Without 
this wise management, it is imperiled’ (Bhagwati 2004, p. 35).
The assertions contradicting what are allegedly ‘globalist claims’ from within ‘globalist’ 
territory put Steger’s conceptualization in doubt, hiterestingly, while asserting that the 
irreversibility and uncontrollability of globalization are the defining claims of
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‘globalism’, Steger acknowledges -  although only in passing -  that these beliefs are 
contradicted even in The Lexus and the Olive Tree (Steger 2005a, p. 79). This neoliberal 
bestseller by Thomas Friedman is nominated by Steger to the status of a paradigmatic 
globalist interpretation and it is the only ‘market globalist’ narrative that Steger 
examines in detail in his latest book (Steger 2008). The fact that the claims of 
globalization’s irreversibility and uncontrollability, which Steger offers as a key element 
in the foundational structure of ‘globalism’, are not consistently upheld in the very 
contribution that he puts forward as the epitome of this ‘ideology’, leaves Steger’s 
proposal open to question.
The remaining claims, save the contention that globalization will eventually benefit 
everyone (claim four), have not gone unchallenged either within what Steger would have 
called ‘globalism’. For example, the link between globalization and democracy (claim 
five) is opposed by Lai fiom a somewhat conservative point of view that entails some 
reservations about the applicability of Western principles to other cultural contexts (Lai 
2000), while Sachs warns against overly economistic interpretations (claim one) thus 
embarking on what is a more ‘socialized’ variant of neoliberalism (Sachs 2005), The 
peculiarities concerning claim six, i.e., that globalization requires a war on teiTor, are 
admittedly explicable in terms of the sudden change of political circumstances following 
the attacks on the United States in September 2001. This is where Steger himself locates 
the origin of the inconsistencies pertaining to this claim. But the deviations from the
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other four claims are not adequately explained by 9/11 since most of the contributions 
that I have referred to above had been published prior to that event.
Except for their patchy occurrence, another problem pertaining to the ‘claims of 
globalism’ is their structural function in this hypothetical ideological construction. On 
several occasions, Steger implies that the ‘globalist claims’ are used insti'umentally in 
political mobilization efforts and partisan strategy. Accordingly, the idea that 
globalization is inevitable and uncontrollable ‘has the potential to produce an immense 
political payoff (Steger 2008, p. 187). Steger develops this opinion on the occasion of 
addressing the question of an ideological tension that is generated by the dogma of 
inevitability that allegedly permeates the ‘globalist’ territory:
But isn’t the belief in the inevitability of globalization a poor fit for a 
market globalism rooted in Hayekian principles? After all, thi'oughout 
the twentieth centmy, liberals and conservatives of all stripes and 
shades criticized Marxism for its devaluation of the power of ideas and 
other non-economic factors. In particular, they attacked Marx and 
Engels’s materialist conception of history as a deteiministic doctrine 
that predicted the demise of capitalism in the name of economic 
inevitability. So, why would influential market globalists like 
Friedman linlc their projected path of globalization to such an 
economistic narrative of historical inexorability? (Steger 2008, p. 187)
Steger’s explanation of this unexpected ideological assertion of ‘globalism’ is offered in 
the following teims:
[T]he presentation of globalization as some sort of natural force, like 
an earthquake or gravity, makes it easier for globalists to convince 
people that they must adapt to the “discipline of the market” if they are 
to survive and prosper. Thus, the notion of inexorably integrating
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markets functions as a suppressant to dissenting discourses. Public 
policy based on economic inevitability appears to be above politics; 
elites simply carry out what is ordained by the logic of globalization. 
Resistance would be unnatural, irrational, and ineffective. (Steger 
2008, p. 187)
This rationalization puts Steger’s model into further doubt. While political strategy is a 
reasonable explanation for a deteiministic interpretation of globalization (where such an 
inteipretation is indeed present!), a question remains as to whether an inteipretation 
motivated in that way provides an adequate criterion for delineating a distinct ideology. 
On closer inspection, and along with Steger’s understanding of their function, as cited 
above, the inevitability and uncontrollability claims (and arguably the remaining 
‘globalist claims’ as well) amount to what Martin Seliger termed ‘operative ideology’ 
(Seliger 1970) or, using the vocabulary of Freeden, the ‘perimeter’. This is the area of 
ideological moiphology that hosts conceptions mediating the adjustment of ideology’s 
core principles to a given political reality. If this is the case, then Steger’s ‘claims’ are 
not adequate as the criteria for delineating an ideological system. The ‘operative level’ is 
of course indispensable to any ideological construction. It provides the platform on 
which core ideas acquire a more precise import in the light of specific political 
developments. However, any particular instance of a conceptual interpretation involved 
in the translation of general principles into concrete policies is not a necessary element 
of its ideological host. Indeed, any such interpretation is potentially subject to 
modification, marginalization, or even elimination in the course of political changes as 
well as in connection with the evolution of the ideological structure in which it has 
developed.
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This vulnerability of operative concepts to political change and ideological 
transfonnation is well exemplified by the arguments that Steger attempts to amass in the 
‘globalise cluster. The provisional character of the claims of globalization’s inevitability 
or uncontrollability -  to stick to just these two claims -  has been attested by the fact that 
they have been disrupted by ideological priorities of a more fundamental significance, as 
well as having been affected by positions foimulated on the same level of articulation, 
that is to say, on the interface between political thought and political action. Thus, as I 
have demonstrated, the pressure of more salient ideological assumptions referring to 
human agency and free will has blocked the notion that globalization is inevitable and 
uncontrollable from acquiring a more durable place in this current of thinking. At the 
same time, the claims concerning the alleged inevitability and uncontrollability of 
globalization have been denigrated by many ‘globalist’ ideologists as counterproductive 
also in relation to political action. Most characteristically, these ideas have been blamed 
for the spread of political complacency and passivity. David Henderson, a frequent 
contributor to the polemical publishing of the British free-market think-tank. Institute of 
Economic Affairs, has for example argued that to maintain the robustness of the case for 
globalization, an ideological mobilization is needed to defend the process against its 
enemies. ‘The celebrations are overdone’ — he declares -  ‘the new collectivists’ are at 
the gates with the potential to stop the process (Henderson 2001, p. 8). In other words, 
the ineversibility and uncontrollability theses may be ideologically useful at a given 
place and time but they bend or even break under pressure of more durable ideological
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beliefs framing a given interpretation or in confr ontation with a different set of political 
priorities emerging at a given time.
In light of this, Steger’s attempt to construct an ideological entity starts from conceptual 
components that are not reliable as fundamental building blocs. While ideologies are by 
definition action-orientated, their identities are constituted by ideas that have more 
durable meanings than would be determined by any set of actual political circumstances. 
What is more, ideological cores consist of broader concepts which, in combination, are 
capable of providing conceptual scaffolding for a distinctive vision of human nature and 
of the most optimal social environment for nurturing its best aspects. The ‘six claims of 
globalism’ fail also on this account. Besides its volatility, this cluster of interpretations 
does not include huge swatlies of what ideologies, by definition, are able to offer, that is 
to say, a comprehensive, and more or less explicitly formulated, anthropology, 
metaphysics and ethics.
The ‘six claims of globalism’ -  were they consistently present -  would therefore not 
have provided a basis for a full political ideology. Even in combination they have a 
narrow scope and do not offer an adequate basis for a distinct view of human nature and 
other equally fundamental issues. At most, they might meet the criteria of what Freeden 
calls a ‘thin-centred ideology’ (Freeden 1998, pp. 750-751). But if, as I demonstrated 
earlier, there are reasons to doubt the regular occurrence of most of these claims in
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paradigmatic exemplifications of what Steger seems to have in mind as ‘globalism’, then 
the existence of even a thin ideology is put into doubt.
Pulling together the threads of my critique of Steger’s model thus fai', the suggestion that 
‘globalism’ constitutes a new ideology is unsustainable for reasons that pertain to the 
criteria provided by Freeden to the effect that an ideology must be ‘established’, 
‘distinct’, and ‘full’ (Freeden 1998, pp. 749-750). So far, I have argued that ‘globalism’ 
is neither established nor full. This cluster of interpretations is not established in that 
most of the ‘claims’ that Steger suggests as its core building blocks are not consistently 
upheld even in what Steger himself nominates as key ‘globalist’ interpretations. 
Moreover, what Steger distinguishes as ‘globalism’ is not a full ideology in that it fails 
to offer a comprehensive socio-political vision. ‘Globalism’ classes more convincingly 
as a set of rhetorical devices opportune in the given political context but contingent on a 
broader worldview and on their ovm unable to offer relevant answers to a wide range of 
social and political problems.
This does not mean that the currents that Steger places under the umbrella of ‘globalism’ 
do not partake in a common ideological identity. The problem is rather that the criteria 
that Steger selects to group these inteipretations in one class are too narrow to provide a 
functional and durable distinction. Distinctiveness is the third criterion of an ideology 
according to Freeden’s model that Steger claims to follow (Steger 2005b). Accordingly, 
a distinct ideology adopts conceptual patterns ‘unique to itself alone’ (Freeden 1998, p.
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750). But, as I am going to demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter, most of the 
proposals that Steger discusses under the ‘six claims of globalism’ are clearly 
identifiable as conceptual threads of classical liberalism which often reach beyond the 
liberal territory into conservatism. This way of thinking had been present in classical 
liberalism far in advance of the neoliberal fixation on globalization and the similarities 
between classical liberal interpretations and ‘globalist claims’ are not just erratic 
overlaps but represent an organic continuity. In the next section I develop my argument 
by juxtaposing what Steger demarcates as ‘globalism’ with the key concepts of classical 
liberalism as an ideology that ‘has always been about globalization’ (Young 2002, p.
173). I substantiate my conceptualization of this set of interpretations of globalization as 
liberal by examining theft interaction with the principle of liberty and their compatibility 
in the context of liberalism’s universalist approach. I demonstrate that while the classical 
liberal concept of globalization is contingent on this ideology’s understanding of liberty 
and on its universalism, the meanings of these extremely capacious fundamentals are in 
turn updated to novel political circumstances in the process of classical liberalism’s 
engagement with the new concept.
Classical liberalism: liberty, markets and globalization
The broad characteristics of the classical liberal understanding of what liberty is, and 
why it could, and should, be universalized, derive fi'om the socio-historical milieu in 
which classical liberalism came into being. As a comprehensive political doctrine 
classical liberalism emerged in the late eighteenth century. It was an expression of the
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aspirations of the bourgeoisie, the class that had rejected the rule of absolute monarchs 
and the unearned privileges of the aristocracy and that was in the process of giving rise 
to full-blown capitalism. Accordingly, the classical strand of liberalism understands the 
core component of libeity to be freedom from undue constraints imposed by all overtly 
non-meritocratic systems of social stratification. This classical liberal concept of liberty 
has been made to work on behalf of the economic and political priorities of the 
bourgeoisie and has thus become associated with the functioning of an economic system 
freed fiom arbitrary feudal obligations.
Liberalism’s tribute to the free market economy contains several interconnected threads. 
Markets are presented as relentlessly efficient and, by implication, as the only reliable 
way to eliminate poverty and destitution. In the course of this utilitarian argument, 
markets are elevated to the status of a paradigmatic arrangement of a free society, a 
perfect mechanism not just for the running of the economy but also for the modelling of 
other spheres of social life. Markets are believed to promote vital moral qualities that are 
conducive to the ‘good life’ in society. Economic freedom is conceptualized as 
underpinning political freedom and economic liberalization is said to entail 
democratization although, as I pointed out earlier, it is important to note that this view 
tends to be compromised either on the more ‘social’ edge of classical liberalism where 
emphasis may be shifted towards a different set of prerequisites of democracy (Sachs 
2005) as well as on liberalism’s somewhat ‘conservative’ periphery where the objective 
of democratization may be de-emphasized altogether (Lai 2000 and Lai 2006). What
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applies to domestic affairs is also valid on the international stage. Here, the expansion of 
free markets is posited by classical liberals as the most reliable guarantee of international 
peace and of the stability of the international system.
The tone employed by leading contemporaiy classical liberals (or ‘neoliberals’) in 
making the case for free markets has been confident and straightfbiivard: ‘The market is 
the most powerful institution for raising living standards ever invented; indeed there are 
no rivals’ (Wolf 2005, p. xvii); ‘No other path toward full economic modernity has been 
proved to be viable’ (Fukuyama 1992, p. 97); ‘More open and competitive markets are 
the only sustainable vehicle for growing a nation out of poverty’ (Friedman 2006, p. 
399; see also Dollar and Kraay 2001 and 2002 for a widely debated articulation of this 
claim). As I showed in the previous section, one variant of this optimistic teleology of 
the free market / free trade economy, that is to say, an unwavering belief that 
globalization will eventually benefit everyone, has been elevated by Steger to the status 
of a claim constitutive of a new ideology (‘claim four’; see Steger 2005a, pp. 71-77). 
Steger is certainly right that an assertion of the perfection of the market and 
consequently an ardent promotion of a worldwide expansion of its principles have 
featured jubilantly in neoliberal publications abundant in the wake of the Cold War. Yet, 
what Steger fails to appreciate or, more specifically, what he admits but does not take 
anything like a full account of, is that the claim which he pinpoints as distinctively 
‘globalist’ has a much longer history. The arguments of contemporary eulogists of the 
virtues of free trade are not original but draw on a pool of theories, assertions and
Classical liberalism
prescriptions that have been accumulated in the liberal tradition over at least the last two 
centuries.
A prime example of such market-zealous argumentation is provided by the doctrine of 
so-called ‘Manchesterism’, a loose name for economic and political movements that 
originated in Manchester in the nineteenth century. The key protagonists of this current, 
Richard Cobden (1804—1865) and John Bright (1811-1889), were persistent 
campaigners against the mercantilist protectionism that the British Empire pursued at 
that time as well as prolific writers (McCord 1993 [1958]). Their work prefigures the 
profound devotion to free trade demonstrated by contemporary neoliberals. Bright, for 
example, found it apt to define himself as a representative of those people ‘into whose 
hearts free-trade principles had sunlc, and become, verily, a religious question’ (Bright, 
in Semmel 2004, p. 162). Cobden in turn insisted, in similarly ‘pious’ terms, on ‘the 
sacredness of the principle’ (of free trade) and declared that he could ‘never agree to 
tamper with it’ (Cobden 1903 [1846]). Cobden characterized the ultimate aim of his 
campaign as making others ‘conform to ti’uth’ (Cobden 1903 [1843]) and maintained 
that ‘the truth’ had an epochal significance: ‘there is no event that has ever happened in 
the world’s histoiy [...] more calculated to promote the enduring interests of humanity 
than the establisliment of the principle of Free Trade’ (Cobden 1903 [1852]). While 
examples of nineteenth century eulogies of the market could be multiplied, the point has 
been made: the ‘globalist’ claim tJiat globalization is good for everyone is not as 
idiosyncratic as is suggested by Steger. Rather, the claim is an integral component of the
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classical liberal equation, a new term for what has always been an explicit aspiration of 
this ideology, that is to say, the creation of a free-market economy on a worldwide scale.
Globalization is thus defined in the ambit of neoliberalism in emphatically economistic 
tenns: its universal benevolence is said to be the result of the fact that it embodies the 
logic of the market. An example of this identification of globalization with the market is 
provided by David Henderson who describes globalization as ‘free movement of goods, 
services, laboui" and capital, thereby creating a single market in inputs and outputs; and 
full national treatment for foreign investors (and nationals working abroad) so that, 
economically speaking, there are no foreigners’ (Henderson, in Wolf 2005, p. 14). In a 
similar vein, Thomas Friedman equates globalization with ‘the spread of free-market 
capitalism to virtually every country in the world’ (Friedman 2000, p. 9) and points it 
out as the reason for ‘erasing borders and uniting the world into a single, lucrative, but 
brutally competitive marketplace’ (Friedman 1996). In even more unequivocal, if also 
rather self-centred teims, is globalization described by Percy Bamevik, then President of 
the ABB Industrial Group:
I would define globalization as the freedom for my group of 
companies to invest where it wants when it wants, to produce what it 
wants, to buy and sell where it wants, and support the fewest 
restrictions possible coming from labour laws and social conventions. 
(Bamevik, in Dayton 2004, p. 25)
In Steger’s account, this identification of globalization with ‘the liberalization and global 
integration of markets’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 52-60) that is ubiquitous in the currently
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hegemonic discourses of globalization stands for another claim in a set that purportedly 
gives rise to a new ideological construction (claim one of ‘globalism’ in Steger’s 
conceptualization). Conversely, I suggest that the market-focused reading of 
globalization represents an incorporation of a new concept into an established classical 
liberal logic and an example of how ideologies interpret any new political phenomenon 
or development in such a way that it coheres with their overall profiles, reinforces their 
objectives, and legitimizes their means.
The universalization of free markets and the removal of any obstacles to trade has been a 
purpose of classical liberalism since its outset and the claims that are made with 
reference to globalization in the present-day free-marketeer camp are far from original. 
Naturally, the classical liberal logic, like any other ideologic, cannot dispense with being 
up to date with botli new socio-political developments and new vocabulary. For 
example, classical liberals may feel compelled to take account of new teclmologies as 
having an impact on the ease with which the classical liberal goals can be achieved, or 
they may find it expedient to make appropriate use of the ‘global talk’. But in broader 
terms their arguments are decipherable as drawing on classical liberal contributions 
generated in the last two centuries or so. In the classical liberal account, free market and 
free trade -  I assume that in a global context the former implies the latter -  are 
unsurpassed in producing material prosperity, social stability and international peace. 
Those whom Steger labels as globalists reiterate not just the general appraisal of the
91
Classical liberalism
market but also point out the same causes, mechanisms and spheres of market 
benevolence.
Markets, globalization and the good polity
That the market is a realm of liberty in which the individual pursuit of selfish goals 
serves the common good has been a constitutive claim of liberalism, articulated already 
by Adam Smith (1723-1790), himself influenced by the writings of a Dutch economist 
and philosopher active in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Bernard de 
Mandeville (1670-1733) (Hundert 2008). But while the liberal endorsement of free 
markets takes off from the acclamation of their supreme economic outcomes, the social 
and political spheres are also said to benefit fr om the freedom of the economy.
On the most basic level, free markets are said to provide the necessary conditions for a 
well-functioning society in that they generate the type of morality and character that are 
conducive to social cohesion. Thus, to use a recent example of this argumentation, 
Martin Wolf has credited the markets with a power to produce a certain type of 
personality as they ‘require, reward and reinforce valuable moral qualities: 
trustworthiness, reliability, effort, civility, self-reliance and self-restraint’ (Wolf 2005, p. 
55). This belief has persisted throughout the development of classical liberalism and it is 
to be found in both foundational liberal theories as well as in most recent neoliberal 
constmctions. With regard to early liberal contributions, Jolin Stuart Mill (1806-1873) 
illustrated the case in point when he argued that ‘the economical advantages of
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commerce are surpassed in importance by those of its effects, which are intellectual and 
moral’ (Mill 1909, pp. Ill, 17, 14). Émile Durkheim’s theory of organic solidarity which 
suggests that the mechanism of modem social integration consists in economic 
interdependence springs to mind as a later expression of this way of thinldng. Durldieim 
(1858-1917) insisted that the members of modem societies do not need to Imow one 
another, nor are required to adhere to the same morality, in order to fomi a well- 
integrated social order. Rather, in complex economies based on high levels of 
professional specialization, individuals are held together by what Durkheim saw as more 
sophisticated and reliable means, namely, the fact tliat they depend on one another for 
the fulfilment of their needs (Durkheim 1997 [1933]). An equivalent of Durkheim’s 
argument has nowadays been employed by Thomas Friedman to praise the integrative 
impact of the global economy:
In the flat world, the division of labor is steadily becoming more and 
more complex, with a lot more people interacting with a lot of other 
people they don’t know and may never meet. If you want to have a 
modem complex division of labor, you have to be able to put more 
trast in strangers. (Friedman 2006, p. 412)
The classical liberal belief in the socially integrative impact of the free market resonates 
with the laissez-faire-s,ty\Qà rejection, or at least marginalization, of institutions 
perceived as less competent or, what is worse, getting in the way of free market 
efficiency. Most typically, the subject of critique has been the nation-state, but 
iiitemational institutions, such as the World Trade Organization or the Intemational 
Monetary Fund, also got their bit of criticism as puiported obstacles to economic
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freedom and, by implication, to the spread of what classical liberalism defines as the 
right social values (Vasquez 2000, p. 9; Lai 2000, p. 33). In tlie context of globalization, 
statements that make the case for limiting the role of the nation-state have become truly 
commonplace.*^ To use just two examples, Thomas Friedman has advised states to 
‘accept the verdicts of the global markets’ and ‘be ready to take punishment’ (Friedman, 
2000, p. 363) while Kenichi Olunae, a Japanese business gum, has made an illustrious 
case for the elimination of the state as ‘increasingly a nostalgic fiction.’ (Ohmae 1996, p.
12):
The uncomfortable tmth is that, in terms of the global economy, nation 
states have become little more than bit actors. They may originally 
have been, in their mercantilist phase, independent, powerfully 
efficient engines of wealth creation. More recently [...] they have 
become -  first and foremost -  remarkably inefficient engines of wealth 
distribution. (Ohmae 1996, p. 12)
Much has been made of this contemporary neoliberal assertion of the ‘markets good, 
states bad’ thesis; indeed, it has become one of the key areas of focus in readers and 
introductions for undergraduate globalization courses (see for example Beynon and 
Dunkerley 2000, or Lechner and Boli 2007). As I showed earlier, Steger has put a 
related view in terms of ‘claim three of globalism’ according to which globalization is
But some evolution of positions as regards the state has taken place even within the 
hard core of neoliberalism. For example, Francis Fukuyama has recently called for ‘state 
building’ (Fukuyama 2004) and even Milton Friedman expressed some reservations à 
propos privatization (Saul 2005, p. 251). Nevertheless, the acceptance of the state 
remains qualified and its competencies are usually defined as delimited to guaranteeing 
social stability as a prerequisite for a business-friendly environment.
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not controlled by anyone (Steger 2005a, pp. 66-71). Accordingly, state intervention is 
not just undesirable; it is also futile. Again, however, this is not a new thread. As is 
widely laiown, the key thesis of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom was that even apparently 
benign state intervention is destined with time to transmogrify into a totalitarian tyranny 
(Hayek 2001 [1944]; see also Wolf 2005, p. xiii), while Milton Friedman put the same 
claim in positive terms;
The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom 
directly, namely competitive capitalism, also promotes political 
freedom because it separates economic power from political power and 
in this way enables the one to offset the other. (Friedman 1962, p. 9)
But the idea of positing states as obstacles to political freedoms as well as economic 
efficiency features prominently also in much earlier liberal statements, for example in 
the argumentation submitted in the early nineteenth centuiy by a French liberal publicist 
and philosopher Benjamin Constant (1767-1830):
[C]ommerce inspires in men a vivid love of individual independence. 
Coimnerce supplies their needs, satisfies their desires, without the 
inteiwention of the authorities. This inteiwention is almost always -  and 
I do not know why I say almost -  this intervention is indeed always a 
trouble and an embarrassment. Every time collective power wishes to 
meddle with private speculations, it harasses the speculators. Every 
time governments pretend to do our own business, they do it more 
incompetently and expensively than we would. (Constant 2007 [1819], 
pp. 18-19)
It is worth noting, however, that while classical liberalism has had a long histoiy of 
claiming that the expansion of markets is most conducive to the good polity, classical 
liberals have not been single-minded with regard to specific political arrangements to
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frame free market economies. According to Steger, ‘globalise slogans concerning the 
political effects of globalization amount to exultant proclamations of worldwide 
democratization. Steger puts this position in terms of ‘claim five of globalism’ (Steger 
2005a, pp. 78-85). It is unquestionable that in recent decades the connection between 
free market economy and democracy has been widely acclaimed in the neoliberal camp. 
Numerous neoliberals have presented the ‘free economy’ as ‘a necessai’y condition for a 
stable and enduring democracy’ (for example Wolf 2005, p. xiii) and some, like 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge, have emphasized the connection between globalization 
and democratization in explicit tenus:
It is not coincidental that the pace of globalization has picked up with 
the spread of democratic rights; the two are symbiotic. Yet 
globalization also widens the concept of what the maximum degree of 
individual freedom could be. (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000, p. 
xxvi)
However, the case for democracy is not unequivocal within the ideological area 
demarcated by Steger as globalism. Commitment to democracy is weak at the ‘right’ end 
of this delineated spectrum, i.e., nearer a more conservatively inclined set of 
inteipretations (Lai 2000, pp. 38 and 40; see also Lai 2006). My understanding of the 
various deviations from any ‘typical’ classical liberal approach (like the question of 
democracy) is that the divergences reflect the continuous diversity of opinions within the 
classical liberal spectrum. The emphasis on democratization was not a primary or an 
inevitable feature of early classical liberalism. Indeed, some analysts maintain that there 
was ‘dichotomy between liberalism and democracy’ (Samet and Schmeidler 2003, p.
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214; see also Gottfried 2001, pp. 30^8). While this view is in my opinion overstated, 
the fact remains that there is a potential of tension between democracy and liberty in that 
democratic regimes may be perceived as suppressing individual differences (vide John 
Stuart Mill). Whatever ambiguity on the subject of democracy remains within the ambit 
of classical liberalism, the current classical liberal interpretations of democracy unfold 
along trajectories that have a long history within liberalism, even though some may be 
closer than others to the mainstream of classical liberal reasoning.
Globalization o f markets and the pacification o f international relations 
While the globalization of liberalism is presented by classical liberals as conducive to an 
optimal arrangement of domestic political affairs, it is also elevated to the status of a 
guarantor of international peace: ‘[IJiberal democracy does not only have domestic 
virtues. It is also the only system of governance for which harmonious and co-operative 
inter-state relations are a natural outcome’ (Wolf 2005, p. 33). Exemplifying this way of 
thinking about the role of markets in intemational relations (and somewhat anticipating 
‘globalism’s claim five’ which postulates that globalization furthers the spread of 
democracy), Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth o f Nations'.
[CJommerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good 
government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals, 
among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a 
continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency 
upon their superiors. This, though it has been the least observed, is by 
far the most important of all their effects. (Smith 1998 [1796], p. 260)
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That the argument in favour of the pacifying potential of free trade was really ‘the least 
observed’ when the Scottish economist was writing his magnum opus is questionable, at 
least on the basis of even a cursory reading of some of the towering European 
philosophers of the Enlightenment. The case was put forward earlier by the Frenchman, 
Charles-Louis de Montesquieu (1689-1755): ‘the natural effect of commerce is to lead 
to peace. Two nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent’ 
(Montesquieu, in Manent 2004, p. 38) as well as by David Hume (1711-1776), another 
Scot who argued that ‘benevolent sympathies’ between nations are based on trade 
(Hume, in Lippmann and Best 2004, p. 194) and also by the Prussian Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804) in his tract Perpetual Peace:
The spirit of trade cannot coexist with war, and sooner or later this 
spirit dominates every people. For among all those powers (or means) 
that belong to a nation, financial power may be the most reliable in 
forcing nations to pursue the noble cause of peace (though not from 
moral motives); and wherever in the world war threatens to break out, 
they will try to head it off through mediation, just as if they were 
permanently leagued for this purpose. (Kant 2003 [1795], p. 25)
The idea was then taken up by later generations of classical liberal thinkers, beginning 
with ones like Claude Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850) in France who put the notion of the 
pacifying effect of trade in terms of warning rather than fulfilled promise: ‘[w]hen goods 
cannot cross borders, armies will’ (Bastiat, in Griswold 1998). In England, it was 
Richard Cobden who proclaimed: ‘Free Trade is God’s diplomacy. There is no other 
certain way of uniting people in the bonds of peace’ (Cobden, in Friedman 2006, p. 515; 
see also Cobden 1903, p. 222). A bit later (ironically in 1913!), a British liberal pundit
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Norman Angell (1872-1967) argued this point in his book The Great Illusion in which 
he claimed that national economies had become so interdependent that war no longer 
made sense:
[Wjealth in the economically civilized world is founded upon credit 
and commercial contract (these being the outgrowth of an economic 
interdependence due to the increasing division of labor and greatly 
developed communication). If credit and commercial contract are 
tampered with in an attempt at confiscation, the credit-dependent 
wealth is undermined, and its collapse involves that of the conqueror; 
so that if conquest is not to be self-injurious it must respect the 
enemy’s property, in which case it becomes economically futile. Thus 
the wealth of conquered tenitory remains in the hands of the 
population of such territoiy. (Angell 1913, pp. x-xi)
Nowadays the same set of claims is made with regard to globalization. The style of 
argumentation wherein a waning past is contrasted with the pacified present also 
remains unchanged. What is typical of those classical liberal arguments is their certainty 
that the peaceful state of affairs has already been achieved. This, again, is as true of the 
unequivocal conclusions of Constant in his The Liberty o f the Ancients Compared with 
that o f  the Moderns -  ‘an age must come in which commerce replaces war. We have 
reached this age’ (Constant 2007 [1819], p. 17) -  as it is of the claims made from the 
vantage point of globalization and contrasting it with the circumstances of the Cold War 
when ‘arms races and deepening antagonisms [...] made sense [because] political 
control over territory was necessary to gain access to its raw materials and markets’ 
(Lindsey 2000, p. 46).
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This claim of Brink Lindsey attests to another thread of continuity in classical liberal 
reasoning. As in early liberal theories so also in neoliberal arguments the notion of 
economic integration as a pacifying force is based on the belief that the establishment of 
worldwide economic freedom guarantees intemational peace by eliminating war as a 
means of achieving economic advantage. This view is also expressed in the flagship 
contribution of Fukuyama: ‘given the fact that access to those same resources can be 
obtained peacefully through a global system of free trade, war makes much less 
economic sense than it did two or tliree hundred years ago’ (Fukuyama 1992, p. 262), as 
well as in an account by Wolf who asserts that ‘harmonious intemational relations’ 
occur when ‘the prosperity of a nation derives not from the size of the territory or 
population under its direct control, but from the combination of intemal economic 
development with intemational exchange’ (Wolf 2005, p. 33; for similar claims see also 
Mueller 1989 and Rosecrance 1999).
But the most emblematic argument regarding the economic foundation of the 
intemational peace is to be found in two books by Thomas Friedman. In his passionate 
acclamation of the teclinology-generated global age entitled suggestively The Lexus and 
the Olive Tree, Friedman offers the so-called ‘golden arches theory of conflict 
prevention’ (Friedman 2000, pp. 248-275) raising McDonald’s coiporation, the 
archetype of a global organization, to the status of a guarantor of peace: ‘[n]o two 
countries that both had McDonald’s had fought a war against each otlier since each got 
its McDonald’s’ (Friedman 2000, p. 248). This is how Friedman explains his verdict:
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[W]lien a country reached a level of economic development where it 
had a middle class big enough to support a McDonald’s network, it 
became a McDonald’s country. And people in McDonald’s countries 
didn’t like to fight wars anymore, they preferred to wait in line for 
burgers. (Friedman 2000, p. 249)
More recently, this New York Times columnist updated his theory of intemational peace, 
now under the heading of ‘The Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention’ (Friedman 2006, pp. 
515-539);
[T]he advent and spread of just-in-time global supply chains in the flat 
world are an even greater restraint on geopolitical adventurism than the 
more general rising standard of living that McDonald’s symbolized. 
[...] The Dell theory stipulates: No two countiies that are both part of a 
major global supply chain, like Dell’s, will ever fight a war against 
each other as long as they are both part of the same supply chain. 
Because people embedded in major supply chains don’t want to fight 
old-time wars anymore. They want to make just-in-time deliveries of 
goods and services -  and enjoy the rising standards of living that come 
with that. (Friedman 2006, p. 522)
Friedman’s light-heartedly formulated position brings up a notion of commerce being 
sufficiently engaging to put people off war:
Countries whose workers and industries are woven into a major global 
supply chain know that they cannot take an hour, a week, or a month 
off for war without dismpting industries and economies around the 
world and thereby risking the loss of their place in that supply chain 
for a long time, which could be extremely costly. (Friedman 2006, p. 
522)
The latter argument is, once again, nothing new. It harks back to the long-established 
notion that tradesmen do not have time to spare for wars. Following the First World 
War, a similar position was argued by a liberal economist Joseph Schumpeter (1883-
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1950): ‘The competitive system absorbs the full energies of most of the people at all 
economic levels [...] There is much less excess energy to be vented in war and conquest 
than in any precapitalist society’ (Schumpeter 1951 [1919], p. 69). Going another 
century back reveals other examples of this claim in liberal thought. They are available, 
for example, in the work of Constant: ‘commerce does not, like war, leave in men’s lives 
inteiwals of inactivity. [...] individual, occupied with his speculations, his enterprises, the 
pleasures he obtains or hopes for, does not wish to be distracted from them’ (Constant 
2007 [1819], p. 18). This is just another evidence of the continuity of classical 
liberalism: the substitution of McDonald’s customers or international chain supply 
employees for Constant’s ‘men of commerce’ is not enough to claim — as Manfred 
Steger does -  tlie status of a vanguard of a new ideology for Friedman’s theodicy of 
global markets as relentless pacifiers of intemational relations.
The liberal (de) ontology: individualism, universalism and progress 
Classical liberal prescriptions employed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to 
defend the bourgeois economic system thus foreshadow an analogous range of 
arguments that are mobilized today to make the case for the globalization of this order. 
The enduring logic of this theodicy of a seamless global economy provides ample 
evidence for the relevance of classical liberalism as an ideological category. But the 
continuity claim can be substantiated yet more conclusively by demonstrating the 
dependence of this economic model on broader liberal principles. The belief in the 
possibility and benevolence of the globalization of free markets is articulated by this
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cluster of interpretations in connection with ideas that are of fundamental significance in 
the ambit of classical liberalism, notably individualism, universalism and an unwavering 
belief in progress. A few examples of their continuous influence are provided below to 
show how embedded the liberal concept of globalization is in the broader and long- 
lasting liberal worldview.
That classical liberalism is an individualist philosophy is a definitional truism as well as 
a paradigmatic proclamation of classical liberals themselves, and a charge repeated by 
their critics fi'om Marx to contemporary communitarians (Machan 1998, p. 1). Liberal 
individualism implies that, to cite Robert EccleshalTs succinct description, ‘what is 
essential to human existence does not depend upon social relations’ (Eccleshall 2003a, 
p. 27). The liberal notion of social contract means that individuals enter social relations 
because they find it convenient to do so. At the same time, the individual self is 
‘independent of and logically prior to the community in which it resides’ (Eccleshall 
2003a, p. 28) and social structures and relations that result from voluntary contracts are 
maintained by a sum of individual actions rather than some higher holistic principle.
The idea of individuals unencumbered in social relations leads liberalism to a conception 
emphasizing the unity of human nature. Accordingly, individual selves, whatever 
specific culture they happen to inhabit, share the features that are constitutive of their 
humanity. The characteristics common to all people are the only ones that really matter 
and so it is to them that liberalism refers in its anthropology. On the other hand, the
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differences that are observable between human beings result from arbitrary and 
superfluous cultural impositions rather than being innate or essential to the true character 
of any individual. In short, human nature is the same at all times and in all places; 
liberalism proclaims itself capable of discovering its qualities, responding to its most 
fundamental needs and releasing its full potential.
As with more specific liberal proposals discussed in preceding sections, liberal univer­
salism can be traced several centuries back. In the case of Kant’s essay Idea o f a 
Universal Histojy with a Common Purpose (1794), the title is suggestive enough. A 
cosmopolitan thinlcer and traveller, Charles de Montesquieu was equally unequivocal 
when exclaiming ‘tlie heart is a native of any country’ (Montesquieu 1993 [1758], p.
135). In his tmn, the liberal philosopher and revolutionary Thomas Paine (1737-1809) 
declared famously ‘my country is the world’ while the French writer and reformer Denis 
Diderot (1713-1784) wrote to David Hume in 1768; ‘you belong to all nations and 
you’ll never ask an unhappy man for his birth certificate. I flatter myself that I am, like 
you, the citizen of the great city of the world’ (Diderot, in Hamilton 1996, p. 26). A 
similar cosmopolitan logic peimeates today tlie entire liberal territory, including 
philosophical liberalism and modem liberal ideas, with Fukuyama offering an example 
of the claim to universality formulated from within classical liberalism:
[T]he principles of liberty and equality [...] are not accidents or the 
results of ethnocentric prejudice, but are in fact discoveries about the 
nature of man as man, whose truth does not diminish but grows more 
evident as one’s point of view becomes more cosmopolitan. 
(Fukuyama 1992, p. 51)
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The liberal arguments in favour of globalization make especially clear sense in 
connection with this liberal universalism -  the possibility and desirability of a global 
liberal order is claimed on the basis of the belief that what works well in the (already) 
liberal world will work well elsewhere. The hope that accompanies this project is that, as 
John Gray puts it in his critical account of liberalism, ‘human beings will shed their 
traditional allegiances and their local identities and unite in a universal civilization 
grounded in generic humanity and a rational morality’ (Gray 1995, p. 1).
The classical liberal argument that this ‘universal civilization’ is optimally advanced by 
following the logic of the free market has been demonstrated in earlier sections of this 
chapter. Again, what should be added here is that in the forefront of classical liberal 
theorizing about the reasons for which the markets work is an explanation pointing out 
that economic freedom is ‘natural’, squaring with the most fundamental qualities of 
human character:
I have always known that the only economic system that works is a 
market economy. [...] This is the only natural economy, the only kind 
that makes sense, the only one that can lead to prosperity, because it is 
the only one that reflects the nature of life itself. (Havel 1992, p. 62)
Classical liberals would have agreed on this question with Vaclav Havel’s unequivocal 
declaration but -  to once more emphasize a strong ideological link witli the past of 
liberalism -  the claim is not original. A reminder of continuity is available for example 
in the writings of John Bright who embarked on the defence of the principle of free trade 
by insisting that it was not solely ‘a principle applied to England, but a principle
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established now which is eternal in its truth and universal in its application, and must be 
applied in all nations and throughout all times’ (Cobden 1903 [1852]).
This way of thinking inevitably brings in the question of the deviations from the liberal 
course of development. Sometimes, in a manner resembling the explanations given by 
the modernization theory in the 1960s (see for example Rostow 1960 or McClelland 
1961), classical liberals suggest the impact of culture as the major obstacle. This, for 
example, is the view of Wolf: ‘some cultures are more readily adapted to making a 
success of a free economy and society than others’ (Wolf 2005, pp. 24-25). But 
pessimism is not a liberal trait:
What look like immutable social values turn out to be highly malleable 
to economic circumstances and oppoitunities. Although not all cultural 
values change so easily, values deemed to be inimical to economic 
development are rarely, if ever, unalterable features of a society. 
(Sachs 2005, p. 317)
Yet again, the reason given for why classical liberal ideology ultimately triumphs in its 
clash with traditional cultures is that it squares with human nature. Classical liberals 
claim to know what ‘the rest of the world’ really needs and wants, again implying not 
just the unity of humankind but also the definitive match between human nature and the 
economic model promoted by classical liberalism:
[T]he “wretched of the earth” want to go to Disney World -  not to the 
barricades. They want the Magic Kingdom, not Les Misérables. And if 
you construct an economic and political enviromnent that gives them 
that half a sense tliat with hard work and sacrifice they will get to 
Disney World and get to enjoy the Magic Kingdom, most of them will
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stick to the game -  for far, far longer than you would ever expect. 
(Friedman 2000, p. 364)
These optimistic evaluations link globalization to progress, the possibility of which is 
another of the broad beliefs defining the liberal tenitory. The idea of universal progr ess 
along one (liberal) pathway was the leitmotif of social evolutionism in the nineteenth 
century. The Taw of three stages’, an idea developed by Auguste Comte (1798-1857), 
provides a prominent example of this way of thinking, in which ‘ Westemness constitutes 
only a final preparation for true humanity’ (Comte, in Todorov 1993, p. 30). But the 
most eminent example of the classical liberal interpretation of the history of human 
civilization in terms of universal progress was presented earlier by the French 
philosopher. Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794):
The aim of the work that I have undertaken, and its results will be to 
show by appeal to reason and fact that nature has set no teim to the 
perfection of human faculties; that the perfectibility of man is truly 
indefinite; and that the progress of this perfectibility, from now 
onwards independent of any power that might wish to halt it, has no 
other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has cast 
us. This progress will doubtless vary in speed, but it will never be 
reversed as long as the earth occupies its present place in the system of 
the universe, and as long as the general laws of the system produce 
neither a general cataclysm nor such changes as will deprive the 
human race of its present faculties and its present resources. 
(Condorcet 1955 [1794], pp. 9-10)
Also on this account, not much has changed in liberal thought. A picturesque description 
of global development towards liberalism presented by Fukuyama captures the same 
logic -  if in slightly more cautious terms -  as that endorsed by Comte and Condorcet 
and sums up liberal universalism and its progressive teleology. The discussion of the
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classical liberal inteipretation of globalization may be brought to a close by citing at 
length:
Rather than a thousand shoots blossoming into as many different 
flowering plants, manldnd will come to seem like a long wagon train 
strung out along a road. Some wagons will be pulling into town 
sharply and crisply, while others will be bivouacked back in the desert, 
or else stuck in ruts in the final pass over the mountains. Several 
wagons, attacked by Indians, will have been set aflame and abandoned 
along the way. There will be a few wagoneers who, stunned by the 
battle, will have lost their sense of direetion and are temporarily 
heading in the wrong direction, while one or two wagons will get tired 
of the journey and decide to set up permanent camps at particular 
points back along the road, though they will discover tliat to get 
tlirough the final mountain range they all must make the same pass. 
But the great majority of wagons will be making the slow journey into 
town, and most will eventually anive there. The wagons are all similar 
to one another: while they are painted different colors and are 
constructed of varied materials, each has four wheels and is drawn by 
horses, while inside sits a family hoping and praying that their journey 
will be a safe one. The apparent differences in the situations of the 
wagons will not be seen as reflecting pennanent and necessary 
differences between the people riding the wagons, but simply a 
product of their different positions along the road. (Fukuyama 1992, p. 
33!%
From ‘market globalism’ to ‘justice globalism’; a summary and a move forward
In this chapter I have demonstrated that the concept of globalization has been absorbed 
into the morphology of classical liberalism with considerable ease, while the broad idea 
of a universal civilization seems to have always been an identifier of the liberal mind. 
The evidence that I have provided and analyzed in this chapter consequently disproves 
the originality or ideological autonomy of the cluster of interpretations that Manfred 
Steger classifies as ‘globalism’. The persistence of typically classical liberal arguments
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in this set of positions suggests that ‘globalism’ does not form an ideological reality sui 
generis, but that it is located within a recognizably liberal territory.
When this is acknowledged, that is to say, when classical liberalism is accepted as the 
analytical matrix on which these decontestations of globalization depend, then their 
diversity, a rather naiTOw focus, and not-so-sporadic inconsistencies, cease to be 
problematic. The ideas grouped under the name of classical liberalism hang together by 
virtue of a shared view on more fundamental questions including distinctive 
anthropology and ethics. Within this well-established conceptual framework there is 
room for a wide, if still inevitably limited, range of decontestations of globalization 
which occupy a less critical location in the overall ideological structure. On the other 
hand, when claims referring to globalization are defined as ideological fundamentals 
then ideological constructions built upon them are susceptible to even minor 
contradictions in how the concept of globalization is understood and responded to. That 
such contradictions are indeed pervasive puts in serious doubt the solidity and durability 
of ‘globalism’ and consequently disqualifies it as a political ideology in its own right.
In parallel to this discussion of classical liberal understandings of globalization, the 
following chapter examines several representative socialist readings of the process. By 
suggesting the persistence of the category of socialism, I find myself again at odds with 
the position of Steger whose work purports the need for a reshuffling of conventional 
ideological types. This time, the case in point is Steger’s most recent book The Rise o f
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Global Imaginary (2008). This work integrates Steger’s previous analyses of the 
ideological combination of ‘market’ and ‘imperial’ globalism within a more complex 
framework that taJces account of two further currents, namely ‘justice globalism’ and 
‘jihadist globalism’. Steger presents the two ideological perspectives as the challengers 
of the dominant ideology and implies that, taken together, the four positions accurately 
map the ideological spectrum of the global era.
The category o f ‘justice globalism’, whose instances overlap with positions discussed in 
the next chapter, is highly problematic. Whereas, as I have shown, the idea of ‘market 
globalism’ isolates a set of interpretations of globalization from their classical liberal 
context and claims for them tlie status of a comprehensive ideological system, ‘justice 
globalism’ combines several distinct ideological positions in a brew that is on many 
gi'ounds mcongruous. ‘Justice globalism’, as described by Steger, contains an excessive 
diversity of currents -  radical and reformist, Marxist and social democratic, 
unequivocally globalist as well as more protectionist -  that do not add up to a coherent 
category. That ‘justice globalism’ as delineated by Steger is disjointed and internally 
extremely divided is evident fr om a brief analysis of the two examples that Steger uses 
as his only illustrations of this alleged ideology, namely the contributions of Susan 
George on the one hand, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, on the other. As I will 
show in the next chapter, the positions represented by these authors do not belong 
together. It is true tliat various interpretations covered under the umbrella of justice 
globalism may cooperate when they find it expedient to coalesce on certain issues and to
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aggregate their political effectiveness vis-à-vis their common enemies. But this does not 
mean that their differences evaporate or that they in effect fomi a new ideology. To 
claim so would amount to restating the logic of Daniel Bell’s end of ideology thesis 
according to which the post-war convergence of different political positions on the 
question of welfare state was supposed to demonstrate the disappearance of ideological 
distinctions (Bell 1962). hi short, ‘justice globalism’ and Steger’s overall tiiadic 
categorization of the politics of globalization are not reflective of the complexity of 
ideological divisions on the question. Steger’s categories might be used as descriptions 
of broad nonnative attitudes attachable to established ideologies and imbued with 
specific meanings in the light of the stmctural arrangements of their hosts. But if treated 
as distinct ideologies the three types of globalism fail to map the spectrum of the debate 
on globalization.
Before I move on, I should mention one more problem with Steger’s classification. By 
suggesting that the ideological propositions that are relevant today can be limited to four 
types of globalism, Steger effectively ignores the existence of antiglobalist positions. 
The more or less unequivocal versions of antiglobalism can be identified within the 
discourses of national populism, fascism, ecologism, and to some degree also anarchism. 
But elements of antiglobalist thinldng also find expression within some socialist 
discourses that Steger classifies together with radically globalist Marxist currents. In 
fact, to anticipate the discussion that I will offer in the next chapter, Susan George, 
whom Steger presents as the key exponent of justice globalism, has on occasion
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expressed considerable reservations about genuinely globalist goals and methods 
(George 2004). This is not to claim that George effectively belongs together with localist 
positions. It is rather to suggest that the fluctuations of her argument might be 
determined by more general concerns within a broader ideological morphology of 
socialism. Such a variation would not compromise the overarching socialist identity of 
her discourse. If, on the other hand, Susan George is to be seen primarily as a ‘justice 
globalist’ then localist implications of her stance are obviously problematic.
Dispensing with ambitions to coin new vocabulary, my argument in the next chapter is 
based on the assumption that the category of socialism may help enlighten a set of 
interpretations of the concept of globalization. This is not to imply an unqualified 
adoption of ‘socialism’ as a single operative criterion satisfactorily explaining the whole 
diversity of positions ‘to the left of liberalism’. Instead, I suggest a broad matrix of 
socialist principles that may develop in quite different directions in any instance of 
political argument, but that nevertheless are intersubjectively recognizable as forming a 
constellation. This, I believe, is a sufficient reason to keep ‘socialism’ as a tool of 
general orientation in the minefield of political ideas.
1 1 2
CHAPTER III 
SOCIALISM:
GLOBALIZATION AS THE FULFILMENT OF HISTORY
This chapter examines the way in which different meanings are bestowed on the concept 
of globalization depending on the variations in interpretations of the concepts located in 
its proximity within the three main socialist currents of Marxism, democratic socialism, 
and social democracy. The fact that their respective concepts of globalization are diverse 
and on several accounts incompatible serves as a pungent reminder that the analysis of 
the ideological readings of globalization requires attention not just to differences 
between broad ideological families but also to the conceptual shifts within the ambit of 
any family as having a potentially significant influence on the resultant understandings 
of globalization.
Socialism: a case of unity in diversity?
Several intioductions to the study of ideologies point out that the socialist tradition 
contains an even greater diversity of cmvents than other major ideologies and that 
therefore socialism is extremely difficult to pinpoint. Ian Adams suggests, for example, 
that there are many socialisms and no clear criterion to nominate the orthodox version 
(Adams 2001, p. 84), while Andrew Vincent draws attention to the fact that socialism 
fails to provide a consistent view on such fundamental matters as democracy, the state,
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and the market (Vincent 1995, pp. 104-112). In his turn, Michael Freeden explains the 
fact that ‘socialist ideology ranges freely over an unusually large spectrum’ (Freeden 
1996, p. 419) by referring to several factors, including lesser significance, when 
compared with other major ideologies, of concerns ‘with feasibility and costs of 
ideological configurations’ (Freeden 1996, p. 418). According to Freeden, socialists may 
afford a greater (than is the case with liberals or conservatives) disregard for the 
pragmatic constraints of whichever actual political reality they find themselves acting in.
This is due to the socialist ideology’s orientation towards the potentialities hidden 
beyond the horizon of an empirically given existence, that is to say, towards the future 
socialist society. The shape of that society remains not, or at least not fully, determined 
before the time when it is, in the words of one contemporary socialist, constracted ‘in 
circumstances we cannot know until we are part of that active process’ (Barker 2001, p.
331).
Some textbooks in the study of ideologies take the variety of socialisms into account by 
privileging socialism with two separate chapters, one dealing with Marxism and the 
other focusing on the rest of the socialist ideology (Adams 2001; Femia 1999; Goodwin 
2007; Wright 1999). Conversely, other scholars discuss various socialist currents under 
one heading (Geoghegan 2003 or Heywood 2003). I combine the two approaches. I use 
the term ‘socialism’ as an overarching category which includes a wide spectrum of 
tendencies and I cover this entire spectrum in one chapter. At the same time, I 
acknowledge the usual distinction between revolutionary socialism and the rest of the
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socialist family and I divide the chapter into two parts, simplifying the diversity of 
socialisms to three conventional categories of (1) Maixism, which is discussed in the 
first part of the chapter, and (2) democratic socialism, examined in the second part 
together with (3) social democracy, located at the reformist end of the socialist 
continuum and spilling over to the liberal tenitory.
From the perspective employed here there are at least two good reasons for discussing 
the whole of socialism en masse. On the one hand, the variety of socialisms entails a 
broad range of socialist positions on globalization. The following discussion thus 
illustrates the way in which different meanings are bestowed on the concept of 
globalization depending on modifications in the concepts located in its proximity. On the 
other hand, in spite of the diversity of socialist interpretations, socialism should be seen 
as a meaningful category because there is a distinct, if very flexible, set of core concepts 
that define the various socialist streams as tributaries of one ideological matrix.
For the purposes of the present investigation, the most important among the core 
concepts that unite socialism into a discernible ideological tradition are histoiy, 
understood in teleological terms ‘as the arena of (ultimately) beneficial change’ (Freeden 
1996, p. 426), and equality.^^ History and equality are capacious concepts with room for
According to Goodwin (2007, p. 104), egalitarianism is ‘the central ideal of 
socialism’. Freeden lists equality and histoi-y alongside three other core concepts of 
socialism: ‘the constitutive nature of the human relationship, human welfare as a 
desirable objective, human nature as active’ (Freeden 1996, p. 425).
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considerable shifts in emphasis and connotation. The directions of these shifts depend on 
variations in socialist preferences regarding a number of vital choices, for instance 
between structure and agency, revolution and refonn, or populism and elitism. Under the 
influence of thus shaped decontestations of history and equality, different socialisms 
offer different evaluations of major institutions, such as the state and the market. In turn, 
the understanding of these institutions in any exemplification of socialism may impinge 
on the structural import of the concept of globalization. Of course, at each of these, 
somewhat artificially separated, levels of idea-formation the influences are reciprocal, so 
that a particular understanding of globalization influences the role attributed to the state, 
while the latter impacts back on the shape of the core idea of equality or on the 
interpretation of the past and the vision of the future. Despite the fact that the core 
socialist concepts are broad and therefore have diverse consequences for the 
constmction of the idea of globalization within socialism, some patterns of influence are 
discernible. For example, the concern with equality has an unequivocal effect on the 
socialist evaluations of the cunent, capitalist, globalization. From an egalitarian 
perspective which, despite its different angles and intensities, is characteristic of all 
fonns of socialism, the capitalist globalization is seen in a consistently pejorative light. 
The socialist preoccupation with history affects the assessment of globalization in a 
more nuanced way. In this context, globalization, even in its capitalist fomi, is perceived 
by some socialists, notably Marxists, as both necessary and progressive.*^
*^ This amounts to a range of political mythologies (where ‘mythology’ and ‘myth- 
making’ are understood as normal modes of ideological argument, see Flood 2001)
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PART 1, MARXISM
The Marxist account of capitalism and globalization
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given 
a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every 
country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn fi'om under 
the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old- 
established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being 
destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction 
becomes a life and death question for all civilised nations, by 
industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw 
material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are 
consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place 
of old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new 
wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and 
climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self- 
sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter­
dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual 
production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become 
common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness 
become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national 
and local literatures, tliere arises a world literature. (Marx and Engels 
1848)
The presentation of the realities of capitalism contained in the Communist Manifesto, 
written by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) and exemplified 
above, sounds very familiar today. Themes such as organization of capitalism on a 
worldwide scale, global interconnectedness and interdependence, or cultural
which are more or less detenninistic and teleological, depending on tradition and source. 
Marxist mythology is particularly illustrative in this respect as it has the capacity to 
interpret negative as positive thi’ough the dialectical nature of the developmental 
process.
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homogenization, engaged the authors of the Manifesto in the mid-nineteenth centuiy as 
much as they are on everyone’s lips today, particularly in the context of the globalization 
debate (Bromley 1999; Bumliam 1998). The enduring relevance of Marx’s analysis of 
capitalism has encouraged several contemporary Marxist scholars to take a sceptical 
standpoint on the novelty of the process of globalization (for example Rosenberg 2000 
and 2005; Saad-Filho 2003), Conversely, other thinkers assert the distinctiveness of the 
current economic regime and praise Marx and Engels as two great forecasters of tlie 
present global form of capitalism; ‘Marx and Engels did not describe the world as it had 
already been transformed by capitalism in 1848; they predicted how it was logically 
destined to be transformed’ (Hobsbawm 1998, p. 17). Whether the works of Marx and 
Engels were concerned with the actual workings of nineteenth centuiy capitalism or 
whether they should be seen as impressively accurate predictions of the capitalist 
system’s future transformation is perhaps not that vital a question for my analysis of the 
Marxist interpretation of globalization. The assumption, endorsed today by most 
Marxists, that globalization is the current pattern in the development of the capitalist 
world remains valid inespective of whether it is maintained that capitalism had 
embarked on its present stage already in the belle époque or only later. On the other 
hand, the continuity in Marxist tliought of the analytical approach that envisages 
capitalism in global tenns, combined with the fact that Marxism, unlike other political 
ideologies, has one (or two) uncontested founder(s), makes it necessary for any 
discussion of the Mai*xist paradigm of globalization to go back to the account of 
capitalism offered by Mai%. That is why I begin my discussion by reminding the reader
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of those threads in Marx’s thinking about capitalism which are particularly relevant to 
the globalization debate. Examples of contemporary Marxist interventions are discussed 
in the context of Mai*x’s original contribution.
Marxism as an egalitarian critique of the capitalist system
Two paths in Marx’s examination of capitalism need to be analytically distinguished 
even if in the writings of Marx they are closely intertwined. The two threads originate 
from two core socialist concepts of equality and history: while the first path evaluates 
capitalism in conjunction with Marx’s central concern with unequal relationships 
between human beings, the second path defines capitalism as a stage in the development 
of humankind and diagnoses its long-term consequences. As is well-loiown, the first, 
‘ethical’, stream of thinldng about the capitalist system condemns capitalism for having 
no precedence as far as the scale of inequality and oppression is concerned. According to 
Marx, capitalism reduces the proletarians, the members of the subordinated class, to 
mere cogs in the process of industrial production, at the same time reducing the 
bourgeois, the members of the dominant class, to the status of economic competitors. 
Capitalism deprives factory workers of access to the fruits of their work; in Mare’s 
terminology it ‘alienates’ them from their labour. Simultaneously, capitalism renders 
factory owners incapable of regarding the subordinated masses as their fellow human 
beings. In this way capitalism does not benefit anyone; by distorting the relationships 
between individuals it deprives human beings, the exploiters as much as the exploited of 
their humanity.
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Marx’s indignation with the realities of life under capitalism and his principled attack on 
that system have served as a spur for political action while his analysis of the pervasive 
condition of alienation produced by capitalism has inspired several critical studies both 
within and without the Marxist ‘orthodoxy’, for example in existentialism and the 
Franlcfurt school (Sartre 2004 [1960], pp. 153-220; Marcuse 2002 [1964]). The 
mainstream of Marxism meanwhile has kept on updating Marx’s critique of capitalism 
in relation to twentieth century developments, especially the so-called ‘Rliineland 
capitalism’, highly regulated by the state and prevalent in the Cold War period. Contra 
social democrats, Marxists refuse to accept that the statist form of capitalism is 
qualitatively distinct from the predatory capitalism of the nineteenth centuiy or the 
neoliberal capitalism that took the lead in the 1970s. Marxism perceives the capitalist 
system as ‘covered in blood and mud’ (Cliff 2000) and inevitably generating inequality 
and injustice; these might have been occasionally mitigated within the capitalist 
framework, but then only partially and always with the ultimate advantage of capitalism 
in mind (Budd 2001; Callinicos 2001a; Callinicos 2001b; Cliff 2000; Harman 2000). 
Capitalism therefore remains the enemy: ‘What connects all the different evils we find 
ourselves fighting is the nature of the system we live under. Its name is capitalism. Its 
core characteristics generate all the major problems we find ourselves contesting’. 
(Barker 2001, p. 330; see also Burkett 2003; Callinicos 2001a, pp. 119-120; Callinicos 
2003, p. 26; Hardt 2002; Saad-Filho 2003 and Wood 2003).
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Whereas Marxism refuses to see the welfarist type of capitalism as qualitatively 
different from the neoliberal form, the offensive of neoliberalism, with the consequent 
swift increase in economic inequality, has enhanced the reception of the Marxist 
sweeping critique of the capitalist system. At the same time, according to Marxists, the 
accelerating globalization of neoliberal capitalism has extended the implications of that 
system on an unprecedented scale and has provided the structural conditions for further 
intensification and expansion of exploitation (Beams 1997, pp. 6-8; Cliff 2000; Fourth 
International 1998, p. 34; Workers League 1993, p. 8). For Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri, two leading theorists of the contemporaiy transformation of capitalism, the more 
globalized that system becomes, the more brutal will be the impact of its ‘enormous 
powers of oppression and destruction’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, p. xv):
Today nearly all of humanity is to some degree absorbed within or 
subordinated to the networks of capitalist exploitation. We see now an 
ever more extreme separation of a small minority that controls 
enormous wealth from multitudes that live in poverty at the limit of 
powerlessness. (Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 43)
In this way, the globalization of capitalism, by expanding and intensifying inequality 
and injustice, confributes even more of the sense of urgency with which the Marxist 
critique has always been associated. At the same time, however, as the next section 
explains, globalization reinforces the unfailing optimism of Marxism.
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The historical role of capitalism according to the developmental strand of Marxism
While an uncompromising ethical critique of capitalism has always been the defining 
feature of Marxism, Marx also provided what could be dubbed a ‘developmental’ sti eam 
of thinking about capitalism. This is the aspect of Marx’s theoiy of capitalism on which 
are based the central tenets of the present-day Marxist analysis of globalization. Both 
Mare’s original reflection as well as contemporaiy Mareist intei-ventions reveal a gieat 
deal of enthusiasm for the technological achievements of the capitalist system and 
attribute to it an unequivocally progressive role in the overall logic of development.
The position of capitalism, and by implication of capitalist globalization, is in Mareist 
thought determined by Mareism’s largely structuralist, teleological and optimistic vision 
of history. There is no consensus among the commentators about exactly how 
comprehensive Mare’s own structuralism was. Marx occasionally deviated from the 
stiucturalist way of reasoning, for instance when he famously insisted, in a markedly 
non-structuralist and non-detemiinistic way, on the political engagement of social 
theory: ‘[t]he philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, 
however, is to change it’ (Marx 1845), But on the whole Mai'x leaned towards the belief 
in an inexorable logic of history, so while he accepted that ‘men make their own 
histoiy’, he nevertheless emphasized that ‘tliey do not make it under self-selected 
circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from tlie 
past’ (Mare 1852). Mare believed in the necessary and logical character of historical 
changes and maintained that subsequent social formations generate problems that
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intensify to the point where these fonnations disintegrate under the weight of internal 
contradictions.
While to Marx this mechanism was particularly clear with reference to capitalism, 
Marxists today identify it in the workings of capitalist globalization. The contradictions 
of capitalism are intrinsic in its competitive impulse, its technological ingenuity and its 
irresistible tendency to expand. These three aspects of capitalism, as well as the 
contradictions that they produce, are seen by Marxists as interdependent. Competition, 
the most fundamental principle of capitalism, entails teclinological progress and 
territorial expansion that subsequently amount to the global spread of the capitalist 
system. Global expansion in turn intensifies competition and so by means of 
globalization capitalism reaches the climax of its contradictions. In the following three 
subsections I discuss those major contradictions of capitalism, as they were understood 
by Marx himself and also as they are elaborated in contemporary Marxist theories of 
globalization. The reader will of course be aware of what are the basic tenets of Marx’s 
theory but they are worth rehearsing here because they fit the Marxist thesis of 
globalization remarkably well and so illustrate the continuity and relevance of Marxism 
in today’s ideological debates.
The contradictions o f capitalism (1): competition
Marx’s analysis of capitalist competition is well-lmown. In summary, competition has 
two aspects: while the owners compete for profits, the workers, having no other means
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of survival, compete for jobs. In the capitalist system profits derive from decreasing the 
wages of workers and increasing their labour output. This form of competition between 
the owners is stmcturally built-in within the system and not a question of morality of 
individual capitalists. Capitalism allows no way out of the race to the bottom; any 
humanitarian restraint would eventually catapult the hypothetical compassionate 
capitalist out of the capitalist class and into the ranks of the proletariat. This competition 
introduces fundamental contradictions into the workings of capitalism. The system’s 
structural necessity to extract from production an ever growing surplus value conflicts 
with the market’s need for consumers able to purchase its products. The logical outcome 
of competition is the progressive pauperization of workers ergo their decreasing ability 
to consume. This fact is coupled with rapid inflation in the numbers of the poor since 
among capitalists there is inevitably a number of less ruthless (or less effective) 
individuals who sooner or later end up as proletarians. By removing increasing numbers 
of the bourgeois from their top positions in capitalist society, the mechanism of 
competition leads to its own negation, namely, to the state of monopoly. But the 
monopoly situation does not save the system from regular and escalating crises of 
oveiproduction. Overproduction, in turn, causes unemployment and hence more poverty, 
and so on, until deprivation reaches its apogee and the masses are faced with no other 
option but to overtlirow the system. It follows that capitalism is inherently suicidal; 
competition, while being the élan vital at the source of capitalism’s enormous 
dynamism, at the same time makes its collapse unavoidable.
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The contradictions o f capitalism (2): technology
According to Marx, capitalist competition brings about an unprecedented progress in the 
development of the means of production. An ever-increasing suiplus value, the key to 
success in the capitalist system, derives not just from extracting from workers a 
‘maximum of labour’ for a ‘minimum of wages’ (Marx 1857); technological innovation 
and, where this is cost-effective, the substitution of machines for workers are other 
means of increasing profits, and other reasons for internal contradictions within the 
system. Marx was aware that in the short term the development of industrial machinery 
contributed to the misery of workers by maldng them increasingly redundant but he 
nonetheless appreciated the long-tenn consequences of the technological advances of 
capitalism and never felt nostalgic about the simplicity or ‘cosiness’ of the way of life 
typical of feudalism. Quite the reverse, Marx commended the bourgeoisie for rescuing 
the masses ‘from the idiocy of rural life’ (Marx and Engels 1848). In the Communist 
Manifesto (further refened to as the Manifesto) Marx and Engels did not conceal their 
admiration for the technological triumphs of the bourgeoisie:
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has 
created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have 
all preceding generations together [...]. It has been the first to show 
what man’s activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far 
suipassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic 
cathedrals. (Marx and Engels 1848)
Marx considered technological innovations of capitalism admirable for what they were, 
namely the expressions of the capabilities of the human mind, but he was especially 
enthusiastic about the potential for social liberation that he saw as inadvertently intrinsic
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to capitalist teclinologies. The liberation was to be facilitated by the contradictions that 
the technologies of capitalism instil in the very system that had brought them into being.
The epochal role of technology, as seen from the Marxist point of view, is not just a trait 
of the capitalist period and needs to be explained in a wider perspective. Marx tended to 
envisage the history of humanity in tenns of technological detenninism, according to 
which the material ‘base’ (means and relations of production, that is to say, technologies 
and regimes organizing their employment) detenuines the ideational ‘superstructure’ 
(ideology, religion, law, custom, etc). The sequence of stages in history is decided by 
major technological transitions, that is, transformations in the base. Changes in people’s 
ideas about the world, namely, adjustments in the superstructure, follow as merely an 
offshoot. In each epoch its characteristic technologies expand and with them their 
‘derivatives’ in the fonn of social classes and coiresponding institutions and ideas. At 
some point the emerging classes no longer fit within the stmctural confines of the 
existing social foiination and consequently they feel compelled to overcome it. The 
development of the era of feudalism, for example, provided the initial conditions for the 
expansion of trade and merchandise, creating the new class of the bourgeoisie. With 
time, the emerging bouigeois social structures became intolerably constrained by the 
circumstances inherent in the feudal system and thus the epochal step towards capitalism 
was made. In the same way, the capitalist society is bound to be brought to an end 
because its achievements will inevitably exceed its capacities:
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Modem bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of 
exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic 
means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no 
longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has 
called up by his spells [...] there is too much civilization, too much 
means of subsistence, too much industiy, too much commerce. [...] 
The conditions of bourgeois society are too naiTow to comprise the 
wealth created by them. (Mare and Engels 1848)
The capitalist system is on course to self-destraction for it provides workers with the 
tools to abolish it. The technologies which give rise to industrial capitalism at the same 
time offer leverage for the liberation of the proletariat. The capitalist mode of production 
involves industrialization, urbanization and massification and pushes masses from the 
land to the cities increasingly concentrated around factories. The sheer numbers and 
close physical proximity of workers in factoiy and urban realities promote the 
emergence of awareness of shared fate and common interests. In Mareist terminology, 
the workers begin to form ‘a class for itself, a prerequisite for the straggle against 
exploitation and for the abolition of capitalism: ‘What the bourgeoisie therefore 
produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat 
are equally inevitable’ (Marx and Engels 1848).
Contemporary Mareists continue to support the global spread of indusfrialization and 
mbanization as a structural precondition for socialism (Beams 1997, pp. 20-21; Fourth 
International 1998; Lombardi 2005; Workers League 1993). They absolve the industrial 
mode of production from the responsibility for the problems it is normally associated 
with and argue that it is not industrialism itself but its current capitalist guise that is to
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blame: ‘the Industrial Revolution created poverty and misery not because it was an 
industrial revolution, but because it was a capitalist revolution: a mobilization of 
industrial technology in the interests of the few at the expense of the many’ (Myers 
2002, p. 28). Therefore, Marxists oppose the claim put forward by ecologists that 
industrialism is bound to cause environmental problems regardless of its political 
framework, histead, ‘it is capitalism that is at the root of contemporary environmental 
crisis’ (Burkett 2003). Likewise, Marxism does not oppose the major implications of 
industrialism such as massification and large-scale structures. With reference to 
transnational corporations, that notorious object of various anti- and alter-globalist 
critiques, the main problem for Marxists, is not the volume of their operations, but the 
fact that they are ‘vehicles for capitalists’ (Greenfield, in Wood 2003, p. 131). 
Accordingly, ‘[t]he outrageous behaviour of large corporations [...] is not primarily due 
to their size [but] is ultimately rooted in the dominance of a system of production geared 
towards private profit rather than collective need’ (Saad-Filho 2003, p. 15). Moreover, 
contemporary Marxists evaluate the impact of the corporate form of capitalism in a way 
reminiscent of Marx’s analysis of classical industrialism, that is to say, with equal 
appreciation of its involuntarily revolutionaiy potential: ‘because of the multinationals, 
the impact of an individual gioup of workers can be much greater than ever before’
(Cliff 2000). hi the same way, Mareists today echo Marx’s rejection of previous 
economic structures. Whereas Marx was resolutely opposed to any reactionary turn to 
feudalism, contemporary Marxists emphasize that small-scale businesses are usually 
more repressive than transnational coiporations and that global corporate capitalism
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provides incomparably greater opportunities for the workers’ revolt than any localized 
capitalist regime (Beams 1997, pp. 21-22; Fourth International 1998, p. 6; Saad-Filho 
2003, p. 12).
Marxists are also keen to highlight the revolutionaiy potential of the infrastructure of 
contemporary capitalism in the form of global informational technologies. Again, the 
stress on the developments in the means of communication has its precedent in Marx:
[T]he ever expanding union of the workers [...] is helped by the 
improved means of coimnunication that are created by Modem 
Industry, and that place the workers of different localities in contact 
with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralize 
the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one 
national struggle between classes. (Marx and Engels 1848)
Marx expected that the fomiation of class consciousness would be accelerated as a result 
of capitalist technology: ‘that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, 
with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modem proletarians, thanlcs to 
railways, achieve in a few years’ (Marx and Engels 1848). Likewise, today’s Marxists 
resolutely reject the ‘luddite’ perspective of some currents of anarchism (Albert 2001, 
pp. 321-322) and admit that the movements challenging capitalism could not exist 
‘without technologies like the web and the cell phone, things that were only recently the 
stuff of capitalist triumphalism’ (Henwood 2002, p. 43).^°
On the other hand, Marxists note and grieve the accelerating encroachment of the 
internet by the interests of capital in the form of privatization, compared by some to the 
great enclosure of the commons (Hardt and Negri 2005, pp. 85-86, 301).
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The contradictions o f capitalism (3): expansion and globalization
That the teclinologies of capitalism may serve subversive ends in the hands of the 
enemies of that system is not the only rationale to earn these technologies an important 
place in the Marxist scheme. Most importantly, they allow for global communication 
and coordination and thus promote another feature of capitalism, inseparable from 
competition, namely its irresistible drive to expansion, which is the fundamental reason 
for the existence of these technologies in the first place. Marx and Engels admired the 
relentless globalization of capitalism. In the Communist Manifesto they noted: ‘[t]he 
need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the 
whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish 
connections everywhere’ (Marx and Engels 1848). Moreover, in the Grundrisse Marx 
reflected on the theme that features in much of the contemporary globalization debate, 
namely, capitalism’s deterritorializing potential: ‘[cjapital by its nature drives beyond 
every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physical conditions of exchange -  of the 
means of communication and transport -  the annihilation of space by time -  becomes an 
extraordinary necessity for it’ (Marx 1858). The drive to expansion (or globalization) 
becomes particularly pressing when exploitation of any given socio-economic system 
(for example one confined within a nation-state) reaches its limits so that capitalists must 
look elsewhere to compete for profits, or when it is no longer practical to exploit the 
workforce in a particular location. In this latter case the outward expansion proves 
essential to mitigate the contradiction between the demand for consumers and the 
principle of increasing profits by paying the workers ever smaller wages. The workforce
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in some areas may then become relatively privileged by higlier wages and ability to 
participate in consumption. At the same time, the increasing exploitation of labour in 
other places allows for the growth of profits to continue.
But this logic -  which matches so well the globalizing drive of contemporary capitalist 
corporations — entails a further important contradiction whose essence is clarified by 
Hardt and Negri in the following way: ‘once a segment of the environment has been 
“civilized,” once it has been organically incoiporated into the newly expanded 
boundaries of the domain of capitalist production, it can no longer be the outside 
necessary to realize capital’s surplus value’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 227). In other 
words, if expansion is a structural prerequisite of capitalism then the capitalist system 
cannot exist without its outside. In such a case capitalist energy would be unable to turn 
outwards and the spiral of competition, exploitation, overproduction and crisis would 
follow with immediate effect. The ultimate success of the capitalist system, its universal 
implementation, the inclusion of all societies within its orbit and the elimination of all 
alternative economic systems -  in brief, its globalization -  thus entails the collapse of 
capitalism.
This point is implicit in Mare’s model, but Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), a Polish-bom 
Mareist political theorist, formulated it in an explicit way with reference to the 
nineteenth century mode of capitalist globalism, namely, imperialism:
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The more violently, ruthlessly and thoroughly imperialism brings 
about the decline of non-capitalist civilisations, the more rapidly it cuts 
the ground from under the feet of capitalist accumulation. Though 
imperialism is the historical method for prolonging the career of 
capitalism, it is also the sure means of bringing it to a swift conclusion. 
(Luxemburg, in Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 228)
This sort of logic is ubiquitous both in the traditional Mareist explanations of 
imperialism and in the present day Marxist theorizing about globalization.^’ According 
to the latter, capitalism cannot suiwive the completion of its own globalization. In this 
context, the breathtaking expansion of capitalism during the post-cold war period is yet 
another sign of its imminent crash.
The perception of capitalism as an indispensable stage in humanity’s march to 
communism sufficed for Marx to identify the capitalist system as progressive when 
juxtaposed with earlier, feudal and ancient, social fonnations. But if the significance of 
capitalism derives from the fact that it brings humanity closer to its destiny, then
There is an important exception to this way of thinking within a broadly conceived 
Marxist paradigm, namely in dependency theories of, for example, Franlc (1996) and 
Wallerstein (1974). As Anthony Brewer explains, while mainstream Marxism maintains 
that capitalism introduces modernization and industrialism to underdeveloped countries 
and so ‘creates the material preconditions for a better (socialist) society as well as the 
class forces that will bring it about’, dependency theories suggest that capitalism 
prevents progress and produces ‘development of underdevelopment’ (Brewer 1990, pp. 
16, 18). On the other hand, Barbara Goodwin points out another exception by arguing, 
with the use of several examples of African socialisms, that socialists in countries that 
have never experienced capitalism may challenge the necessity of the capitalist stage 
(Goodwin 2007, pp. 115-117).
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globalization has an especially important place in histoiy, marking -  when it fulfils itself 
as the condition of globality — the end of the capitalist epoch and the begimiing of the 
next stage in history (Negri, in Coco and Lazzarato 2002, p. 133). Whatever injustices 
the ‘Empire’ (another name for the contemporary organization of capitalism) entails, and 
however urgent its abolition, it is a step foiward when compared with previous socio­
economic arrangements, including earlier (bourgeois, imperialist, even welfarist) 
incarnations of the capitalist system itself:
[W]e insist on asserting that the construction of Empire is a step 
forward in order to do away with any nostalgia for the power structures 
that preceded it and refuse any political strategy that involves returning 
to that old arrangement [...]. We claim that Empire is better in the 
same way that Marx insists that capitalism is better than the foims of 
society and modes of production that came before it. (Hardt and Negri 
2000, p. 43)
Naturally, the present form of capitalism is ‘better’ than imperialism or Keynesianism, 
or pre-capitalist regimes, not because its mechanisms of exploitation are less inliumane. 
On the contrary, as already noted, capitalism today ‘constructs its own relationships of 
power based on exploitation that are in many respects more brutal than those it 
destroyed’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 43). However, because that system is bound to 
become global, it will not fail to collapse, and so its ultimate success will be a structural 
prerequisite of its fall. In this way, Marxism may define the historical role of the 
capitalist globalization as progressive while denunciating the actual abhorrent practices 
of that process.
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Marxism’s normative and instrumental globalism
The Marxist vision of history is dialectical; new epochs do not negate the achievements 
of the preceding stages but preserve what is most valuable in them. Accordingly, 
capitalism has qualities that are to be appreciated as the preconditions of the future state 
of affairs and among them globalization has an especially revolutionary potential. As I 
have observed, an oft-repeated Marxist catchphrase proclaims that the problem with 
capitalist globalization is not that it is global but that it is capitalist. While capitalism is 
to be eradicated, its global technology and imagination are to be harnessed for the 
advantage of all.
Mareism itself has always been a determinedly globalist ideology, both nomiatively and 
instmmentally.^^ In normative tenns, Marxism has consistently espoused universalist 
philosophy positing itself contra all particularistic, nationalistic cuiTents. Mare perceived 
nationalism as a bourgeois ideology serving to divide the world proletariat along 
national lines and countered nationalist ideologies with the idea of the proletariat as one 
class which has no country, and with the vision of history that brings all of humanity to 
its natural state of universal equality. Borders, boundaries and separate national
Some commentators have suggested that Marx’s globalism was not without 
reservations for Mai'x supported the nationalistic aspirations of Poles and Hungarians 
(for example Ree 2003). In my view this stance of Marx should be seen as an 
encouragement for peoples struggling against particularly reactionary and absolutist 
monarchies and therefore it does not invalidate Marx’s overall radically globalist stance. 
Later ideas claiming to adhere to the thought of Marx but refuting Marx’s globalism, 
such as Stalin’s ‘revolution in one country’, should be seen as deviations from the 
Mareist mainstream.
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identities are viewed by Marxists as the products of regimes worldng in the interest of 
capital (Hardt and Negri 2000, pp. 44-46). Marxists share the universalist spirit with 
other socialists who normally see themselves as, to quote the Renaissance poet John 
Donne, ‘involved in mankind’ (Donne, in Heywood 2003, p. 108) and not as any 
particular ethnic or national group but in Marxism the sense of universal comi adeship is 
adhered to with exceptional passion and consistency.
Complementing the normative globalism of Marxism is its instrumental globalism and 
its concomitant pro-technological zeal. Mare and Engels emphasized that the way to 
abolish capitalism led through the internationalization of the working class politics: 
‘workers of the world unite’ (Marx and Engels 1848) and hoped that industrialism with 
its technological conditions and capacities could promote worldng class consciousness 
on a global scale and integrate the proletarians into a worldwide ‘class for itself, hi the 
same way, for contemporary Marxists new technologies are to unite people globally (see 
for example Workers League 1993). Global forms of communication, organization and 
mobility -  Mareists are in favour of migration and demand the abolition of border 
controls (Heyter 2000) -  are to be the mode of resistance, valuable in itself but also 
necessitated by the character of the very system that Marxism wants to see brought to its 
end:
We believe that toward the end of challenging and resisting Empire 
and its world market, it is necessary to pose any alternative at an 
equally global level. Any proposition of a particular community in 
isolation, defined in racial, religious, or regional terms, “delinked” 
from Empire, shielded from its powers by fixed boundaries, is destined
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to end up as a kind of ghetto. Empire cannot be resisted by a project 
aimed at a limited, local autonomy. We cannot move back to any 
previous social fonn, nor move forward in isolation. Rather, we must 
push through Empire to come out the other side [...]. We have to 
accept that challenge and leam to think globally and act globally. 
Globalization must be met with a counter-globalization. Empire with a 
counter-Empire. (Hardt and Negri 2000, pp. 206-207)
The concept of globalization and the continuity of Marxism
Building on the theoretical opus of Marx, Marxism today keeps on analyzing capitalism 
as a system based on the competitive impulse which in turn generates capitalism’s 
teclinological advancement and drive to expansion. Contemporary Marxists have linked 
these dynamics of capitalism to the concept of globalization, understood as both the 
triumph of capitalism as well as the ultimate trigger of an impending upsurge of 
problems within that system. Accordingly, while in the classical Marxist account 
industrial capitalism was to be the last among the divided and exploitative social 
formations, in the contemporary Marxist thought there is equal confidence: the cunent 
globalization of capitalism will bring about the transition towards a global society of 
equals. Moreover, while globalization is certain to cause the collapse of capitalism, it 
also provides the foundation for the construction of the post-capitalist society, which is 
to benefit fiom the technological legacy of its predecessor. Therefore, the role that 
Marxism claims for itself is both to assist the inevitable fall of global capitalism, as well 
as to reclaim its globalizing dynamism for the future.
It is clear that the concept of globalization has not presented Marxism with the challenge 
of radical reconfiguration of its main ideas. Conversely, it has consolidated the Marxist
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way of thinking and served to confirm and stiengthen the main Mareist theses. Mareism 
has decontested globalization according to its vision of history as possessing an inherent 
logic, a linear direction and an inevitable end culminating in the accomplishment of the 
universal human inclination to equality, cooperation and sharing. The determinant 
function of the concepts of history and equality in relation to the different approaches to 
globalization in the socialist ideology is exemplified further in the second part of this 
chapter where democratic socialism and social democracy are examined. While 
democratic socialism and social democracy differ, both are more refoi*mist and 
evolutionary than Marxism in their understanding of history and equality. Consequently, 
their respective attitudes to globalization diverge from Marxist approaches: democratic 
socialism endorses a weaker version of globalism whereas some currents of social 
democracy may even take an antiglobalist course.
PART 2. DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
Democratic socialism and social democracy are confusing tenns. This is due to 
historically variable conventions of usage and the imprecise criteria of distinction 
between the two currents and, in turn, between them and Mareism. While social 
democracy is now part of the political mainstream, in the past the terai invoked different 
associations. Before 1919, for example, the revolutionaiy party of Bolsheviks was 
known as the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Goodwin 2007, p. 111). 
Similarly, the early German Social Democratic Party was, declaratively at least, a
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Marxist party. In fact, as Heywood points out, ‘social democracy’ was a Mareist term 
employed to contrast comprehensive democracy with merely ‘political’ democratization 
(Heywood 2003, p. 139). Later, in the early twentieth century, there emerged a rift 
between Marxism and social democratic parties. The cleavage was especially apparent 
with reference to their respective principles of action, namely, what they postulated as 
the optimal means to get to the socialist society. Whereas Mareists stood by the 
necessity of a revolutionary transformation, those who then called themselves social 
democrats opted for a change managed within the institutional framework of liberal 
democracy. At the same time, the understanding of the goal of the transformation itself 
was not principally different in the two camps which both partook in the broad socialist 
vision of an equal society.
The idea of the socialist end striven for with the use of democratic means is nowadays 
accepted as the chief characterization of the ideology of democratic socialism. Social 
democracy, on the other hand, now has a different meaning, which it acquired in the 
second half of the twentieth century. The sustained economic growth in the wake of the 
Second World War, coupled with the narrowing down of wealth disparities and some 
mitigation of social divisions in western societies, convinced a large section of socialists, 
now known as social democrats, that it was not necessary, and perhaps not even 
expedient, to bring the capitalist system to its end. Capitalism appeared to be very 
efficient in providing economic prosperity and social democrats assumed that instead of 
abolishing the capitalist mode of production, they could harness it to the aim of social
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justice. Social democracy, a key component of the so-called politics of consensus which 
dominated the western world’s political and ideological landscape until well into the 
1970s, should thus be understood as the standpoint that accepts capitalism while using 
democratic institutions, especially the welfare state, to mitigate its adverse effects.
In a nutshell then, the difference between democratic socialists and social democrats is 
that while the former encourage the puisuit of socialism by the means available in the 
democratic system, the latter limit themselves to the promotion of democracy that takes 
responsibility for the provision of social welfare in a capitalist setting. Of course, while 
in theory the borderline separating democratic socialism and social democracy may be 
delineated in this way, it is usually problematic to pigeonhole ideological texts as 
unequivocally belonging to one or other of the two categories. But while unambiguous 
examples of democratic socialism and social democracy are scarce, the ideal types may 
be used to establish the ideological proportions of any particular discourse. Moreover, 
and most importantly, these two ideal-typical positions on capitalism are reflected in the 
resulting concepts of globalization and so the conventional distinction between 
democratic socialism and social democracy is convenient for the purpose of mapping out 
two broad approaches to globalization within the tradition of non-Marxist socialism.
While I account for the distinction between the two cunents that came into being, and 
now coexist, as a result of two historical split-ups within socialism, I do not see this 
chapter as tlie place where I should examine the ideological constellation resulting from 
the shift that took place within social democracy in the 1990s. The so-called Third Way 
politics was endorsed to some extent by most western social democratic parties as a 
response to the offensive of neo-conservatism. But while some interpretations suggest
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State-centred concepts of history, equality and globalization
As I have illustrated using the case of Marxism, socialist analytical and normative 
approaches to globalization are usefully interpreted in connection with the meanings 
attached to the core socialist concepts of equality and history. Equality and histoiy 
permeate the entire socialist ideology but, as already noted, these are very capacious 
concepts and they may be defined in a bewildering variety of ways even within one 
ideological family. For instance, socialist concepts of equality may be centred on the 
elimination of poverty, or the reduction of inequality, rather than on economic equality 
(equality of outcome) as demanded by Mareism. In the same way, socialist 
understandings of history as unfolding in a propitious direction may differ from the 
Mareist concept in that they may conceive progress in evolutionary and gradualist terms. 
Whatever their particular emphasis, the socialist decontestations of equality and history 
are constructed contingently. For any socialist current this means that the more its 
reading of histoiy diverges fi'om the Mareist paradigm, the farther fiom Mareism will 
also be its understanding of equality. Ditto the idea of globalization; a socialist 
interpretation of globalization will adopt a non-Marxist flavour when influenced by a 
concept of history that envisages a non-Marxist (i.e., gradual and peaceful) course of 
progress or by an idea of equality stopping short of the radical Marxist goal.
that the Third Way should not be excluded fiom the social democratic tradition 
(Stammers 2001), I believe that William Hutton is right when he points out that social 
democratic identity of the Third Way is problematic in that the current ‘operates within 
the same political economy as the right’ (Hutton 1999, pp. 98-99).
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While history and equality are, in their different variants, central to all currents of 
socialism, it is the notion of the state, and in particular of state economic intervention, 
that has come to the forefront of the democratic socialist and, especially, social 
democratic interpretations and has a heavy bearing on how the two currents understand 
and respond to globalization. Socialist positions can be ranked according to how much 
importance they give to the state in the process of transition to socialism and what 
durability they envisage for the state once that transition has been accomplished. In this 
respect, and provided that the extreme positions of anarchism and Soviet totalitarianism 
are not taken into account, Marxism would represent the least statist option while social 
democracy would occupy the place at the other end of the continuum; democratic 
socialism would then be located ‘between’ Marxism and social democracy.
This continuum overlaps with the scale of globalism, with Marxism representing the 
position which is most supportive of globalization, and social democracy remaining the 
most ambivalent. The degree of importance attached to the concept of the state thus 
influences the ideas of, and pertaining to, globalization. The state, at least when 
understood along Westphalian lines, is generally defined as a territorial unit that claims 
authority over a separate fraction of the globe’s ten*itoiy, and hence over its inliabitants 
whose particular identity, understood as superior to their potential global affiliations, it 
thereby aims to ascribe. Wlien it is put forward as the optimal arrangement of political, 
economic and social life, now or in the envisaged future, the state inevitably 
compromises globalism. In the case of democratic socialism, where the state, for the
Socialism 142
most part, is accentuated on the way towards and at the moment of transition, it is 
mainly instrumental globalism that is compromised. In other words, in opposition to 
Marxism, the means of action employed in the pursuit of socialist aims may not be 
conceived in unequivocally global terms. In the case of traditional social democracy, 
normative as well as instrumental globalism may be compromised; if it is imputed that 
the state remains in place as the administrator of national economies on behalf of 
national societies, then globalist aims tend to give way to implementations of social 
democratic principles on merely national scales. The rest of this chapter focuses on the 
concepts of globalization that are constructed by democratic socialism and social 
democracy contingently on their respective understandings of the present and the future 
role and import of the state.
The equivocal globalism of democratic socialism: ideas versus implementations
Democratic socialism is not a fashionable tenn at tlie moment and political 
commentators and activists whose ideas I discuss here may not define themselves as 
democratic socialists. For example, the British campaigner George Monbiot, to whose 
recent book The Age o f Consent (2003) I refer extensively, does not see himself as a 
socialist, or even as a gieen socialist (that would have seemed appropriate in the context 
of his long-standing engagement with environmental issues) but as an adherent of the 
‘global justice movement’, a term which aims to invoke diverse and inclusive political 
identity. Likewise, the author of the manifesto Another world is possible if... (2004), 
Susan George opts for simply ‘the movement’ that, she insists, has an ecumenical, all-
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inclusive nature. Yet, while the label may not be enjoying its heyday at present, the 
positions analyzed here display the logic that situates them within the broad tradition of 
democratic socialism. And it is for the reason of their recognizable ideological identity 
that the ostensible inclusiveness purported by these proposals is easily impaired in 
encounters with rival ideologies. The confrontation is especially intense in relation to 
Marxism, which is seen as totally misguided in the course of action that it has adopted.
The allegations are fonnulated in terms that echo the traditional charges of democratic 
socialism against its Marxist competitor but, while continuity is identifiable, novel 
circumstances have forced the democratic socialist standing in the debate to take account 
of new concerns and concepts.
‘Globalization’ is perhaps the most important of the concepts that have recently entered 
the democratic socialist territory. The concept has been problematic for the overall logic 
of the conceptual paths criss-crossing the democratic socialist morphology. On the one 
hand, consistently with its egalitarian idea that people deserve equal concern regardless 
of their location and culture, democratic socialism has adopted a broadly globalist 
outlook. On the other hand, this form of globalism has been prevented from taking a 
consistent course due to the democratic socialist endorsement of the state as a major 
instrument of progress. In other words, the challenge confronting democratic socialism 
in its attempts to decontest globalization consists in the tension between its globalist goal 
and its statist method of pursuing it. In the occasional instances where the concept of 
globalization has been accommodated within democratic socialism in a way which
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coherently reinforces and updates the overall democratic socialist logic, this has been 
achieved by weakening, though not altogether abandoning, instmmental statism. An 
instance of a democratic socialist position where statism is undermined allowing for a 
more consistent globalist outlook is discussed below in juxtaposition with several 
exemplifications of widespread contradictions between the global aspirations of 
democratic socialism and its statist methodology.
Democratic socialism lays a lot of emphasis on its self-professed globalist identity. 
Accordingly, with reference to the ends they strive for, democratic socialists are 
adamant in their rejection of the ‘anti-globalization’ appellation that the mainstream 
media as well as some analysts have applied indiscriminately to all critics of 
neoliberalism. Susan George for example asserts that ‘the movement is internationalist 
and deeply engaged with the world as a whole and the fate of everyone who shares the 
planet’ (George 2004, p. ix). She conveys this globalist identity in simple and appealing 
terms ‘[w]e are “pro-globalization” for we are in favour of sharing friendship, culture, 
cooking, solidarity, wealth and resources’ (George, in Callinicos 2003, pp. 13-14). The 
endorsement of noimative globalism by democratic socialism may also be based on a 
pragmatic evaluation of the existing state of affairs. Globalization may then be seen as 
‘too widely accepted and embedded to be reversible in its essential integrative impact’ 
(Falk 2000, p. 166). Therefore, ‘demands to return to a simpler, more rural or communal 
era’ may be rejected ‘as utopian’ (George 2004, p. 154).
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While rejecting localization as a project which is not viable, democratic socialists are 
also vigilant about the likelihood of the association of localist ideas with ‘dangerous 
chauvinistic and extremist social energies’ (Falk 2000, p. 163). Richard Fallc argues for 
example that the localist response to globalization:
[Tjakes the form of backlash politics that looks either to some pre­
modern traditional framework as viable and virtuous [,..] or to ultra- 
territorialists that seek to keep capital at home and exclude foreigners 
to the extent possible. These responses [...] have a rightist flavor, 
because of their emphasis on the sacred religious or nationalist 
community of the saved that is at war with an evil “other”, either 
secularist or outsider. (Falk 1999, p. 142)
The task that democratic socialism defines for itself is thus not to reverse globalization, 
which would be both unfeasible and undesirable, but ‘to alter the guiding ideas that are 
shaping enactment’ (Falk 2000, p. 165). In this way, through reform rather than 
eradication, it is possible to accomplish ‘disconnection from globalization in its current 
form so as to allow for the construction of a new foim of globalization on a different 
basis’ (Houtart 2001b, p. 53). In a still more explicit democratic socialist fonnulation, 
‘globalization-from-above’ should be captured and used ‘as a vehicle for humanity’s 
first global democratic revolution’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 23), or -  in the vocabulary of Falk 
-  for the construction of ‘globalization-ffom-below’.
On a declarative level also the method of democratic socialism is defined as resolutely 
globalist. The globalist approach is preached as a matter of strategic necessity: ‘proposed 
alternatives will be effective only if they are global in scale’ (Monbiot 20003, pp. 10-
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11). This belief is supported by refeii'ing to the nature of the adversaiy, usually defined 
as coiporate, financial, neoliberal or, less frequently, capitalist globalization. Thus, for 
example, François Houtart, the Belgian catholic priest-cum-sociologist and one of the 
founding fathers of the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre, identifies the major 
shortcoming in the present strategy of action against global capitalism to be the fact that 
‘[wjhile capital [...] reproduces itself on a global scale, resistance is still mainly local’. 
He explains that this state of affairs is ‘extremely useful to the hegemony of the market 
and its political expression, since it is much easier to develop piecemeal responses and 
repressions than to confront a coherent whole’ (Houtart 2001a, p. vii). By the same 
token, Richard Falk argues that the response to what he calls ‘globalization-ffom-above’ 
must be both global and comprehensive; localized ‘reactions to symptomatic disorders 
associated with globalization [...] do little more than influence entrepreneurial forces to 
be more pmdent or to make more of a public relations effort’ (Falk 1999, p. 143).
However, as has already been noted, while democratic socialism boasts a globalist 
identity, it remains attached to the state and this attachment is evident in many instances 
of democratic socialist reasoning, including the argumentation of the authors quoted 
above. Thus, for example, while Susan George claims to be ‘pro-globalization’, she is 
unconvinced about the possibility of transferring the prerogatives of the state to a 
supranational level: ‘[wje’re often asked if we want a world government. Personally, I 
don’t, or, rather, I think it’s far too early’ (George 2004, p. 159). George insists that 
‘[ajcting directly at the international level [...] is clearly impossible’ (George 2004, p.
146
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102) and that the movement should ‘hang on’ to the state, as ‘one of the only significant 
targets we can actually reach through democratic channels’ (George 2004, p. 104). 
Similarly, Houtart combines the aspiration to accomplish ‘the construction of a new 
form of globalization’ with an appeal ‘to give back to the states more real power vis-à- 
vis the transnational economic powers, which are destroying their sovereignty’ (Houtart 
2001b, pp. 53 and 54). Likewise, Samir Amin argues that a different globalization 
should be worked out in ‘the framework [...] defined by the need to defend the 
sovereignty of nations’ (Amin 2001, p. 61) and Falk, in his turn, insists that 
globalization-fiom-below ‘accepts the unchallengeable persistence of state’ (Falk 1999, 
p. 146).
In all these cases, lip seiwice is paid to the idea of globalism but, as George’s rejection of 
the idea of global governance aptly illustrates, the concept of the state prevents notions 
of genuinely globalist implementations from developing. Nevertheless, there exist 
examples of democratic socialist thinldng which prove that the state may be pushed to a 
more peripheral position in the democratic socialist equation, allowing for a more 
consistent globalist outlook without adverse effects for ideological consistency. George 
Monbiot epitomizes a democratic socialist way of thinking in his interest in a competent 
organizational management of a radical social change. He insists that ‘[djemocracy is 
unattainable unless it is brokered by institutions’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 41) and that ‘[t]he 
absence of government [...] is unworkable and ultimately intolerable’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 
40). But, at the same time, contiaiy to the authors discussed above, Monbiot identifies
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the lack of governance on the scale suitable to match economic globalization as the main 
problem of contemporary politics: ‘Everything has been globalized except our consent. 
Democracy alone has been confined to the nation state. It stands at the national border, 
suitcase in hand, without a passport’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 1). Consequently, Monbiot 
offers several specific solutions to ensure democracy on the supranational level and in 
some respects he manages to escape thinking in statist terms. For example, his key 
scheme is the creation of the world parliament in which the MPs would ‘have no 
connection to the governments of the nations from which they come’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 
88), thus making it ‘not an assembly formed by nation states, but an assembly formed by 
the world’s people’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 88). In order for that parliament to be ‘global, not 
international’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 88) it would consist of six hundred representatives, 
each representing a constituency of ten million people, each of whom possesses one 
vote:
[I]f we are to establish 600 constituencies of even size, many of them 
will have to straddle national borders [...]. The less our representatives 
are bound to the demands of nationliood, the less parochial their 
outlook is likely to be. The more we, as constituents, are forced to 
share our political destiny with the people of other nations, the more 
we are forced to understand and engage with their concerns. (Monbiot 
2003, pp. 87-88)
While Monbiot does not go as far as to advocate the full-scale elimination of states, he 
puts forward proposals that weaken their sovereignty and hold them to account. In other 
words, Monbiot offers an update of democratic socialism within a new context defined 
by the centrality of the concept of globalization. He reconciles new circumstances with
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the democratic socialist insistence on the institutionalization of democracy by 
transferring institutions of governance to a higher level.
Monbiot’s willingness to substitute global for national governance results from the fact 
that his views fit in within democratic socialist temtory where the state is seen as an 
instrument to achieve, in a democratic way, the goal of a socialist society. On the 
contrary, in the case of traditional social democratic thinldng this manoeuvre may be 
prevented by the fact that the state is not just the principle of action that may be replaced 
by a more adequate one in new circumstances. For social democracy statism is an 
important concept with potentially weighty consequences for its understandings of 
equality and history and for its concept of globalization. As I demonstrate below, the 
traditional social democratic vision is so fiimly anchored in the idea of the state that in 
their defence of statism some social democrats do not hesitate to put the very existence 
of globalization into question.
Social democracy: the impossibility of disembedded markets and the myth of 
globalization
Social democracy assumes moderation in terms of both the method of change, which is 
to be gradual, democratic and institutionalized, as well as its objective, which amounts 
to the retention of capitalism as a reliable generator of economic prosperity but with 
measures to prevent it from causing social distress. Contingently on its understanding of 
history in terms of evolution and reform, social democracy endorses a weak concept of
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equality, which gravitates towards the idea of prevention of excessive economic 
disproportions between individuals. Traditionally, social democratic positions have 
linked equality to the welfare state, a benign administrator which, through progiessive 
taxation and nationalization of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, ensures 
universal access to seiwices and hence not just civil and political but also, cmcially, 
social rights of the citizens (Marshall 1950). The social democratic vision thus combines 
the productivity of the capitalist market with state-regulated ‘universal welfare regime’ 
(Esping Andersen 1990). Consequently, the social democratic concept of globalization is 
also constructed in an inevitable conjunction with the state in its close backgiound.
Statism, formulated as both an operative and a fundamental component of traditional 
social democracy, prevents it from joining the globalist positions of its fellow socialist 
ideologies.^"  ^The contemporary social democratic way of thinking about globalization is
As I explained in the Introduction, this thesis is not intended as a comprehensive 
overview of ideology-laden interpretations of globalization. Rather, the cases discussed 
are employed as examples of how the concept of globalization may impact on existing 
ideological configurations. This explains why, in the interest of coherence of the present 
comparative chapter, I limit my discussion of social democracy to a ‘traditional’ current 
which displays a strongly statist orientation and therefore may adopt a sceptical stance 
on the question of the reality of globalization. It should be noted that this is not the only 
type of view of globalization within social democratic ideology. An alternative social 
democratic position has been articulated, which could be dubbed ‘global’ social 
democracy, and which postulates enactment of social democratic principles on a 
supranational level. The fundamental assumption of the ‘global’ social democracy is that 
globalization is a real process with cmcial political, economic and social consequences 
and that therefore social democratic arguments now need ‘to be theorized in relation to 
new global concerns’ (Olssen 2009, p. xi). According to this current, globalization 
should be governed by some sort of ‘global covenant’ (Held 2004) with capacities to
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particularly indebted to the Hungarian critic of economic laissez-fairism, Karl Polanyi 
(1886-1964) (Ancelovici 2002; Block 2001; Munck 2006; Palacios 2001; Rodrik 1997; 
Ruggie 2003 and Stiglitz 2001). Polanyi’s most important book, The Great 
Transformation (2001 [1944]), focuses on what he calls the ‘disembedding’ of markets, 
that is to say, on the notion of laissez-faire as a setting where markets are fully self­
regulating and function independently of other social institutions, only according to the 
dictates of the ‘invisible hand’. Polanyi attempts to discredit this idea by demonstrating 
that in traditional societies markets are always interlocked in a complex system of social, 
political and religious institutions and that economic activities are inexorably 
intertwined with, and overshadowed by, the overlapping dimensions of prestige, power 
and kinship. Polanyi is convinced that the inclination of traditional societies to keep the 
markets on the leash of tradition and convention, that is to say, within a system of non­
economic meanings and institutions, is not just an idiosyncrasy typical of the past, and 
doomed to disappear in the course of human development. Armed with historical and 
anthropological arguments, he embarks on a devastating critique of the ffee-market
‘regulate globalised capitalism, explore new modes of redistribution and protect those 
excluded from the labour market internationally’ (Martell 2001, p. 218; see also 
Stammers 2001). Global social democracy thus tends to work ‘by analogy’ -  it relies, in 
the words of Simon Tormey, ‘on transferring an argument that has enjoyed widespread 
validity at the national level to the global level’ (Tormey 2004, p. 102). Instead of 
analyzing this relatively straightforward transition, I focus my attention on a more 
peculiar ideological shift whereby a social democratic current denies the existence of 
globalization in order to save the logical integrity of its overall message.
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dogma and reproaches the liberal venture of ‘disembedding’ as a project bound to 
destroy society:
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of 
human beings and their natural environment [...] would result in the 
demolition of society. [...] Robbed of the protective covering of 
cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of 
social exposme; they would die as the victims of acute social 
dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation. Nature 
would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes 
defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to 
produce food and raw materials destroyed, polanyi 2001 [1944], p. 
76)
The picture of society dominated by a disembedded market is thus presented in 
extremely catastrophic terms but this disastrous vision is, paradoxically, the ground for 
Polanyi’s optimism. Since any economic system is inevitably ‘absorbed in the social 
system’ (Polanyi 2001, p. 71), the domination of society by the economy is not just 
unnatural; it is a sheer impossibility:
Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied stark 
utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time 
without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it 
would have physically destroyed man and transformed his 
surroundings into a wilderness. (Polanyi 2001 [1944], p. 3)
Polanyi’s vision of histoiy is thus, appropriately for a socialist, positive. He is confident 
that society will take precedence over market and will re-embed it in the social tissue 
and he gives socialism an important function in the process: ‘[s]ocialism is, essentially, 
the tendency inlierent in an industrial civilization to transcend the self-regulating market 
by consciously subordinating it to a democratic society’ (Polanyi 2001 [1944], p. 242).
Socialism 153
The idea of transcending the market by subordinating it to a democratic society sounds 
like a succinct social democratic credo. Social democracy aims to embed the market or, 
in other words, to mitigate its ‘antisocial’ tendencies by the means available in the 
modem welfare state, the regulator and dispenser of resources ensuring that no member 
of society falls below the poverty line.
The enduring centrality of the state in social democracy is reflected in the fact that much 
of contemporary social democratic reasoning about globalization is centred firaily on the 
defence of statism. In the traditional social democratic evaluation of globalization two 
major threads may be distinguished. Firstly, globalization is seen as undeimining ‘the 
privileged resort of civilization’, i.e., the state, in favour of markets, which are identified 
with ‘anarchy, that is, the war of all against all’ (Ancelovici 2002, p. 433). Secondly, 
while the present political developments are seen in very pejorative terms, social 
democracy has not abandoned its standard optimistic belief in the future of regulated 
capitalism and it continues to see the state as a potent political, economic and social 
player: ‘it is not true that national governments have lost their capacity to pursue 
domestic strategies to promote economic and social goals’ (Vandenbroucke 1998, p. 57), 
big government remains ‘viable both politically (in terms of wimiing elections) and 
economically (by promoting strong macroeconomic performance)’ (Garrett 1998, p. 4; 
see also Berger 2000, p. 58).
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The two notions -  that, due to globalization, the state is in crisis, and that, despite 
globalization, it is still capable of fulfilling its role -  contain an obvious tension. The 
confidence that the state is still fit to play its role in the reconciliation of capitalism with 
social justice makes it necessary to explain the reasons for the involution of the social 
functions of the state and the resulting escalation of inequality. Social democracy copes 
with this deplorable situation, and with the consequent rupture in the logic of its concept 
of history, by seeing it as an outcome of a delusion. Globalization, which serves free- 
marketeers as an explanation of, and an argument for, the dismantling of the state, is 
interpreted by traditional social democrats not as a real process but rather as ‘a key tenn 
in a minority rhetoric aimed at silencing voices that are in favour of regulating markets 
rather than regulating for greater market freedom’ (Hirst 1999, p. 95; see also Hay 
2001).
While reasoning along these lines is widespread in social democracy, one inteiwention 
has become emblematic of the social democratic argument sceptical of the reality of 
globalization. The case in point is Paul Hirst’s and Grahame Thompson’s book 
Globalization in Question (1999) which nominates globalization to be:
[A] myth suitable for a world without illusions, but [...] also one that 
robs us of hope. [,..] The old rationalist explanation for primitive 
myths was that they were a way of masking and compensating for 
humanity’s helplessness in the face of the power of nature, hi this case 
we have a myth that exaggerates the degree of our helplessness in the 
face of contemporary economic forces. (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 
6)
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Hirst and Thompson submit five substantial claims with reference to globalization. 
Firstly, they set off to provide evidence that the considerable extent of 
internationalization of capitalism, which they aclmowledge, is not unprecedented and 
that ‘in some respects, the current international economy is less open and integrated than 
the regime that prevailed fiom 1870 to 1914.’ Secondly, with reference to capitalist 
corporations, tliey maintain that ‘there seems to be no major tendency towards the 
growth of ti’uly international companies.’ Thirdly, they dispute the thesis that there is 
transfer of investment to the developing countries, and point out the enduring economic 
marginality of the ‘Third World’. Fourthly, tliey challenge the claim that the world 
economy has become global, suggesting instead that economic activity is concentrated 
in the main economic powers, namely, Europe, Japan, and North America. Finally, the 
fifth point of Hirst and Thompson serves as their conclusion -  ‘global markets are thus 
by no means beyond regulation and control’ -  as well as providing the rationale of their 
advocacy of the political action aiming to institute anew the mechanisms of regulation 
and control of the market by the state (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 2; see also 
Thompson 2005, p. 54).
The assumption that globalization is an artificial construct and ‘can thus be 
deconstructed by society’ (Munck 2006, p. 175, emphasis deleted) is the key to the 
social democratic interpretations discussed in this chapter. If, along socialist lines, 
human nature is naturally sociable (Polanyi 2001, p. 48) then historical development 
cannot cairy on defying innate human propensities by ‘desocializing’ one of the most
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important social institutions, that is to say, the market. History cannot continue to unfold 
in reverse; it will inevitably retake its proper couise as it did following the equally 
‘aberrant’ belle époque period, on which Polanyi’s analysis focuses. The excesses of the 
market will always be accompanied by opposite tendencies, in the process that Polanyi 
called the ‘double movement’. In other words, the laissez-faire drive to disembed the 
market from society, to leave it to self-regulate, and to subject the social world to its 
imperatives will inevitably face a societal correction, which will aim to re-embed the 
market within a system of socially negotiated rules.
The societal side of the ‘double movement’ today takes the form of state intervention 
and the state remains one of the most important social democratic concepts, both as a 
means of action facilitating the formation of the social democratic society, and as a key 
element of the final picture determining the social democratic shape of the core, socialist 
concepts of history and equality. Therefore, also in its response to globalization, social 
democracy remains ‘largely a political doctrine within national parameters’ (Shaw 2001, 
p. 23). Even though a more globally orientated cunent of global democracy is on the 
rise, in large sectors of social democracy the belief remains that states alone are able to 
hold markets to account, and that the move towards implementing social democratic 
principles is to take place primarily at the national level. Accordingly, the 
demystification of the idea of globalization should be the first step on the way to 
abolishing its pernicious effects and returning to the natural course of social evolution 
towards benign state interventionism in the service of social inclusion.
Socialism 157
The socialist concept of globalization?
The diversity of currents within the socialist family is reflected in the globalization 
debate. By simplifying the variations of socialism to three ideal types of Marxism, 
democratic socialism and ‘national’ social democracy, it is possible to distinguish 
analytically between three broad socialist understandings of globalization. In each of 
these cases two core ideas of history and equality exert a broad influence on the 
conceptualizations of globalization, while the role allocated to the state further specifies 
the approaches to the new concept. Thus, to begin with Marxism, its radical idea of 
equality and its revolutionary vision of history exclude the state fr om playing a crucial 
role. The state’s relative insignificance in Marxism allows in turn for the development of 
a confident globalist approach. In the case of democratic socialism, a full-blown 
globalism is constrained by this current’s insistence on employing the state as the tool in 
the historical progress towards equality. Still, among democratic socialists some have 
begun displaying a considerable extent of globalist imagination and advocated means to 
transfer politics to supranational levels. This moderate globalism has been made possible 
by the fact that in democratic socialism the state has the function of an operative concept 
and as such is subject to change. Conversely, in social democracy the concept of the 
state has acquired more importance as not merely a means of transition but as the key 
distributive mechanism. As such, the concept of the state is located in direct adjacency 
to the core ideas of history and equality. The social democratic belief in statism is 
therefore more entrenched rendering social democracy, or at least the more traditional
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social democratic cuiTcnts that I have discussed here, less inclined to frame its vision in 
globalist terms.
The diversity of socialist inteipretations of globalization demonstrates that the concept is 
decontested within its host ideologies in ways which depend on the already existing 
conceptual moiphologies. These conceptual connections may be relatively 
uncomplicated, as with the Marxist perception of globalization as the final step towards 
the fulfilment of history, or the oufright rejection of globalization as a myth by some 
social democratic currents, or they may be more problematic, as with the ambiguities 
concerning the possibility of enacting the democratic socialist vision on a global scale. 
But ultimately the concept of globalization is shaped according to long-term priorities of 
its host ideologies, such as, in the respectively discussed cases, the revolutionary 
abolition of capitalism, its gradual transcendence, or its retention in an improved form. 
In any of these cases, the new concept is interpreted so as to confirm the rightness of its 
host’s purpose and the optimality of its method.
The differences between the thiee currents suggest that there might be no such thing as 
the socialist understanding of globalization. However, such a possibility does not 
devalue the present attempt to trace the existing conceptual paths as they develop from 
within the ‘socialist matrix’. This matrix consists of a set of core concepts that limit 
somehow the range of conceptual choices available to its ‘effluxes’ in making sense of 
the idea of globalization. While the remaining options may still amount to a breathtaldng
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diversity, they are recognizable, at least in their key aspects, as ‘socialist’ and thus as 
distinct from other such broad categories.
CHAPTER IV 
NATIONAL POPULISM AND FASCISM:
BLOOD AND SOIL AGAINST GLOBALIZATION
Parallel to the globalist visions of liberalism and Maixism, the rejection of the global has 
a long history. This chapter examines anti-globalization positions articulated on the right 
end of the political spectrum. It traces their development from the long tradition of 
antiuniversalism while also identifying new conceptual and rhetorical shifts espoused by 
parties, movements and intellectuals representing national populist and fascist thought.
Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment
The ideologies that I have discussed so far, namely liberalism and socialism, sprang 
from the same source: the Enlightenment. Thus, even though many important 
differences divide the two worldviews, they coalesce on the fundamental assumption 
that human beings are of equal value and essentially of the same nature regardless of 
time and place. Consequently, both liberals and socialists are committed to universalism, 
talcing for granted the possibility of one law to guide all peoples and to thus unite 
humankind in one peaceful global civilization. While liberalism and socialism elevated 
universalism to the status of one of the key organizing principles of Western civilization 
(and thus prepared ground for the contemporary accelerated globalization) this 
universalist outlook has not been left unchallenged. The rise of the Enlightenment 
provoked an intellectual reaction that Zeev Stemhell described in suggestive terms: ‘the
National populism and fascism
man of the Enlightemnent wanted no less than to recreate the myth of Prometheus. His 
immediate enemies replied by appealing to Providence, to destiny, to histoiy and to the 
profound roots of the collective subconscious’ (Sternhell 2000, p. 143).
hi this chapter my focus is on the right-wing antiglobalism which developed from the 
early denunciations of the Enlightemnent. More specifically, my analysis engages with 
antiglobalist interpretations articulated within the territory of what is conventionally 
termed the extreme right, and in particular within two ideological currents which belong 
there: national populism and fascism. To make sure that ideological continuity between 
early antiuniversalist ideas and the contemporary extreme right is clearly shown, I begin 
with a brief historical summary of relevant, mostly nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, contributions. Subsequently, I explain the meaning of the concept of the 
extreme right, shed light on several differences between national populism and fascism, 
and discuss, in a comparative way, their antiglobalist arguments. The last section 
provides an account of conceptual changes that have taken place in this ideological area 
and that have followed a shift from traditional nationalism to a new post-nationalist 
orientation. The objective of this part is to demonstrate that whereas the shift is indeed 
significant, its consequences for the values and the logic of extreme right ideologies are 
not as fundamental as is sometimes suggested. While hopes, aspirations and identities 
that in the past were articulated primarily in national contexts are no longer restricted to 
the national level, they are still recognizable as integral to particular ideological
161
National populism and fascism
traditions thus demonstrating that the change of the territorial referent does not have to 
cause an evaporation of ideological distinctions.
The anti-Enlightenment tradition of the right: a historical sketch
The French Revolution of 1789 is a useful symbolic marker of both the Enlightemnent 
as well as of the reaction against it that saw counterrevolutionaries striving to find ways 
to restore absolute monarchy and its concomitant aristocratic social order. While the 
counter-revolutionary reaction was in this instance provoked by a specific set of 
circumstances, it can also be seen as an expression of a more durable, conceivably 
eternal, disposition that emphasizes organicism, tradition and particularity, and that 
clashes with equally long-lasting tendencies towards emancipation, innovation and 
universalism. The particularistic and defensive reactions to globalization that I discuss in 
the present chapter are merely new expressions of the same intellectual movement that 
highlights rootedness and history, and thus incomparability of different local 
perspectives, against what it sees as a ‘view from nowhere’: an abstract cosmopolitan 
perspective detached from local beliefs and practices and thus devoid of genuine 
legitimization. The discussion presented in this section is not intended as a systematic or 
comprehensive historical account but aims to highlight some of the key moments of anti- 
Enlightenment reaction in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Europe’s most 
important intellectual centres: France, Germany and Britain.
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France
Not unexpectedly, the reaction to the turmoil of the Revolution was particularly strong 
in France and the French have since remained the trendsetters of the anti-Enlightenment 
tradition. French counterrevolutionary intellectuals such as Louis de Bonald (1754- 
1840) or Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) were outraged by what they saw as the 
disastrous consequences of the Revolution for monarchical and papal authority and for 
social order and stability. While their primary concern was with the conservation of 
group privileges and social hierarchies, they framed their view in broad philosophical 
terms opposed to the combination of individualism and universalism which was typical 
of the Enliglitenment and which featured in revolutionary slogans. In nineteenth century 
counterrevolutionary thought in France the defence of monarchy against the 
revolutionary upheaval was understood as the defence of the tested, the known, and the 
traditional against the pretensions of speculative rationalism. The monarch was 
presented as a quintessential representation of the kingdom, a form of totem in which the 
values, traditions and customs of the community were deposited. De Bonald’s 
distinction between the old and the new political orders was formulated in terms that 
emphasized the contrast between the deep-rooted and the unencumbered: ‘monarchy 
considers man in his ties with society; a republic considers man independently of his 
relations to society’ (De Bonald, in Boudon et al. 1997, vol. 1, p. 264). Thus, while the 
defence of monarchy was in the centre of early nineteenth century counter-revolutionary 
reaction in France, the logic used in pro-monarchical arguments may be employed in 
favour of any political arrangement which is considered as organically evolved from a
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given place and thus as innate there. Indeed, as I am going to show in later parts of this 
chapter, acclamations of rootedness and cultural particularity similar to those of the 
French counterrevolutionaries feature in contemporary right-wing diatribes against 
globalization.
Particularly relevant from the point of view of the contemporary antiglobalist right is the 
anthropological theory of the anti-Enlightenment, as formulated for example by De 
Maistre, who is considered to be the most important among French authoritarian 
conservatives. De Maistre attacked the individualistic and universalistic anthropology of 
liberalism when he famously denied the possibility of the existence of an individual 
abstracted from national culture;
There is no such thing as man in the world. In the course of my life I 
have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians etc.; I laiow, too, thanlcs to 
Montesquieu, that one can be a Persian. But as for man, I declare that I 
have never met him in my life; if he exists, he is unknown to me. (De 
Maistre, in Etzioni 2003, p. 40, emphasis deleted)
De Maistre’s rebuttal of universalist anthropology fits well within contemporary right- 
wing critiques of the globalist aspirations of liberalism and socialism. Ernest Renan 
(1823-1892) and Maurice Barrés (1862-1923) are other French authors whose 
contributions resonate in today’s antiglobalist tlieory. Both wrote in a later period when 
anti-Enlightemnent sentiments continued to run high and both emphasized the idea of 
organic development and rootedness. Renan’s statements embodied the essence of 
nationalist ontology: ‘[t]he nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of
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efforts, and sacrifices, and devotions’ (Renan 1970 [1882], p. 81) and combined with his 
refusal to accept the utilitarian conception of the nation as merely a matter of economic 
convenience:
Community of interests is assuredly a powerful bond between men. 
But nevertheless can interests suffice to make a nation? I do not 
believe it. Community of interests makes commercial treaties. There is 
a sentimental side to nationality; it is at one body and soul; a 
Zollverein is not a fatherland. (Renan 1970 [1882], p. 79)
This holistic nationalism cuhninated in the thought of Banes. His philosophy was 
opposed to what he saw as the offspring of universalism: déracinement or rootlessness. 
Barrés’s most important book. Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme, can be read as a 
manifesto postulating an unequivocal rejection of liberal anthropology: ‘[t]he sovereign 
individual with his intelligence and his ability to seize the laws of the universe! This idea 
must be destroyed’ (Barrés, in Steiner 1970, p. 162). What Banés offered in its stead 
was an unashamedly deterministic and irrationalist theory of the individual and the 
nation: ‘[w]e are not in control of our thinldng [...] Human reason is in such bondage 
that we all follow the path of our ancestors’ (Bairés, in Steiner 1970, p. 162). From 
Barrés’s perspective there is no universal truth or justice, merely ‘French truth and 
French justice’, meaningful only from the point fanned by the past centuries, ‘from 
which everything is seen through the eyes of a Frenchman’ (Barrés, in Steiner 1970, pp. 
161-162). Nationalism, asserts Barrés, ‘is simply the discoveiy of that point, searching 
for it, and when it is found, holding to it and receiving from it our art, our politics and 
the manner of living our life’ (Bairès, in Steiner 1970, pp. 161-162).
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The nationalism of Banes is an extreme exemplification of the sense of an organic 
rootedness in nation, and hence of a categorically localist attachment where the soil of 
the countiy as well as its dead command tlie people to a particular way of life. In other 
words, it is localism centred on la terre et les morts:
The soil speaks to us and works with the nation’s consciousness quite 
as much as it cooperates with the dead. The soil gives the active life of 
the dead its efficacy. Our ancestors pass on as a whole the heritage 
accumulated in their souls only by the immutable vital activity of the 
soil. (Barrés, in Steiner 1970, p. 192)
From this view followed Banés’s more specific political ideas. For example, while he 
saw himself as a French nationalist, he was also very strongly attached to his native 
region, Lorraine. He contrasted Lorraine with the cosmopolitanism of Paris (his novel, 
entitled suggestively Les Déracinés, portrayed the lives of his fellow Lorrainers in 
Paris). He stated his regionalist position clearly; ‘[t]he view that we have of the soil 
compels us to envisage an organization of the countiy by regions’ (Barrés, in Steiner 
1970, p. 192), and he was convinced that the future of France laid in decentralization. 
But Banés was not alone in advocating decentralist ideas: Georges Sorel (1844—1922) 
and Charles Maurras (1868-1952), two thinlcers whose work continues to influence the 
extreme right, likewise wished for decentralization of France that they hoped would 
revive its local and provincial life (Spektorowsld 2003a, p. 115). This two-tiered 
nationalism -  related on the one hand to the nation and on the other hand to specific 
regions within it -  remains a characteristic feature of some currents of extreme right 
localism today.
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A particular conception of inequality is one of the crucial conceptual concomitants of 
this radical form of nationalism. If, as declared Barrés, ‘[i]t is my sense of descent which 
provides me with the axis around which my total, self-contained idea of life revolves’ 
(Barrés, in Steiner 1970, p. 160), then ways of life evolved from different roots are not 
compatible. In this way, the commitment to inequality does not need to follow fr om the 
notion of innately different levels of intelligence or talent. Instead, inequality is 
understood as resulting from an arbitrary fact of one’s organic belonging. A devoted 
anti-Semite for most of his life. Barrés did not advocate the idea of a racial or even 
cultural inferiority of the French Jews. His hostility was based purely on their alleged 
lack of roots in the French soil — a characteristic that. Barrés believed, necessarily 
implied their disloyalty to France:
The Jews have no native land in the sense that we understand it. For 
us, a homeland implies the soil, our ancestors, the land of our dead. 
For them it is only the place where they find the greatest profits [...]. 
Does it follow that you should call them “dirty Jews” or the highest 
aristocracy in the world? You can do what you like, according to your 
own inclinations and your circmnstances. It does not matter. But do 
not deny that the Jew is a creature apart, (Barrés, in Steiner 1970, p. 
181)
This idea of the fundamental inequality between those who belong and those who do not 
has been passed on from Barrés and other nineteenth century thinkers of nationalist 
orientation to the contemporary extreme right. It now assists right-wing antiglobalists in 
their attempts to articulate a new form of racism, one which does not refer to biology but 
to culture. I discuss this culturalist racism, or differentialism, as it is also known, later in 
the present chapter.
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Germany
In Germany, a reaction set in against the rationalist and mechanistic worldview of the 
Aufldarung in the form of the Romantic movement. While German Romanticism had a 
more ambivalent view about universalism and particularism than the extremely 
dichotomist thinking of the French countenevolutionaries (Sayre and Lowy 1984), its 
prevalent conception of the community was still one of an organic Volk attached to a 
particular place and expressing itself tlirough local habits, traditions, mythology and 
folklore. Zeev Stemliell explains the antiglobalist implications of German romantic 
nationalism in an evocative way:
[0]ne cannot enter a family in the way in which one buys a share on 
the stock exchange. [...] people who are the product of the same 
geographical environment, the same climate, and who heard the same 
tales and legends at their mother’s knee possess a mentality which is 
unique of its kind. (Stemhell 2000, p. 144)
Nationality was thus from the romantic perspective a matter of nature rather than a civil 
or political fact. In elaborating this view, romantic nationalism drew in particular on the 
contributions of thinkers such as Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). Herder asserted that providence ‘has wonderfully 
separated nationalities not only by woods and mountains, seas and deserts, rivers and 
climates, but more particularly by languages, inclinations and characters’ (Herder, in 
Knop 2002, p. 55). Accordingly, since nations are distinct by virtue of natural features, 
individuals naturally belong to, and are constituted by, their particular nationalities. It 
follows that the nation is not a mere collection of individuals but a Volkstum (or
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folkliood), an organic, indivisible and unique being that generates particular ways of 
thinking and living. An individual who is devoid of patriotism is therefore seen as one 
who ‘has lost himself and the whole world about himself (Herder, in Viroli 1995, p. 
118).
Among national attributes, language was particularly important to Romanticism. Herder 
believed that language determined thought. Likewise, Fichte saw language as a natural 
phenomenon. He expressed the unity of language and nation in his thirteenth address 
‘To the German Nation’ in 1806:
Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a 
multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any human 
art begins; they understand each other and have the power of 
continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; 
they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole. 
Such a whole, if it wishes to absorb and mingle with itself any other 
people of different descent and language, cannot do so without itself 
becoming confused [...] and violently disturbing the even progress of 
its culture. (Fichte 1968 [1807-1808], pp. 190-191)
As I am going to show later, Fichte’s belief that ‘absoiption’ of different cultural 
influences into an ostensibly homogenous group leads to ‘confusion’ and ‘violent 
disturbance’ has been popular among contemporary antiglobalists on the extreme right 
who have used the idea in their assertions of the necessity of cultural and political 
banders to globalization and multiculturalism. The logic of this particular antiglobalist 
argument owes a lot to thinkers such as Fichte and Herder.
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The criticism of the Enlightemnent in Germany was later associated with several 
outstanding thinkers such as the first German sociologists: Ferdinand Tomiies (1855- 
1936) and Max Weber (1864-1920). Tonnies defined the essence of modernization as a 
progressive loss of community (Gemeimchafi) and he described the emergence in its 
place of the impersonal social aggregate {Gesellschaft) which generates no real sense of 
roots or belonging (Tonnies 2003 [1887]). While Tonnies did not intend his distinction 
between ‘community’ and ‘society’ to serve as a critique of modernity, his ideas, and in 
particular his terminology, have been appropriated by antimodemist, and now 
antiglobalist, thought (see for example Benoist 1994). Weber was more unequivocally 
pessimistic in his evaluations of modernity and in his prognosis for the future. He 
identified rationality as the driving force of modernization but in his evaluation the most 
important outcome of the process was an alienating disenchantment that empties the 
world of meaning. Weber did not hide his loathing of the modem era that he associated 
with spiritual futility and purposelessness:
[M]echanized ossification, embellished with a sort of rigidly 
compelled sense of self-importance [...] narrow specialists without 
mind, pleasure-seekers without heart; in its conceit, this nothingness 
imagines it has climbed to a level of humanity never before attained. 
(Weber 2002 [1905], p. 124)
The antimodemist reaction in Germany reached its zenith with the conservative 
revolution movement which was particularly prominent in the Weimar Republic but
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exerted influence all over Europe. Conseiwative revolutionaries, such as Ernst Jünger 
(1895-1998), Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), or Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), formulated a 
forceful rejection of humanism, egalitarianism, universalism, and globalism. The 
profound pessimism about modemity featured also in the thought of Martin Heidegger 
whose reflection (in 1935) captures the spirit of the epoch while also anticipating recent 
debates surrounding the detenitorializing impact of globalization:
Once the furthermost comer of the globe has been technologically 
conquered and opened up to economic exploitation, when every 
possible event in every possible place at every possible time has 
become as accessible as quickly as possible, when people can 
“experience” an attempt on the life of a king in France and a 
symphony concert in Tokyo simultaneously, when time has become 
only speed, instantaneousness, and simultaneity, and time as History 
has disappeared from the existence of all peoples, when the boxer is 
seen as the great man of a people, when mass gatherings mnning into 
millions are regarded as a triumph -  then, yes, then, the questions 
which hover over this whole grotesque charade like ghosts are: for 
what? -  where to? -  and what then? (Heidegger, in Griffin 1995, p. 
151)
A more specifically localist expression of the same intellectual Zeitgeist was given by the 
most important codifier of left-wing (that is to say, antiimperialist and anticapitalist) 
Nazism, Otto Strasser (1897-1974). In 1936 Strasser declared ‘[t]he resolute repudiation 
of any form of imperialism’ to be ‘a core feature of the volJdsch idea’ (Strasser, in 
Griffin 1995, p. 114). Insisting that ‘[ejveiy people should pursue happiness in its own 
way’ (Strasser, in Griffin 1995, p. 114), Strasser affirmed an antiglobalist tendency in 
Nazism, which acknowledged ‘the right of every nation to national independence, to its 
autonomous control of the forms taken by its political, economic and cultural life’
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(Strasser, in Griffin 1995, p. 114). The antiglobalist inclination of left-wing Nazism is 
nowadays thriving in various ‘Third Positionisf movements such as the English 
National Revolutionary Faction led by Troy Southgate (Macklin 2005).
Britain
In Britain, the reaction against modemity was more moderate and more pragmatic. The 
dominant current of British conservatism remained under the influence of Edmund 
Burke (1729-1797) who, while famous for his critique of the French Revolution, did not 
want to respond by going back to the status quo ante. Assuming that ‘[a] state without 
the means of some change is without the means of its conseiwation’ (Burke 1868, p. 29), 
Burke opened British conservatism to penetration by liberal ideas and led it to a 
qualified reconciliation with new socio-political realities. But next to Burke’s liberal 
conservatism, the British also developed an organic strand, often called Toryism to 
highlight its pre-industrial roots. This current drew attention to the dismptive effects of 
modemity and insisted on preserving strong social bonds that were to prevent society 
from descending into chaos. It was built on an idyllic vision of an organic feudal 
community, ‘a mythical Merrie England in which the propertied classes had 
benevolently discharged their custodial responsibilities to the poor, who had 
reciprocated with affectionate deference’ (Eccleshall 2003b, p. 53). This Tory 
patemalism was rooted in an organic and localist cosmology. The patemalistic çocial 
ideal of a benevolent hierarchical stmcture integrated by the bonds of charity and 
obedience could only be maintained in a society which remained relatively closed and
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inunobile, both in the social and in the geographical sense; both vertically and 
horizontally. In this model it was not only the subordinate classes that ‘knew their place’ 
and lived localized lives. The land-owning aristocracy was also embedded in its place: it 
was attached to the land it owned and it disdained the uprooted lifestyle of the 
bourgeoisie. Moreover, the genteel ideology of Tory consei"vatives was scornful of an 
economistic zeal of the bourgeoisie and scoffed at the economics and ethics of 
liberalism. The Tories posed as sceptical about abstract principles, drawing instead on 
historical experience and local traditions.
Some later antiliberal ideas in Britain took the form of distributism, a current which was 
particularly popular in traditionalist Roman Catholic circles and theorized by thinkers 
such as Hillaire Belloc (1870-1953) and G. K. Chesterton (1874-1936), who were 
influenced in turn by some French traditionalists (Griffiths 2004). The distributist 
movement postulated an alternative to both capitalism and socialism in the form of a 
guild-based system of small property-owners. Smallness was an important element of 
the distributist worldview and the connection between distributism and localization was 
most clearly made by an English Dominican monlc Vincent McNabb (1868-1943). 
Commenting on the massification implied by capitalism, McNabb asserted that the 
savings afforded by ‘mass production’ are offset by the costs incurred by the necessary 
‘mass distribution’ (NcNabb, in Cooney 2002, p. 18). Anthony Cooney recapitulates 
McNabb’s ‘Distributist Law’ in the following way:
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The area of production should be as far as possible coterminous with 
the area of consumption. The utilitarians were wrong in saying things 
should be produced where they can be most economically produced. 
The true principle is things should be produced where they can most 
economically be consumed. (Cooney 2002, p. 18)
Some of the ideas of distributism were later adopted by the emblematic exponent of 
localism, E. F. Schumacher, while on the contemporaiy British extreme right the 
distributist standpoint is claimed by several national populists (including members of the 
British National Party) as well as assorted fascists, such as Patrick Harrington 
(Harrington 2002; see also Médaille 2002 for an example of contemporary distributist 
argumentation).
*  *  *
There is no space here for a more comprehensive historical summary. Wliile similar 
ideas surfaced elsewhere in Europe, France, Germany and Britain provide sufficiently 
revealing illustrations of the key directions in the development of anti-Enlightenment 
thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The idea of rootedness has been 
running through anti-Enlightenment thought since then and has gained new momentum 
in reaction to the recent ascendancy of globalist ideologies. The following section 
provides a general account of antiglobalist ideas formulated within the extreme right as 
well as a broad classification of relevant ideological currents. The analysis of differences 
between the perspectives that those currents take on the question of scale is left to the 
final part of this chapter.
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Contemporary right-wing antiglobalism
Roots, identities: These are the new absolutes. (Taguieff 1993)
Globalisation = pluralism = diversity = disunity = conflict (England 
First, n.d.a)
Key categories: extreme right, national populism and fascism
The category of the extreme right has for some time been the subject of scrupulous 
scholarly attention and I am not going to attempt to add another contribution to the 
variety of definitions and conceptualizations that have resulted fiom this analytical 
effort. Instead, I am going to rely on a basic characterization. Of the range of existing 
definitions of the extreme right twenty-six were examined by Cas Mudde. In those 
twenty-six conceptualizations Mudde identified fifty-eight different characteristics 
postulated as either essential to, or at least typical of, the extieme right. Among them 
only five features -  nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-democracy and a call for a 
strong state -  were to be found in over half the definitions (Mudde 2000, p. 11). 
Commenting on the findings of Mudde, Elisabeth Carter concluded that nationalism, 
xenophobia, raeism and ethnocentrism ‘are mere manifestations of the principle of 
fundamental human inequality, which lies at the heart of right-wing extremism’ (Carter 
2005, p. 17; see also Saalfeld 1993, p. 181). I posit that a simple but useful 
conceptualization of the extreme right can be had by accepting Carter’s suggestion that it 
combines commitment to the fundamental belief in human inequality with the rejection 
of ‘the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional
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state’ (Carter 2005, p. 15). According to Carter, while the extreme right owes the first 
part of its name to its rejection of democracy, rejection of human equality is what 
‘makes right-wing extremism right-wing’ (Carter 2005, p. 17). Indeed, in the present 
analysis I am going to show that denunciation of equality is a major explanans of the 
antiglobalist stance of the extreme right while antidemocratic sentiment determines the 
radical nature of the alternatives that it offers.
As stated earlier, my focus in this chapter is on two ideological fonns articulated within 
the parameters of the extr eme right, i.e., on fascism and national populism. At this point, 
things get more complicated. That fascism fulfils the criteria of belonging to the extreme 
right is not a controversial thesis (Berlet and Lyons 2000, pp. 16-17; Billig 1989, p. 146; 
Carter 2005, p. 21; Ebata 1997, p. 21; Hainsworth 2000; Ignazi 2002). However, the 
association between national populism and the extreme right is less clear and so is the 
relationship between national populism and fascism. Describing the characteristics of 
national populist ideology, Roger Griffin used the concept of ‘ethnocratic liberalism’ 
(Griffin 2000, p. 173). This notion captures the fact that national populists do not see 
themselves as opposed to the rudiments of modem western society and may even claim 
to be exemplary democrats. Nevertheless, their understanding of democracy is peculiar -  
it assumes that democratic rights are enjoyed by members of just one group (usually an 
ethnic majority) and it claims to represent the will of this majority while refusing to take 
account of the competing claims of other groups (especially ethnic minorities and 
immigrants). Mudde offered a similar interpretation of national populism by focusing on
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its ‘economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism’ (Mudde 2004, pp. 5-6). 
Accordingly, in national populist ideology a broad acceptance of managed capitalism 
and welfare state^ ® is coupled with the rejection of the idea of universal entitlements to 
social and economic security, the latter being denied to immigrants who are presented as 
parasites and benefit cheats abusing the ‘native’ population. In other words while the 
policies of national populists are often packaged in a way that is meant to convey an 
impression of respect for democratic principles, when explored in greater detail, the 
implications of national populist ideas contradict democracy and it tuius out that 
national populists self-style as democrats only when this is likely to boost their electoral 
performance. This selective commitment to democracy, combined with an 
antiegalitarian position (finding its expression especially in sharply and systematically 
unequal valuations and standards applied respectively to the ‘natives’ and the 
immigiants), determines national populism’s membership in the extreme right.
The distinction between national populism and fascism is not clear-cut either. National 
populist ideology characterizes the platforms of some relatively successful parties, such 
as, to take European examples, the British National Party, the French Front National, the 
Italian Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord, the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs 
or the Swiss Schweizerische Volhpartei. In the United States national populism has
But it should be noted that national populists do not hold one view of capitalism and 
that ideological evolution in this area is always possible. For example, Flood notes a 
transition fi’om a broadly neoliberal orientation to an economic model claiming a 
welfarist identity which took place in the ideas of Front National in the early 1990s 
(Flood 1997, p. 124).
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been articulated by gi'oups such as the Jolin Birch Society, founded in 1958 and the 
Libeify Lobby (active between 1955 and 2001) and reached the mainsti eam of American 
politics in 1992 with the presidential candidacy in republican primaries of a 
paleoconservative Patrick Buchanan and with Ross Perot’s 1992 independent candidacy. 
On the other hand, due to the lack of wider appeal, fascist positions tend to be 
represented by a plethora of minute and ephemeral so-called groupuscules (Griffin 
2003b). Some of those groups have been examined in detail. For example, Jeffrey Bale 
analyzed Nouvelle Résistance created in 1991 by Christian Bouchet as an offshoot of 
Troisième Voie (Third Way) and then transfonned into Unité Radicale, which in turn 
spht up into Bloc Identitaire and a ‘study group’ Réseau radical (Bale 2002). Steve 
Bastow devoted an article on a neo-fascist Third Way to similar gi'oups, and especially 
the Belgian Partie Communautaire National-Européen (Bastow 2002). The Russian 
case of the Arctogaia group and its charismatic leader Aleksandr Dugin was also 
analyzed in two separate studies by Marlene Lamelle and Markus Mathyl (Lamelle n.d.; 
Mathyl 2002). And the ideas of a British fascist, Troy Southgate and of his National 
Revolutionary Faction were discussed in a piece by Graham Macklin (Macklin 2005). 
Fascism may also find articulation in think-tanlcs and networks which are characterized 
by relatively low levels of institutionalization but significant intellectual output. The 
analysis of fascist antiglobalism presented in this section draws primarily on the 
contributions of one such international network, known as the New Right.^^
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It should be noted however that the question of the New Right’s fascist identity has 
been a subject of a considerable debate, both within and without the movement. Without
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In spite of the fact that differences in respective national populist and fascist 
organizational forms are evident, this criterion should not be treated as perfectly reliable 
in delineating tlie two ideological territories. While national populism and fascism will 
typically have different institutional vehicles, the distinction is not shaip for, as Flood 
demonstrates with reference to the French national populist party Front National and a 
neo-Nazi groupuscule Terre et Peuple, the connections and overlaps between national 
populists and fascists are not unusual, with tlie latter often establishing themselves either 
within or close to national populist parties (Flood 2004 [2000]). Furthermore, in a trade­
off between influence and ideological purity, fascists have also been loiown to act from 
within recognized national populist parties (with the proviso that they mitigated their 
more extreme opinions).
Moving on to the level of ideas, one fairly reliable criterion that distinguishes fascism 
from national populism is fascism’s revolutionary and totalitarian orientation (Passmore 
2004 [1995], p. 205) although even in this respect it is always a question of degree rather
engaging directly in this debate, I suggest that if Griffin’s description of the fascist 
vision as ‘palingenetic’ (Griffin 2003c) is accepted, then the New Right meets the fascist 
criteria. As I am going to demonstrate, the realization of the New Right’s vision would 
require a total transformation of the global order and the abandonment of the key 
principles that lay at its basis, including Christianity, rationalism, universalism and the 
idea of human rights. My analysis therefore concurs with Griffin’s demystification of the 
efforts of some New Right theorists to distance themselves fi*om fascism and with the 
emphasis that he puts on the New Right’s ‘profound continuity with the fascist epoch’ 
(Griffin 2003a).
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than kind. National populism is generally a more conservative current in that it does not 
include the idea of palingenesis, which is typical of fascism and which envisions an act 
of dramatic rebirth of a people after a period defined as decline (Griffin 1993, p. 26).
While fascism demands a comprehensive paradigm shift, including radical changes in 
the sphere of religious, philosophical and civilizational principles, national populists do 
not advocate such sweeping transformation either in philosophical, or in economic 
terms. Nor are national populists interested in exerting as total an influence on the 
populace as is the ambition of fascists.
The more radical, transformative character of fascism, has contributed to its capacity to 
move beyond traditional nationalism and it is on this question that the differences 
between fascism and national populism are most interesting fi*om the perspective of this 
study. As I demonstrate in the final section of this chapter, the majority of fascists have 
nowadays abandoned the conventionally understood concept of the nation and extended 
the scale on which they project their ideas. On the other hand, as the term itself suggests, 
the political imagination of national populism on tlie whole continues to have national 
parameters: the majority of national populists still associate themselves with nations 
which they aim to defend against the forces of globalization. The qualifications inserted 
in these sentences are meant to suggest that the demarcation according to scale is not 
entirely reliable. Indeed, a minority of fascists remain traditionally nationalist, while 
some national populists have (under influence of fascist theories) combined loyalty to 
nations with a more international orientation. Nevertheless, while I do not claim that it
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works in eveiy case, I believe that the criterion of spatial orientation can broadly map 
some general tendencies and I find it useful in pursuing my principal aim in this chapter, 
which is to demonstrate a definite continuity in the ideas that are at play in the process of 
constracting exclusionary territorial identities whether on national or supranational 
levels.
National populism: globalization as swamping
The most typical characteristic of national populism is its hostility to immigration and 
cultural pluralism and to the institutions and ideologies perceived as promoters of these 
phenomena. The anti-immigration stance is in national populist publications associated 
with resentment towards the so-called ‘establishment’ (major political parties, 
mainstream politicians, business figures, the church, the media, etc.). This combination 
of enmity to both immigrants and the ‘establishment’ makes up what Chip Berlet and 
Matthew Lyons termed ‘producerism’, that is to say, a particular type of rhetoric that 
champions ‘the so-called producers in society against both “unproductive” elites and 
subordinate groups defined as lazy or immoral’ (Berlet and Lyons 2000, p. 6).
The concept of globalization has been integrated in this framework with considerable 
ease. Denunciations of the ‘establishment’ and panicked warnings against immigrants 
are now articulated in connection with opposition to the process of globalization. The 
impression of the sinister ‘globalization link’ is amplified by presenting the two groups 
as acting in collusion, with the establishment conspiring on the global level to ‘swamp’
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the major countries with immigrants. The objective of this promotion of immigration is 
to undermine social cohesion and weaken the patriotism of the real ‘natives’, to in turn 
promote a further globalization in the form of more immigration and ‘export of jobs to 
the Third World’, thus bringing ‘ruin and unemployment’ to native industries and 
communities (BNP n.d.). The picture thus fits together: ‘the enemy within’, i.e., the 
‘establishment’ and the ‘aliens’, is linked with ‘the enemy without’ (Flood 1997, p. 110) 
and globalization is presented as a ‘New World Order’, a new geopolitical system 
coordinated by either foreign powers or transnational institutions according to the 
principles of ‘globalism’ (the word has been substituted for the notion of 
‘cosmopolitanism’ in national populist discourse; on this rhetorical change see Simmons 
2003).
While national populist theories of this globalist New World Order will differ on the 
question of whether humankind has already reached this stage or whether the new 
system is still under construction, the idea itself reiterates the logic of the various 
conspiracy theories, going back to Auguste Barruel (1741-1820) who claimed to have 
uncovered the conspiratorial plot of the order of the Illuminati against the ancién regime 
dominated by the monarchy and the church (Hofman 1993). Contemporaiy tlieories of 
the New World Order can take very suggestive forms^^ and continue to have strong 
antisemitic, antimasonic and apocalyptic undertones (for example Robertson 1991).^^
182
For example, in the United States, the Militia men and Patriot movement, whose 
opposition to globalization has gained them a mass following of several million, were
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National populists portray the alleged conspiracists as deadly enemies of the sovereignty 
of nations but the specificity of those revelations varies. For example, the leader of the 
French Front National Jean-Marie Le Pen linked the New World Order in rather abstr act 
terms with the global market by asserting that it ‘works tenaciously to dismantle nations 
in order to assure its authority over a world without frontiers, without opposition and 
without values except those of the “stock market”’ (Le Pen, in Simmons 2003). On the 
other hand, Nick Griffin, Le Pen’s counterpart in the British National Party, was more 
specific. In his account of globalization entitled ‘Cults, jets and greed -  the frantic msh 
to “One World’” , Griffin identified three elements in the conspiracy that he claimed to 
have exposed: ‘the Zionist movement’, Marxism and Liberalism with its ‘absurd 
superstition of egalitarianism’ (Griffin 2004-2005). According to Griffin’s denunciation, 
the ideologists of the New World Order -  and he named, among others, Rupert 
Murdoch, Michael Lemer and George Soros as the main conspirators — aim to achieve 
‘the total destruction of all independent sovereign states’ as ‘a prerequisite for the 
establishment of their various dreams of a single world government’ (Griffin 2004-
keen to prophesy an imminent enslavement of the American nation by the UN in various 
apocalyptic stories involving ‘surveillance from hidden cameras, and black helicopters, 
and implanting biochips in the newborn’ (Castells 2004, p. 89; see also Rupert 2000, pp. 
94-118).
But while the continuity of clahns of antisemitic conspiracy in extreme right 
interpretations of globalization is evident in references to the ‘Zionist occupied 
governments’ or the ‘East Coast’ (Sommer 2008, p. 314), some scholars note a shift 
away from antisemitism to Islamophobia (Zuquete 2008, p. 329).
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2005). More generally, in European variants of national populist ideology one fairly 
common element is the portrayal of the United States as the main culprit of 
globalization. Thus, for the Northern Italian Lega Nord, globalization stands for a plot to 
construct an ‘anglophone and totalitarian Global Village on the mins of the peoples’ (in 
Mudde 2004, p. 11). The paity put the following slogan on its propaganda posters: ‘The 
process of globalization is controlled by American bankers and will turn the whole 
world into a “melting pot’” (in Woods 2009, p. 162). Likewise, according to one of the 
main ideologues of the Front National, Samuel Maréchal, ’'mondialisme bears another 
name, less abstract, that is, American financial interests and those of the boards of 
directors of the trusts and the lobbies. Such a system is absolutely opposed to even the 
vaguest desire for national independence’ (Maréchal, in Simmons 2003; see also Flood 
1997, p. 134).
Whatever the specific focus of these critiques they all share the assumption that 
globalization is engineered by identifiable agents: states or organizations usually 
manipulated by powerful individuals or special interests. In other words, globalization is 
not an outcome of random or uncontrollable developments but a carefully managed 
process unfolding in a thoroughly planned direction and on various levels from 
geopolitics to everyday social life.^° Consequently, the responses that national populists
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For example, Flood documents the Front National's extensive critique of the globalist 
curriculum purportedly imposed on the French educational systems and of the cultural 
colonialism supposedly peipetrated by bodies such as UNESCO, the Council of Europe 
or the European Commission (Flood 2004 [2000], pp. 168-170).
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suggest also need to be enacted on different levels and these are discussed later in this 
chapter.
Fascism: the palingenetic perspective on globalization
Alongside national populist parties the extreme right is populated by more radical, 
fascist and Nazi groups distinguished by their readiness to engage in revolutionary 
struggle and a vision of palingenesis according to which ‘through the intervention of a 
heroic élite the whole national community is capable of resuiTecting itself Phoenix-like 
from the ashes of the decadent old order’ (Griffin 2000, p. 165). In other words, the 
postulate here is a total annihilation of the coiTupt global liberal society and the 
construction, on its ruins, of the ‘pluriverse’ of communities defined as volkisch, whose 
members are to partake in a common heritage of their own ‘blood and soil’. The fascist 
ideological family includes a diversity of tendencies such as national-bolshevism, 
national-anarchism, third positionism, and others. In this chapter I am going to focus 
predominantly on the New Right which provides the most sophisticated articulation of 
contemporary fascist thought.
The New Right (to be distinguished from the neoconservative right in Britain and the 
United States that also used to be called New Right) is a pan-European network with the 
most significant base in France, where the Nouvelle Droite emerged in the 1970s in 
reaction to the events of 1968 and styling itself as a counterforce to the politics of the 
New Left with which some of the New Right’s intellectuals had earlier been associated
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(Gunn 1989, p. 25). The influence of Nouvelle Droite and its erudite guru, Alain de 
Benoist, has been important, if diffuse and exerted in usually diluted forms via national 
populist parties. The network’s think-tank, GRECE, standing for Le Groupement de 
Recherches et d ’Études pour la Civilisation Européene (The Centre for the Research and 
Study for Euiopean Civilisation), has also played a role, as have its journals: Éléments 
and Krisis. Outside France, the New Right has been influential in Germany (where its 
main advocate is the French leader of the Thule Seminar group, Pierre Krebs), Italy 
(Marco Tarchi) and Russia {Arctogaia group and Aleksandr Dugin). In Britain -  as Ruth 
Levitas shows in her book on neoconservatism -  New Right ideas were propagated by 
Michael Walker’s journal Scorpion and for a time enjoyed some sympathy among the 
members of the neoconservative Salisbury Review gioup (Levitas 1986).
The New Right is a metapolitical and elitist cuiTent. The discourse of the New Right is 
metapolitical in that it addresses directly the fundamental themes of culture, identity, 
modemity and progress in their interdependence and long historical perspective. The 
New Right styles itself as a radical critique of the cosmological and anthropological 
mdiments of the dominant paradigm, and as a wide-ranging project for the localized, 
decentralized and communitarian tomorrow. This critique draws on a rich conglomerate 
of diverse influences, including authoritarian conservatives (e.g., Joseph de Maistre), 
nationalists (e.g., Maurice Barrés) and fascists (e.g., Julius Evola and the Conservative 
Revolution movement). The promiscuity of the New Right in appropriating 
miscellaneous ideological influences is exemplified in the fact that it does not limit itself
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to just the right-wing arsenal of intellectual sources and tools and also strives to 
appropriate selected left-wing ideas. It used to call itself a ‘’Gramscisme de droite' and 
boiTOwed from the Italian thinker his emphasis on the culturalist strategy of attaining 
ideological hegemony. In its quest for this hegemony the New Right has aimed to form a 
distinct cultural paradigm whose premises have been elaborated by New Right 
ideologues in books and articles as well as in more ephemeral publicist interventions.
The New Right’s orientation is also elitist in that it has refrained from direct 
participation in party politics. Yet, to stick with the example of the French Nouvelle 
Droite, regardless of its abstention from electoral contest and in spite of the insignificant 
size of its membership, the group influenced the most important national populist party 
in France, Front National (Flood 1997, p. 105; see also Simmons 2003) and supplied it 
with discursive strategies, such as the substitution of the culturalist ‘right to difference’ 
for biological racism (similar influences of the New Right on national populist parties 
can be indentified in other European countries thus demonstrating the fact that fascism 
and national populism are not always easily separable).^’ Its intellectual complexity as 
well as considerable, even if indirect, political impact, make the New Right a fitting case
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But it should be noted that De Benoist distances himself from Front National. ‘As for 
my position concerning the National Front, it is quite simple, I see in it no ideas which 
are my own and give meaning to my life’ (Benoist, in Bar-On 2007, p. 166). Some 
authors claim that the New Right’s association with national populism is somewhat 
inadvertent. For instance, Ignazi argues that the Nouvelle Droite ‘produced a series of 
interpretations and intellectual tools that, beyond the intentions o f the Nouvelle Droite 
itself, have been reffamed and adopted by the extreme right parties’ (Ignazi 2003, p. 24, 
emphasis in original).
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to be analyzed as an example of contemporary fascist antiglobalism which has absorbed 
a diversity of antiuniversalist ideas while giving them a distinctly fascist shape.
Antliropology is the starting point of the discourse of the New Right. In important 
respects New Right anthropological ideas mirror those of De Maistre, Renan or Barrés.
Alain de Benoist for example makes an obvious allusion to De Maistre when declaring, 
tongue in cheek: ‘I see a horse but I do not see a horsekind’ (Benoist, in Sunic 1990, p.
109). In ‘The French New Right in the Year 2000’, a manifesto-like document co­
authored with Charles Champetier, De Benoist -  again like De Maistre -  proclaims that 
he has never met a man (always in masculine), that ‘humanity is irreducibly plural’, and 
that ‘human life is necessarily rooted in a given context, prior to the way individuals and 
groups see the world’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). Elsewhere he elaborates on this 
point in greater detail:
The category of “people” cannot be confounded with language, race, 
class, territoiy or nation alone. A people is not a transitory sum of 
individuals. It is not a chance aggregate. It is a reunion of inheritors of 
a specific fraction of human history, who, on the basis of the sense of 
common adherence, develop the will to pursue their own history and 
give themselves a common destiny. (Benoist, in Sunic 1990, p. 47)
Similar assertions abound in publications by other New Rightists such as Michael 
O’Meara who makes an analogous point in his insider account of the movement. Citing 
Protagoras’s motto that ‘Man is the measure of all things’, O’Meai a affirms tlie diversity 
of cultures: ‘[gjiven the world’s different cultures, there are necessaiily a plethora of 
different measures in the world’, and sums up their impact: ‘an individual is never
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distinguishable from his culture; never independent of the “measures” he applies’ 
(O’Meara 2004, p. 48).
This embedded anthropology positions the New Right against the ideologies of the 
Enlightemnent. Liberalism and socialism are accordingly denounced as the enemies of 
cultural diversity that aim at ‘annihilating déculturation’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 51), and as 
perpetuators of what those critics see as universalistic pretensions of contemporary 
Western civilization. The French ideologue of the German New Right, PieiTe Krebs, 
thus laments what he sees as the dominant tendency of our times resulting from the 
impact of the ideologies of universalism: ‘[t]he tragedy of the contemporary world is the 
tragedy of disloyalty: the uprooting of every culture, estrangement fr om our true natures, 
the atomization of man, the levelling of values, the unifonnity of life’ (Krebs, in Griffin 
1995, p. 349). Tomislav Sunic, a Croatian diplomat, academic and franslator with a 
major input to propagating New Right ideas worldwide, exemplifies the tendency to 
reject both liberalism and socialism as part of one ideological package when he accuses 
them of ‘the same globalistic design to erase the plurality of nations and supplant diverse 
national consciousness with the universal belief in “generic man” and one humanity’ 
(Sunic 1990, p. 106). Likewise, another New Rightist, Guillaume Faye, interprets the 
two currents in terms of one ‘egalitarian ideology’ that from the seventeenth century 
onwards ‘sets forth the premises for a political science which no longer conceives of a 
people as a specific historical reality’ (Faye, in Sunic 1990, p. 117).
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From manifold critiques offered by codifiers of the New Right emerges a very clear 
anthropological assumption: if cultural distinctions are what define individuals as human 
beings, then all the rest, that is to say, qualities that are common to humankind, are 
features of the human species understood in animalistic terms, namely, as biological 
needs and instincts. Universalistic ideologies are thus presented more or less explicitly 
as promoting dehumanization, the levelling of ‘man’ to his animal side: ‘whenever it 
unhinges man from the immense chain of generations, liberalism inevitably ends up 
privileging the elemental and subindividual in man, for it sweeps away all that is human 
in him’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 64). Consequently, living a human life outside one’s 
immediate cultural context is unfeasible: ‘consider man in abstraction from these or 
reduce him to his elementary animal desires and you deprive him not just of what makes 
his life possible, but of those qualifications that make him who he is’ (O’Meara 2004, p.
64).
The belief tliat people are determined by their cultural and historical heritage implies 
that individuals in any culture will share tlie same values and be in fundamental respects 
similar while being different and unequal from others. Importantly, individuals are 
allocated to communities ‘by virtue of their organic adherence’ (Benoist 1994) 
determined by birth. Cultures are not voluntary creations of free and rational agents but 
‘organic hierarchies bound by time, place, and common purpose’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 64), 
preexisting realities into which we are bom and which therefore demand our conformity.
The implications of this philosophy are thus twofold. Firstly, if ‘people do not exist in
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the real world other than as concretely rooted people’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000), 
then any society that detaches itself from its roots and transgresses borders between 
cultures -  for example by allowing alien cultural elements to enter its realm -  represents 
a deviation from the natural, that is to say, territorially determined and closed mode of 
human existence where multiplicity of cultures implies ‘diverse, if not incommensurable 
cultural perspectives’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 48). Secondly, closed, biologically and 
culturally endogamous, communities naturally impose unifoim beliefs on their members. 
Individualism in such conditions is out of the question. Its absence does not result from a 
visible repression ‘from above’ but is due to the repression coming ‘from within’ and to 
a natural internalization of the preordained biological and cultural heritage with its 
values and obligations, hi this context individualism is seen as a ‘pernicious’ 
consequence of undermining the separate homogeneity of distinct cultures and societies. 
Globalization is a primary factor in this process.
New Rightists typically interpret globalization as a process founded on a set of 
interrelated ideas of individualism, universalism, rationalism, progressivism and 
egalitarianism, all of them rejected in the anti-Enlightenment thought. While 
individualism posits the idea of the human being abstracted from his/her community, 
universalism stands for a belief that people are essentially the same and thus that there 
exists one truth that suits all. Rationalism in turn asserts that this universal truth may be 
discovered while progress comes to its global spread leading to the assumption of 
equality of all human beings through the discovery of their alleged sameness. The New
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Right employs a longue durée perspective and identifies the roots of these components 
of globalism in the metaphysics of Cliristianity against which it defines itself as pagan 
(Benoist and Champetier 2000). According to New Right intellectuals, the globalist 
mission of Cliristianity has always aimed to eradicate the diversity of cults that compose 
the richness of pagan polytheism. In this respect, socialism and liberalism, that are said 
to drive globalization forwards, are presented as closely related with Clnistian theology: 
while Christian monotheism supersedes ‘a subtle form of plural, polytheistic, and 
contradictory totality, that is inherent in organic interdependency’ (Benoist 1996a), 
modem universalism suppresses the diversity of cultures and gives birth ‘to the most 
empty civilization mankind has ever known’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). Just as 
Cliristianity cannot stand the plurality of gods, so -  argues De Benoist -  from the 
globalist perspective ‘the diversity of the world becomes an obstacle and all that 
differentiates men is thought to be incidental or contingent, outmoded or even 
dangerous’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000).
One consequence of seeing people as inescapably rooted in their communities 
determined by biological and cultural ties, is a view that globalization is a fraud that has 
disturbed the ‘natural order’ without fulfilling any of its promises:
[It] has not liberated man from his original familial belonging or from 
local, tribal, cooperative or religious attachments. It has only submitted 
him to other constraints, which are harsher, because they are further 
away, more impersonal, and more demanding: a mechanistic, abstract, 
and homogenous subjugation has replaced multiform organic modes. 
(Benoist and Champetier 2000)
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From the perspective of the New Right, the process of globalization is far from offering 
some hypothetical common worldview that would fit coimnunities worldwide equally 
well. Such a worldview is impossible and at any rate in reality, as the New Right sees it, 
it is not the case. Instead, according to the New Right, the world is ‘subject to the 
cultural imperatives of Washington’s “cosmo-capitalism”’, the whole of the planet now 
forming "zone d ’occupation américainne’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 51). The view identifying 
globahzation as ‘progressive colonization of the whole of the planet by Yankee 
interests’ (in Bastow 2002, p. 356) is also popular in publications by groupuscules 
inspired by the New Right. For example, the Belgian national-Bolshevik Partie 
Communautaire National-Européen asserts: ‘the American power has become the sole 
global superpower and attempts to impose its “New World Order” everywhere, with its 
cortège of wars and inequalities’ (in Bastow 2002, p. 356).
The global American culture carries with it the ‘values of merchants’ and produces a 
material, speculative and instrumental civilization described in terms never too remote 
fr om antisemitic rhetoric with which right-wing theories of culture have always been, to 
a greater or lesser extent, impregnated. At the same time, the identification of American 
capitalism as the agent of globalization may serve as a rhetorically mobilizing factor. In 
the face of McDonaldization, ‘Coca-McDeath’ (in Macklin 2005, p. 321), or what the 
French group Terre et Peuple calls ‘le cauchemar américain’ (in Flood 2004 [2000], p. 
175), the New Right believes it is only primordial identities that may offer a real shelter:
193
National populism and fascism
‘blood alone is able to prevail against the rapacious forces of money’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 
210)/^
The New Right’s advocacy of ‘a heterogeneous world of homogeneous peoples, each 
rooted in their own culture and soil’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 77) has also a more specific 
implication for the New Right’s policy as well as ideology. The insistence on global 
segregation and local homogeneity leads to a formulation of the ‘right to difference’ 
principle that has replaced biological racism as an expression of xenophobia of the 
extreme right. According to New Right culturalism, fundamental differences between 
communities result from culture rather than race and ‘the term racism cannot be defined 
as a preference for endogamy’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). This idea of cultural 
differences rooted in territorial places borrows from Barrés’s notion of enracinement. In 
Barrés -  as we have seen -  the concept had a sinister translation into a culturalist 
argument for antisemitism. Likewise in the discourse of the New Right the notion of 
rootedness helps in articulating a type of prejudice, which is as exclusionary as 
biological racism and yet can be put forward as a discourse that remains acceptable 
within the parameters of liberal democracy (Levitas 1986, p. 127). While avoiding 
biological racism, culturalism leads to the same preference for segregation and rejection
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This hatred of the United States took an anecdotal form in the declaration of Alain de 
Benoist (still in the period of the Cold War) ‘that it was preferable to wear the helmet of 
the Red army than to live under the yoke of American imperialism by eating a steady 
diet of hamburgers in Brooklyn’ (in Bar-On 2001, p. 343).
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of multiculturalism as allegedly jeopardising separate cultural identities. The possibility 
of intra-cultural diversity is accepted conditionally on circumstances that are vague to 
the point of providing an effective barrier, as in the assertion of O’Meara:
[Ijnfusions of “difference” are sources of wealth to a society only if 
there is a firm cultural core to assimilate them. To destroy this core by 
imposing a variety of cultural models, each with a different order of 
valuation, inevitably leads to the dissolution of established norms and 
values. (O’Meara 2004, p. 76; for more on culturalism see Barker 
1981, p. 23; Hossay and Zolberg 2002, p. 307; Mudde 1995, p. 211)
In practical terms, this position translates into a fierce opposition to immigration, and 
hence to any global connections that may be held responsible for the recent rise in the 
volume of international flows of people, even though in the discourse of the New Right 
the immigrants are cautiously portrayed as the casualties and not the villains: 
‘responsibility for current immigration lies primaiily, not with tire immigrants, but with 
the industrialized nations which have reduced man to the level of merchandise that can 
be relocated anywhere’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000).
Wliile fascist positions (exemplified here by the New Right) thus concur with national 
populists in identifying the same problems (i.e., Americanization and immigration) at 
the source of what they understand to be a deep-seated economic, political and cultural 
crisis, the means that they suggest as an effective barrier to this process are different or 
at least the scale on which they are to be enacted has changed. It is to the variation in 
scales on which the respective national populist and fascist ideas are played out that I 
turn in the final part of this chapter.
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Different ethno-scales: from traditional nationalism to supranational identities
The globalists see an oak tree and wonder how much the wood is 
worth or how many new houses they could put in its place [...] We 
nationalists see an oak tree and remember Drake and Nelson, Purple 
Emperor butterflies, and how we want to see our grandchildren playing 
under it. (BNP Land and People n.d.a)
Nations, at least as you loiew and loved them, are dead. We live today 
in a post-nationalist, globalized world. What you call youi' nation is 
now a mere administrative district of the New World Order. Never 
mind its ‘proud and ancient histoiy’! Never mind its ‘wondeidul 
accomplishments’! Never mind how many of your ancestors fought 
and died for it! Those things were in the past. (National anarchist 
publication Voice o f the Resistance^ in Preston 2003)
I have demonstrated that there has been a marked continuity between antiuniversalist 
and antiliberal ideas of nineteenth century opponents of the ‘great transition’ brought 
about by the French Revolution, later fîn-de-siècle promotion of rootedness as a remedy 
to civilizational disenchantment, and the advocacy of extreme right localism which 
voices the virtues of small-scale particularisms in reaction to the process of intensified 
globalization in recent decades. Antiglobalism of the extreme right is interlocked with 
other concepts -  rootedness, inequality, etc. -  whose particular interpretations depend on 
specific tendencies within a broader national populist or fascist stream but which hang 
together as a recognizable constellation. Consequently, the durability of this form of 
antiglobalism (or antiuniversalism, as this is the right word for the form in which this 
tendency expressed itself in the past) is no more surprising than the durability of pro- 
globalist ideas in ideological currents that originate from the universalism of the 
Enlightenment.
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At the same time however, specific forms that antiglobalism of the extreme right has 
recently taken make obvious that ideological continuity does not mean conservation in 
fixed stmctures but rather a state of a dynamic inteiplay in which highly flexible 
concepts are able to adapt to and combine with new ideas to meet novel political 
challenges. With regard to the range of topics discussed here, the most important change 
that has taken place in right-wing antiglobalism consists in the crystallization of a new 
referent, that is to say, the new spatial unit, and the related new ethnos, that are to be 
defended against the homogenizing and universalizing tendencies at play. In the theories 
of French counteiTcvolutionaries, German romantics or British Tories, it was the nation 
that mattered. De Maistre thus spoke of the nationalities of Europe (as well as Persians) 
when contrasting them with the idea of an abstract individual. Likewise, Fichte’s and 
Herder’s celebration of nationalism refeired to European nations, and Barrés defined 
himself as French even when emphasizing that his roots were especially in Lorraine.
This form of antiglobalism -  nationalism in the traditional sense of the word, i.e., 
referring to state-nations delineated by linguistic criteria and defined by their possession 
of statehood or at least by aspiration to one -  is still alive and well. However, alongside 
national loyalties, new, more extensive, supranational types of attachments are given 
voice. The remainder of this chapter discusses these two forms of extreme right 
antiglobalism (national and supranational) as they are articulated today and explains 
what the differences and similarities between them tell us not just about the ideological 
currents in question but also about ideology as a generic phenomenon.
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The defenders o f nations
National populist responses to globalization are articulated in terms of a necessity of 
national struggle for liberation from external political, economic and cultural 
impositions. In the United States, a national populist form of antiglobalism is 
represented by foiiner presidential candidate, Patrick J. Buchanan, who has on many 
occasions made nationalist statements like: ‘[w]e don’t want to be citizens of the world 
because we have been granted a higher honor -  we are citizens of the United States’ 
(Buchanan, in Gardell 2003, p. 10). Buchanan is keen to situate himself in a broad 
historical and civilizational context: ‘nationalists are in rancorous conflict with the 
globalists [...] this is the new conflict of the age that succeeds the Cold War’ (Buchanan 
1998, p. 265). In Europe, the Italian Lega Nord similarly describes the conflict between 
nationalists and globalists in terms of a battle between two incommensurable sets of 
values: ‘[tjhose who fight for the survival of their nations represent the camp of the 
diversity of cultures, true tolerance, and freedom whereas the America-like 
multiculturalism [...] represents the camp of uniformity, deracination, and enslavement’ 
(in Betz and Jolmson 2004, p. 317).
These Manichean pronouncements are complemented by more specific ideas and policy 
proposals. These are concerned with the questions of economic autonomy and cultural 
integrity where the former is to be promoted by protectionist measures (in Buchanan’s 
case the postulated dissolution of NAFTA) while the latter can only be achieved by 
stopping immigration and possibly expatriating ethnic minorities. The insistence on
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economic protection may be combined with xenophobic undertones, where economic 
competitors are defined as cultural ‘others’ as in the following declaration of the leader 
of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi:
[T]he truth is that the people have realized we need to protect our local 
economy from the fast food of McDonald’s, Chinese cooking and cous 
cous [...] The same realization is needed to stop the negative effect of 
democratic globalization on our factories and jobs before it is too late 
[...] Italy must mitigate the impact of Chinese competition’, (in Woods 
2009, p. 166)
The ideas of economic self-reliance may also take more dramatic forms. Land and 
People, the environmentalist section of the British National Party puts the case for 
economic nationalism in the context of its catastrophist anticipation of a worldwide 
collapse of trade:
The supply of cheap imported food could be cut off at any moment, 
and as the state of the world becomes increasingly chaotic and perilous 
we would be prudent to assume that the day of no imports is not long 
to be awaited. [...] By supporting our local growers we are doing more 
than just helping the planet and our local economies. We are taking out 
insurance, so that when the day of no imports inevitably comes we will 
be sure to have a fanner nearby who has a few acres of spuds in the 
ground, and there will be allotment holders, smallliolders and local 
producers able to supply the finit and vegetables that will otherwise be 
unavailable. (BNP Land and People n.d.b)
Economic protection is high on the national populist agenda but it is the question of 
immigration that engages most of national populism’s political energy. Anti­
immigration positions may take extraordinarily hostile forms, as exemplified by the 
suggestion of Bossi that the illegal immigrants should be stopped with ‘a few canon
199
National populism and fascism
shots at the boats bringing them’ (Bossi, in Woods 2009, p. 172). While one set of 
measures is suggested in order to stop immigration, another set of policy proposals 
refers to how to deal with those already present. At the most extreme, it may be 
suggested that immigrants be repatriated. Indeed, in its 1995 presidential campaign 
Front National suggested a compulsory repatriation from France of three million 
immigrants in seven years (Flood 1997, p. 119). Other policies are typically variants of 
the Flemish Vlaams jB/o /c’ s notion of being ‘boss in one’s own country’ (in Betz and 
Johnson 2004, p. 322). Le Pen’s ‘national alternative’ thus suggests re-establishing ‘a 
strict policy of “national preference” with respect to citizenship, social rights and access 
to work’ (Betz and Johnson 2004, p. 322). While such policies are aimed at immigrants, 
they may also express, more or less explicitly, a critique of globalization and a demand 
of ‘the re-establishment of the supremacy of national law over supranational laws, 
treaties and directives’ (Betz and Johnson 2004, p. 322).
Alternative scales: race and civilization
Some of the groups that classify as fascist (due to their palingenetlc conceptual makeup) 
are still imbued with national imaginary. The English Movement is a radical group with 
an apocalyptic vision: ‘we can already see signs of great changes and of a fast-growing 
tension within this country, the signs are that in the not too distant future the whole thing 
will quickly fall apart’. At the same time it retains nationalist rhetoric encapsulated in a 
series of unequivocal slogans: ‘English Culture -  English Tradition -  English Identity -  
One Folic -  One Soil -  Think National -  Act Local!’ (English Movement n.d.).
2 0 0
National populism and fascism 201
Likewise, another group, the British People’s Paify opposes to ‘International 
Cosmopolitanism’ its ideal of ‘Wliite Nationalism’, which -  while based on a racial 
criterion -  is foimulated in nationalist terms where the ultimate objective is ‘a healthy, 
clean and energetic folk state’ (BPP n.d.). Similarly, England First sees itself mainly as a 
defender of England against ‘ventures, such as the E.U., N.A.T.O. and the U.N. [as well 
as] Big Business, Freemasonry and other N.W.O. vested interests’ all of them allegedly 
intending to turn England into ‘an impoverished province in the New World Order’ 
(England First n.d.b). But while it is possible to identify conventional nationalism in 
organizations which are otherwise located in the fascist, rather than national populist, 
category, the territory of fascism is nowadays populated predominantly by positions that 
reject thinking in nationalistic teims.
The necessity to move beyond the nation-state has sometimes been articulated in the 
form of a ‘realistic assessment’ of the globalizing world, as in the declaration of a 
representative of ‘national anarchism’, Keith Preston to the effect that ‘traditional 
ideological, cultural and even national boundaries are irrelevant in the cunent world 
order’ (Preston 2003) or as in the rhetorical question posed by another national 
anarchist, David Michael:
In a world where Britain, France, Austria no longer exist, can we really 
expect future generations to feel national loyalty towards Britain, 
France and Austria? Isn’t this rather like expecting the young people of 
today to feel national loyalty towards Wessex, Mercia, Gaul or the 
Roman Empire? (Michael n.d.)
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In cases where supranational orientation is a matter of stiategy and political ‘realism’ 
rather than firm principles, the national level can be integrated within a multiscalar 
structure. For example, the French gioup Terre et Peuple combines national references 
with identification with Europe based on common Indo-European descent (Flood 2004 
[2000], p. 175) while also complementing those two tiers -  national and supranational — 
with subnational and transnational regionalism, i.e., emphasizing regions within France 
as well as ‘solidarity with ethno-identitarian movements throughout the continent’ 
(Flood 2004 [2000], p. 176). In such cases a supranational orientation serves to anchor 
the national point of reference in a broader perspective. This is explained by Griffin with 
regards to developments within Nazism:
[T]he national or ethnic dimension of the struggle for regeneration was 
not abandoned, but subsumed within a wider context, so that Swedish 
or American Nazis can feel that the struggle for the rebirth of their 
nation or homeland is but one theatre in an international race war. 
(Griffin 2000, p. 167)
In other cases national identification has been rejected outright and contrasted 
unfavourably with other levels. One example of the shift firom national to supranational 
orientation is to be found in the ideology of White racialism. By choosing race as the 
main point of reference, the White supremacy movements and Aryan revolutionaries 
have backed off from nationality as a criterion of identification. In other words, they 
oppose globalization not as a process tlireatening a particular nation, but as ‘an antiwhite 
conspiracy that ultimately aims at exterminating the Aryan race’ (Gardell 2003, p. 11).
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The rejection by White racialists in the United States of patriotic nationalism was 
expressed clearly following 11 September 2001. As Gardell explains:
While many mainstream Americans were swept away with patriotic 
feelings in reaction to the terrorist attack against the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, Aryan revolutionaries 
were among the few Americans to openly applaud the event. (Gardell 
2003, p. 324)
Racially motivated and stmctured geopolitical schemes are also articulated by European 
fascists. For example, Troy Southgate's ‘ethno-pluralism’ is essentially a project for 
racial apartheid, to be achieved by means of ‘“humane” repatriation and the reordering 
of the globe according to racially segregated colour blocs’ (Macklin 2005, p. 306).
More complex models of antiglobalist but explicitly post-nationalist future have been 
conceived by groups and intellectuals associated with the New Right. In keeping with 
the New Right’s ostensible rejection of biological racism, these projects focus on large 
civilizational units and essentialize cultural differences. In this case Europe is in the 
centre of attention. The idea of Europe ^  a counterforce against the West (i.e., against 
America) crystallized most powerfully with the collapse of communism when there
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Usually however, racialism is not antiglobalist but ‘counterglobalist’, or simply 
imperialist. For example, the founder of the White supremacist Church of the Creator, 
Ben Klassen declares the ‘Church’s goal in globalist terms: ‘[w]e must again, in a 
planned and deliberate program, resume the colonization of the world which the White 
Race has pursued for the last several centuries in a more or less haphazard, but vigorous 
manner. Like the American pioneers, we, the White Race, must now make it our 
Manifest Destiny to win the world, and populate all the good lands thereof (Klassen 
1973).
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remained, from the fascist perspective, only one enemy: the homogenizing, consumerist 
and debilitating American-led globalization.^"^ With attention now shifted to a 
continental dimension, the idea of the nation has been opposed in unequivocal terms. It 
has become associated with values and concepts deemed antithetical to fascism. An 
illustration of this antinational position is available in the writing of De Benoist who 
denounces the concept of the nation by integrating it in his broader opposition to the 
individualistic worldview:
The nation, in the modem sense of the word, and nationalism as a 
distinguished form of patriotism are historically linked with the value 
of individualism. The nation is precisely the type of global society that 
corresponds to the kingdom of individualism. (Benoist, in 
Spektorowski 2003b, p. 58)
Featuring in those unequivocal critiques is the assumption that traditional nationalisms 
‘are chimerical and noxious to the European cause’ (in Bastow 2002, p. 359) and that 
meaningful cultural identities are most clearly expressed in connection with large 
political and civilizational entities. Evident here is the impact of Samuel Huntington’s
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But in pursuing this pan-continental form of post-nationalist orientation the New 
Right can draw on a long tradition of fascist thought. Thus, to give a brief list of 
influences, in France the European course of fascism was associated with ideas of Pierre 
Drieu La Rochelle (1883-1945) and Maurice Bardèche (1907-1998). In Germany, the 
key role in its articulation was played by national bolshevism of Ernst Niekisch (1889- 
1967) and by left-wing Nazism of Otto Strasser who insisted that the ‘Federation of the 
Peoples of Europe is the vital precondition for the spiritual recovery of the European 
nations and for the preservation of the civilization and culture of the West’ (Strasser 
1936, in Griffin 1995, p. 114). In Britain, the conception of Euro-Africa was put forward 
by Oswald Mosley (1896-1980). Perhaps most influential of all Europeanist fascists was 
an Italian philosopher and esoterist Julius Evola (1898-1974) who blamed nationalism 
for European disunity (see Spektorowski 2003a, pp. 123-124) and offered a vision of a 
spiritually united European Imperium as an antidote.
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‘clash of civilizations’ thesis (Huntington 1993 and 1996), which has been widely 
discussed in New Right circles (see for example Benoist 2001, pp 130-131 and 1996b, 
p. 134, footnote). Echoes of Huntington are to be found for example in a piece by De 
Benoist and Champetier, where the two authors assert that ‘[t]he 21®^ centuiy will be 
characterized by the development of a multipolar world of emerging civilizations: 
European, North American, South American, Arabic-Muslim, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, 
etc.’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). Yet, while they may have drawn inspiration from 
Huntington, De Benoist and Champetier repeat the clash of civilizations thesis with very 
significant modifications, among which two are most symptomatic: the splitting up of 
Huntington’s ‘Western’ civilization into European and North American blocs and the 
incoiporation into Europe of what Huntington calls ‘Orthodox’ civilization. The former 
change does not require explanation in light of the already discussed New Right 
resentment of the United States. On the other hand, the incoiporation into Europe of the 
Orthodox culture has become something of a trade mark of New Right geopolitics. 
Accordingly, the European identity encompasses the whole of Eurasia ‘from Galway to 
Vladivostok’ (Bale 2002, p. 45) and a ‘Eurosiberian imperium’ (O’Meaia 2004, p. 196) 
is an appropriate political form to match this identity (for more on the question of New 
Right Eurasianism, see for example Lamelle n.d., Mathyl 2002).^^
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It was already in the period of the Cold War that some fascists adopted an unusual 
idea of allying Europe with the Soviet bloc against the West. Anti-Western Europeanists 
included Alain de Benoist, who believed that the Soviet Union was more Russian than 
communist and that it could have been co-opted in the struggle against America (Bar-On 
2001, p. 343). Others preferred to cast their geopolitical ideas in terms of so-called third 
positionism rejecting both capitalism and communism and postulating a ‘third way’ to
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In spite of conceiving their political ideas on such large scales, the New Right 
understands itself in antiglobalist terms as is apparent in the declaration of its key 
intellectuals: ‘it is only at [a] local level that one can create a standard of living worthy 
of human beings’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). Indeed, the most renowned Russian 
New Rightist Aleksandr Dugin makes an unequivocal connection between antiglobalism 
and the civilization-orientated paradigm: ‘all anti-globalization tendencies are 
“Eurasianist” by definition’ (Dugin, in Lamelle n.d., p. 14). The reconciliation of vast 
regionalism with anti-globalization takes place through federalism where belonging in a 
civilization is complemented by micronationalist loyalties: ‘[tjhese civilizations will not 
supplant the ancient local, tribal, provincial or national roots, but will be constituted as 
the ultimate collective form with which individuals are able to identify’ (Benoist and 
Champetier 2000). This federalist vision of Europe is described in suggestive temis as 
the ‘appearance of thousands of auroras, i.e., the birth of sovereign spaces liberated from
be developed in ‘solidarity’ with the Third World (more recent expressions of this ‘Third 
World solidarity’ claim are discussed in Bale 2002; Spektorowski 2003a, pp. 115 and 
118; and Spektorowski 2003b, p. 59). Nevertheless, the majority of fascists were 
anticommunist and pro-Western (Bale 2002, p. 29) as exemplified by a supranationalist, 
but resolutely pro-Western orientation of the founder of the BNP, John Tyndall,; ‘Over 
and above the rivalries of nations, there is the transcendent interest of Western 
Civilisation, Western Culture and -  as the creator of these things -  the White European 
Race. Here we must see “The West”, not in the fonn currently fashionable: as a coalition 
of nations organised in mutual defence of the dubious blessings of “liberal democracy” 
and “capitalism,” but as a cultural and above all racial entity’ (Tyndall, in Griffin 1995, 
p. 370). Only with the end of the Cold War could the idea of opposition to the West in 
unity with Russia become entrenched in fascist ideology.
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the domination of the modern’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000), ‘Europe of One Hundred 
Flags’ wherein “each historic nation can assert its own political, social and economic 
freedom within the ancestral boundaries of its racial and cultural heritage” (Southgate, in 
Macklin 2005, p. 321) or, in most evocative formulation, as:
Eurosiberian imperium as a sovereign democratic federation made up 
of various self-governing communities, representing both the ethos and 
the ethnos of the different European families. This makes it 
identifiable not with the modem demos, understood in the liberal sense 
as congeries of faceless unrelated individuals but rather with those 
transcendent affiliations implicit in the existence of un people or ein 
Volt (O’Meara 2004, p. 196)
In emphasizing the volkisch element, the fascist vision of Europe provides ground for an 
effective mechanism of cultural exclusion. Indeed, as we learn from De Benoist and 
Champetier -  the federations that they envisage are closed and capable of ‘organizing 
themselves into autonomous entities and acquiring enough power to resist outside 
interference’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). In practice, this means their ability to 
provide an effective blockade to immigiation. As Alberto Spektorowski notes, Europe as 
envisaged by the New Right ‘does not expel foreigners tlirough draconian laws, but 
rather raises impenetrable cultural baniers against them’ (Spektorowski 2003a, p. 122). 
Tims formulated, the fascist conception of Europe reveals its exclusionary purpose. As a 
unit of identification it is far more extensive than a nation but remains as, if not more, 
effective in emphasizing cultural differences and raising barriers against those who are 
defined as aliens.
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Old logic in new scales
The conceptual change discussed above is significant: while national populism on the 
whole continues to speak on behalf of nations, fascism has abandoned what once was 
one of its central features, i.e., ultra-nationalism, and now defines itself as a defender of 
civilization and actually rejects nationalist orientation as noxious to this mission. At play 
here is thus the abandonment of what Steger calls the ‘national imaginary’ (Steger 
2008), but while Steger’s claim that the national is in the twenty-first century no longer a 
useful point of reference is in this particular instance vindicated, the conclusion that 
Steger draws from his claim, namely a total redrawing of the ideological map and 
irrelevance of conventional ideological categories, cannot be sustained.
Fascism provides yet another example contradicting the ideology rupture thesis in that 
the spatial shift that has occurred in fascist interpretations has not fundamentally affected 
its ideologic or its potential political implications. Tlie self-identification of fascism is, 
in most cases, no longer national, but its raison d ’être remains as antiuniversalist and 
exclusionary as it has always been while its style and rhetoric are as radical as ever. In 
short, like other ideologies discussed in this thesis, while fascism has changed, the 
change has not been disruptive enough to deny its recognizable identity or deprive 
analysts of ideology of a meaningful analytical category.
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CHAPTER V 
ANARCHISM AND ECOLOGISM:
ALTERNATIVE LOCALIZATIONS 
IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The final chapter continues the examination of antiglobalist politics by providing a 
comparative analysis of some representative anarchist and ecologist critiques of 
globalization. By revealing that deep-seated differences remain between the alternatives 
that the two ideologies have to offer the chapter demonstrates that antiglobalism is a thin 
category that becomes meaningful only in the specific ideological environments in 
which its particular instances are to be found.
Anarchism and ecologism: preliminary remarks
That anarchism and ecologism display close conceptual affinities is a fact that has been 
acknowledged by both exponents as well as analysts of the two ideologies (see for 
example Bookchin 1971; Carter 1999, pp. 198-199; Goodwin 2007, pp. 249-250; 
Jennings 1999, pp. 144—145; Morris 1996, p. 132; O’Riordan 1981, p. 307; Pepper 1993, 
pp. 152-203; Purchase 1993, p. 25; Sonn 1992, pp. 107-113). Anarchism has long been 
an established political ideology. Its founding fathers -  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809- 
1865), Michael Bakunin (1814-1876), and Peter Kropotldn (1842-1921, to name just 
the most renowned -  were active in the nineteenth and, in the case of Kropotkin, also in
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the early twentieth century. Thus, when ecologism emerged in its cunent form in the 
1960s and 1970s, it could draw inspiration from anarchist thought (Carter 1999, p. 199) 
and in particular from the anarchist ideal of a decentralized society that had displayed 
‘green’ features long before the colour acquired its current political connotation 
(Woodcock 1992; Pepper 1993, p. 117).^  ^ At the same time however, anarchism and 
ecologism are evidently distinct. With respect to the subject of the present study, while 
the two ideologies share a strong inclination to political autonomy and economic self- 
reliance, a closer look at their motivations reveals several significant differences 
between their respective positions on the question of the desirable scale of human 
interaction.
This chapter begins by identifying some key conceptual connections between 
antiglobalism or, in more positive terms that I prefer to use, localism and the overall 
conceptual morphologies of anarchism and ecologism. This general discussion paves the 
way to a more detailed comparison which demonstrates that the broadly similar 
positions adopted by the two ideologies on the question of globalization clash on critical 
details that ultimately break them up into discrete streams of thought. The analysis of the 
two models of localization demonstrates the ideological thinness of antiglobalism,
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It is possible to identify the roots of ecologism in much earlier theories of 
romanticism, Malthusianism and traditional conservatism, as well as in works of 
naturalist writers and wilderness activists such as Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), 
John Muir (1838-1914), Aldo Leopold (1887-1948), or Bob Marshal (1901-1939), but 
-  as Andrew Dobson points out -  it is only with the more recent acceleration and 
globalization of enviromiiental decay that ecologism developed in its current frill-blown 
form (Dobson 1999, pp. 231-234).
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namely, that it is unable on its own to convey a clear meaning and that therefore any of 
its particular expressions depends on a mature ideological host and thus remains 
different from and potentially irreconcilable with others.
Antiglobalism in the orbit of ecologism and anarchism: major conceptual 
connections
While this section is concerned with conceptual paths that are identifiable in ecologist 
and anarchist interpretations and that determine their respective identities as broadly 
antiglobalist, I should begin by demarcating ecologism from what is known as 
enviromnentalism and by drawing attention to ecologism’s attempt to define itself 
against globalist ideas articulated in its conceptual vicinity.
Ecologism and environmentalism
The distinction between ecologism and environmentalism has a wide currency both 
among ecologists themselves -  already in 1972 The Ecologist published an editorial 
entitled Down with Environmentalism I (Allen 1972) -  and in the scholarship on the 
subject (see for example Dobson 2007; Goodwin 2007, p. 237; Patterson 2001, pp. 277- 
278). Accordingly, the tenn ‘ecologism’ applies to positions that are both more radical 
and more complex. As Jonathon Porritt and David Winner argued at the time when tlie 
term was gaining wider recognition, ecologism is radical for it:
[S]eeks nothing less than a non-violent revolution to overthrow our 
whole polluting, plundering and materialistic industrial society and, in 
its place, to create a new economic and social order which will allow
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human beings to live in harmony with the planet. (Porritt and Winner 
1988, p. 9)
The ambitions of enviromnentalism are in contrast limited to seeking ‘a cleaner service 
economy sustained by cleaner technology and producing cleaner conspicuous 
consumption’ (Dobson 2007, p. 7). Enviromnentalism does not go anywhere as far as to 
question the fundamental values of the society that has brought about the current 
ecological disaster. From the perspective of ecologism, enviromnentalism is no more 
than teclmocratic ‘managerialism’ (Sachs 1993, p. 11) that belongs to the dominant 
‘majority tradition’ (Sessions 1987, pp. 18-19) and is ‘characterized by a narrow 
definition of community along with centralization of power [and] the perception of 
nature as an accumulation of natural resources’ (Manes 1990, p. 141). Ecologism is also 
more complex in that its radical view on the relationship between hmnankind and nature 
is articulated as a central part of an elaborate system of beliefs. Environmentalism, on 
the other hand, amounts merely to a set of policies concerned with an optimal 
management of environmental resources and falls short of expressing a distinct 
worldview.
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It should be noted that the ideological status of ecologism is also a subject of an 
ongoing controversy in political theory. On the one side there are the analysts who are 
sceptical about ecologism’s ability to offer a distinctive and/or comprehensive 
ideological worldview. Barbara Goodwin thus denies ecologism’s membership in the 
family of established ideological traditions: ‘no single or clear vision of the Good Life 
emerges from deep Green assumptions [...so] even the deepest Green doctrine falls 
short of being an ideology’ (Goodwin 2007, pp. 259-260). Michael Freeden similarly 
emphasizes the thinness of the green theory by arguing that its ‘core concepts are 
insufficient on their own to conjure up a vision or interpretation of human and social 
interaction or purpose’ (Freeden 1996, p. 527). On the other side are the proponents of
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The differentiation between ecologism and enviromnentalism is useful not merely for 
the purpose of delineating the area under discussion. What is particularly important from 
the perspective adopted here is that the distinction between the two cmrents is reflected 
in their different positions on the question of globalization. Whereas environmentalism 
opts for global solutions to global problems, ecologism seeks alternatives tlirough local 
measures undertaken by local communities and questions the capacity of any form of 
‘globalization fr om below’ to provide a real way out of the cun ent turmoil.
The clash between the localist assumption that ‘global thinking is impossible’ as well as 
impractical (Esteva and Prakash 1998, p. 22) and the globalist stance of 
enviromnentalism intensified particularly after the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. 
Enviromnentalists won at the Smnmit the support of the world’s major policy-makers
ecologism’s ideological maturity. Andrew Dobson argues accordingly that it is possible 
to identify ecologism’s ‘key tenets, myths and so on that distinguish it from other 
ideologies’ (Dobson 2007, p. 4). Dobson also maintains -  in opposition to Freeden and 
Goodwin -  that ecologism is adequately deep in that it couches its ‘analyses and 
prescriptions [...] in terms of fundamental “fruths” about the human condition’ and is 
not issue-based but has ‘some principled vision of the Good Life’ (Dobson 2007, pp. 3 - 
4; for similar opinions see Baxter 1999, p. 1 and Humplney 2002). I refrain here from 
defending an unequivocal position on the question of ecologism’s claim to being an 
ideology but in practice I treat it as one. What is important from my point of view is that 
while the scope of ecologism is indeed rather narrow, it is, in any case, a distinctive 
current in that its defining ideas are absent from other ideologies. That it is consequently 
possible to study ecologism in its own right is a rationale for the present analysis which 
seeks to prove that the concept of globalization is inteipreted within the ambit of 
ecologism in connection with its particular conceptual traits and in ways that provide a 
meaningful distinction from other ideologies. But while the ideological status of 
ecologism is a contentious matter, enviromnentalism is obviously neither comprehensive 
nor distinct and is therefore unequivocally disqualified as an ideology in its own right.
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for limited and, according to ecologists, absolutely insufficient measures: 
‘[ejnviromnentalists were given a seat at the table but the talk was not of nature but of 
compromise, techno-fix and coiporate greenwash’ (Do or Die Editorial Collective 2003, 
p. 3). A collection of articles entitled Global Ecology (Sachs 1993) was one of the 
critical ecologist responses to the Summit and to the Brundtland Report, a document that 
laid down its conclusions (WCED 1987). Running through these contributions is not 
merely a rejection of reformism but also a denunciation of the belief that there exists any 
‘neutral global matrix’ containing all ‘languages, theories, cultures’ (Lohmann 1993, p. 
161). Instead, the dominant discourse and practice of globalization are presented as mere 
extensions of Western imperialism:
The global in the dominant discourse is the political space in which a 
particular dominant local seeks global control, and frees itself of local, 
national and international restraints. The global does not represent the 
universal human interest, it represents a particular local and parochial 
interest which has been globalized through the scope of its reach. 
(Shiva 1993, pp. 149-150)
While environmentalism is not included in the following analysis, this brief reminder of 
its differences in relation to ecologism provides another substantiation of the fact that 
globalization is far from eradicating conceptual distinctions between different political 
standpoints. The positions that the two cuixents take on globalization are enlightening as 
indicators of ideological identity (of ecologism in this case, since environmentalism does 
not qualify as an ideology) with the localist approach to environmental problems 
providing a reliable criterion of an ecologist territory. Below I provide a general 
summary of the ideas that compel ecologism to take the localist path.
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Key concepts: ecocentrism, limits to growth and localization
[T]o become dwellers in the land, to relearn the laws of Gaea, to come 
to know the earth fully and honestly, tlie crucial and perhaps only and 
all-encompassing task is to understand place, the immediate specific 
boundaries where we live. (Sale 1991, p. 42)
The ideological distinctiveness of ecologism arises out of its particular attitude to nature, 
which has typically been captured in terms of ecocentrism. Ecocentrism attaches moral 
value to all of nature, in opposition to anthropocentrism which is based on ‘the exclusive 
moral considerability of humans’ (Eckersley 1992, p. 50). The conceptual weight of 
ecocentrism can only be appreciated if it is acknowledged that its adversary, 
anthiopocentrism, is defined by ecologists as encompassing the entire detrimental 
heritage in which the currently dominant mentality is rooted: ‘a cherished principle of 
the Enlightenment, the raison d ’être of capitalism and socialism, the pretensions of the 
major religions of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and institutional Buddhism, 
the central myth of civilization’ (Manes 1990, p. 142). Elements of ecocentrism resonate 
thi'ough early theories that inspired ecologism; they are present for example in Aldo 
Leopold’s land ethic which ‘changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the 
land community to plain member and citizen of it’ (Leopold 1989 [1949], p. 204) but the 
ecocentric assertions have become particularly uncompromised with the crystallization 
of ecologism in recent decades. Thus, for example, the contributors to a radical ecologist 
journal Do or Die ‘reject even the notion of benevolent stewardship as that implies 
dominance’ (Do or Die Editorial Collective 2003, p. 3) while Dave Foreman, a co­
founder of the militant group Earth First! with which this journal is associated,
Anarchism and ecologism
fonnulated the first principle of the movement as ‘placing of Earth first in all decisions, 
even ahead of human welfare if necessary’ (Foreman 1991, p. 26) and asserted that from 
an ecocentric perspective: ‘[a]n individual human life has no more infrinsic value than 
does an individual Grizzly Bear life’ (Foreman 1991, p. 26).
The specific implications of ecocentrism for some of the positions taken by eeologists 
will become apparent in the course of a more detailed discussion in the final section of 
this chapter. More generally, it is important to note that ecocentrism entails a deeply 
antimodem position rejecting the instrumental, domineering and exploitative approach 
to nature that it perceives as inherent in the modem mindset. While thriving on and 
promoting anthropocentrism, modernity -  and globalization in particular, as modemity’s 
extension and escalation -  also encourages progress (along one path for all) and an 
obsession with speed and size/^ The modem, originally Westem, and nowadays 
increasingly global, belief in, and practice of, unlimited economic growth is for 
ecologism the most important of the causes of the cuiTent ecological crisis. The limits to 
growth thesis, originally formulated in 1972 in a report by the Club of Rome, a 
prominent think-tank consisting of intellectuals as well as political, and -  intriguingly -  
industiy figures, entails rethinking the questions of scale (Meadows 1972). In the face of 
the limited capacity of the Earth it is necessary to halt demographic and economic 
growth and -  according to ecologism -  this is not going to happen in a society with
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For more on the question of the modern attitude to nature see Fritjof Capra’s summary 
of the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm (Capra 1983).
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global connections. The ‘global environment’ is too distant and too abstract to awake 
genuine respect, loyalty and care. Global political and economic arrangements imply 
discomiection between the centres of decision-making and places affected by those 
decisions as well as between the sites of production and the sites of consmnption. Large- 
scale structures therefore diffuse ecological and social responsibility of ralers and 
planners and contribute to the public’s ignorance about ecological costs of economic 
practices.
The overriding policy principle of ecologism is thus radical localization. Ame Naess, a 
Norwegian ecocentric philosopher summarizes the reasons for localism in the form of a 
concise formulae: ‘[t]he vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to the 
weight of influences from afar, from outside the local region in which that form has 
obtained an ecological equilibrium’ (Naess 1973, p. 98). In a similarly technical way 
another zealous localist Kirkpatrick Sale eulogizes local scale as one in which ‘the 
sensors of the society are most receptive, the feedback system and information loops 
most effective, the decision-making mechanisms most adaptive and competent’ (Sale 
1991, p. 65). Sale is a key exponent of an influential version of ecologist theory known 
as bioregionalism. The ideational makeup of bioregionalism has a decisively localist 
slant. Sale defines bioregion as:
[A] part of the earth's surface whose rough boundaries are determined 
by natural rather than human dictates, distinguishable from other areas 
by attributes of flora, fauna, water, climate soils and landfomis, and 
the human settlements and cultures those attributes have given rise to. 
(Sale 1974, p. 225; compare with Dodge 1981)
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All of the core ideas of bioregionalism -  ‘place, reinhabitation, bioregion, home, and 
community’ (Carr 2004, p. 73) -  emphasize local attachments, loyalties and identities 
against the abstract universalism of the global. Peter Berg and Raymond Dasmann (who 
are credited with the coinage of the term) associate the purpose of bioregionalism with 
‘becoming native to a place through becoming aware of the particular relationships that 
operate within and around it’ (Dasmann and Berg 1978, pp. 217-218), and Sale puts this 
same view in the fonn of an imperative: ‘we must somehow live as close to it as 
possible, be in touch with its particular soils, its waters, its winds; we must leam its 
ways, its capacities, its limits; we must make its rhythms our patterns, its laws our guide, 
its fruits our bounty’ (Sale 1974, p. 224). As is evident from these examples the 
bioregional perspective suggests nature to be a mould in which social structures should 
set. Rather than assmning that hmnan efforts should modify nature, bioregionalism 
suggests that the natural forms determine social patterns while natural borderlines 
impose limits on human interactions. As John Barry puts this, the bioregional process of 
becoming ‘native’ to a place, is to be ‘an identity constituting ecological condition. Who 
you are is a question of where you are’ (Barry 1999, p. 85, emphasis in original).
Importantly, and contrary to social patterns typically imposed by globalization, 
ecologism implies recognising one’s own place, for example one’s bioregion, as a 
naturally closed area (Goldsmith 1988, p. 203). Mobility and associations with the 
outside world are rejected as implying instability. Ernst Friedrich Schumacher (1911- 
1977), a German economist celebrated by ecologists and immortalized by his ‘small is
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beautiful’ slogan, made this point in the early 1970s: ‘now everything and everybody 
has become mobile. All structures are tlireatened, and all stmctures are vulnerable to an 
extent that they had never been before’ (Schumacher 1973, p. 57). More specifically, the 
ecological community should preserve its own character by avoiding any economic and 
political dependency. Self-sufficiency, that is to say, the practice of subsisting within 
one’s ecological niche and with what it provides, is therefore the main principle of 
economic organization in an ideal ecological community and an article of faith of the 
deep green ideology. Sale gives strong reasons for this ‘most elemental and most elegant 
principle of the namral world’:
Just as nature does not depend on trade, does not create elaborate 
networks of continental dependency, so the bioregion would find all its 
needed resources -  for energy, food, shelter, clothing, craft, 
manufacture, luxury -  within its own environment. And far from being 
deprived, far from being thus impoverished, it would gain in every 
measure of economic health. It would be more stable, free from boom- 
and-bust cycles and distant political crises; it would be able to plan, to 
allocate its resources, to develop what it wants to develop at the safest 
pace, in the most ecological manner. It would not be at the mercy of 
distant and uncontrollable national bureaucracies and transnational 
governments, and thus it would be more self-regarding, more cohesive, 
developing a sense of place, of community, of comradeship, and the 
pride that comes from stability, control, competence and 
independence. (Sale 1974, p. 230)
Edward Goldsmith, probably the most influential British ecologist, provides another far- 
reaching naturalist argument for self-sufficiency by declaring it a principle of evolution: 
‘as evolution proceeds, so do natural systems become increasingly self-sufficient, 
reducing their dependence on forces outside their control’. Self-sufficiency is here 
ranlced as ‘an essential strategy [...] for increasing their capacity for homeostasis and
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hence their stability’ (Goldsmith 1996, p. 381). Trade, on the other hand, is charged by 
ecologists with being not just wasteful of resources and enviromnentally harmful but 
also with rendering communities dependent on the global market (Morris 2001) and, 
contra classical liberal theories of trade as global pacifier, with causing international 
conflicts: ‘people who live in highly self-sufficient local communities are less likely to 
get involved in large-scale violence than people whose existence depends on world-wide 
systems of trade’ (Schumacher 1974, p. 49).
The multiple implications of the localist orientation of ecologism will be discussed in 
comparison with anarchism later in this chapter. So far, I have made the basic point: that 
ecologism advocates a far-reaching localization based on its radical conceptual makeup 
centred on the notion of ecocentrism and the resulting rejection of modernity and its 
concomitant principle of growth. I will now embark on an analogous presentation of the 
anarchist case for localism in the light of its own core concepts. The section introduces 
general characteristics of the anarchist theory of scale, leaving the examination of its 
specific imphcations to the last (comparative) section. As with other ideologies 
discussed in this thesis, I demonstrate significant historical continuities in anarchist
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Ecologists acknowledge that self-sufficiency, understood as ‘a state of absolute 
economic independence’ (Dobson 2007, p. 82), may in practice be unattainable. 
Therefore, they usually accept some degree of exchange when ‘local conditions 
inadequately satisfy local needs’ (Mander 2001, pp. 14-15), but even then they envisage 
at least self reliance, a ‘relative independence’ (Dobson 2007, p. 82) which assumes that 
‘everything that could be produced within a nation or region should be’ (Hines 2000, p. 
viii).
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inteipretations (due to its relative novelty less emphasis has been placed on the historical 
identity of ecologism) and I maintain that the ways of thinldng about globalization that 
have been offered by anarchism and ecologism continue to unfold along two distinct, if 
related and at times overlapping, trajectories.
Against the expansion o f governance: anarchist responses to globalization
The fascinating secret of a well-functioning social organism seems 
thus to lie not in its overall unity but its structure, maintained in health 
by the life-preserving mechanism of division operating through 
myriads of cell-splittings and rejuvenations taking place under the 
smooth skin of an apparently unchanging body. Wherever, because of 
age or bad design, this rejuvenating process of subdivision gives way 
to the calcifying process of cell unification, the cells, now growing 
behind the protection of their hardened frames beyond their divinely 
allotted limits, begin, as in cancer, to develop those hostile, arrogant 
great-power complexes which cannot be brought to an end until the 
infested organism is either devoured, or a forceful operation succeeds 
in restoring tlie small-cell pattern. (Kohr 2001 [1957], pp. 190-191)
The anarchist position on globalization is detennined especially by the central anarchist 
preoccupation with the questions of authority and power.'^ ® Less interested in debating 
anthropocentrism or the idea of progress, the anarchist critique of modernity focuses 
instead on its paradigmatic institution; the state, the ‘enemy of all human love’ 
(Woodcock 1977, p. 331). The anarchist denunciation of the government has had myriad
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By anarchism I mean here the egalitarian and communal position to be distinguished 
fi'om the so-called ‘anarcho-liberalism’ or ‘libertarian capitalism’ associated with 
authors such as Murray Rothbard (2006 [1973]), Robert Nozick (1974) or David 
Friedman (1989).
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expressions in anarchist thought, but it was the Frenchman, PieiTC-Joseph Proudhon, 
who gave it the most famous formulation:
To be governed is to be kept in sight, inspected, spied on, directed, 
law-driven, numbered, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, 
estimated, valued, censured, commanded, by creatures who have 
neither the right, nor the wisdom, nor the virtue to do so [...] to be 
governed is to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, 
registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, 
licensed, authorized, admonished, forbidden, corrected, punished [...] 
That is government. (Proudhon, in Jennings 1999, p. 132)
It is in the context of this principled anarchist rejection of government that the anarchist 
model of localization becomes understandable. In political teiins, anarchism opposes 
globalization as a dynamic that replicates on a much larger scale the flaws inherent in 
the state. One of the reasons why the state is infinitely oppressive is the fact that it is far 
too big to be controlled by the people. Large-scale institutions are associated with lack 
of accountability and accumulation of power: ‘[bjigness is attractive to anyone in pursuit 
of power, for one is the hand-maiden of the other’ (Body 2001, p. 18). But while the 
state is too large to be held responsible to the community, globalization brings about an 
even greater concentration of authority -  for example in the form of global governance 
institutions -  to which ever growing numbers of people are subjected all over the world. 
Globalization thus expands and multiplies the problems associated with the state: it 
prevents an individual’s control over decisions which ‘come from agencies which he 
[sic] never constituted, business interests which have no roots in his community, and 
political figures who are unresponsive to his needs’ (Bookchin 1974, p. 86). From this
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perspective, localization is necessary to bring a sense of freedom and empowennent to 
both individuals and communities.
The explanation of the possibihty and praxis of local autonomy has always been a major 
preoccupation of exponents of the anarchist thought. Kropotkin’s belief that the future 
belonged to small-scale cooperative communities had lasting influence on utopian urban 
planners such as Ebenezer Howard (1850-1928), Patrick Geddes (1854-1932) and 
Lewis Mumford (1895-1990), as well as on contemporary anarchism but, as Woodcock 
notes, even in his own times the Russian anarchist was not original:
Kropotkin was only refining on tendencies that were evident in 
anarchism ever since William Godwin [...] Godwin called the local 
units parishes; Proudhon and Bakunin were more interested in self- 
governing workshops and communes [...] and Kropotkin reinforced 
this concept in Mutual Aid. (Woodcock 1992, p. 118)
Whenever it was formulated, the anarchist defence of localization took off from a 
particular set of explicit or implicit assumptions about human nature. Central to 
anarchism has always been the confidence that people are inlierently sociable and 
cooperative and that their natural tendency is towards egalitarianism. Anarchist 
anthropology draws especially on Kropotkin’s doctrine of evolution postulating the 
‘sui*vival of the most cooperative’ and the associated principle of ‘mutual aid’ 
(Kropotkin 1902). Individuals are thus able to fulfil their social and economic needs in 
communities, in this way making ‘the services of the state redundant by performing 
them themselves’ (Somi 1993, p. 7):
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[I]n the absence of the State, the deep-rooted need for peace and 
socially stabilizing tendencies of human community would, after a 
brief period of readjustment, quickly reassert itself Many, if not all 
vital social functions and practices -  which tlirough laziness, we have 
foolishly left in the hands of bureaucrats and State officials -  would 
again be performed by the internally self-regulating community in an 
infinitely more humane way. (Purchase 1997, p. 76)
The abolition of the institutions of autliority is conceivable only in small coimnunities 
where strong bonds of sympathy and loyalty between individuals allow for social 
cohesion to emanate from below. Anarchist objectives would be far more difficult to 
realize in large and fragmented social agglomerates that form only ‘imagined’ 
communities. The remedy to the increasing concentration of global power is thus 
decentralization and localization of political life. Localized decision-maldng is deemed 
an effective way of managing communities, as ‘nobody can assess [people’s] needs 
better than those who experience them’ (Woodcock 1977, p. 22) as well as having 
positive social and psychological consequences, bringing a sense of empowerment to 
both communities and individuals:
[B]y inducing people to co-operate regularly in decisions relating to 
then own lives, decentralization will in fact eliminate the alarming 
atomization of modem communities into lonely individuals dependent 
on authority personified by the policeman and the social worker. 
(Woodcock 1977, p. 22)
More teclinical aspects of localized anarchist politics are discussed by Murray Bookchin, 
who is usually credited with the formation of ‘social ecology’, a current which has 
influenced anarchism at large with its ecologically-minded but also distinctly anarchist, 
and more specifically Kropotkinesque, plans for democratic decentralization. Bookchin
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believes that only in the conditions of localization is it possible to put into practice the 
principles of anarchist direct democracy. He emphasises the significance of a physical 
proximity among people who make decisions affecting themselves and thus reinforces 
the imperative for localization:
[I]n making collective decisions [...] all members of the community 
should have an opportunity to acquire in full the measure of anyone 
who addresses the assembly. They should be in a position to absorb his 
attitudes, study his expressions, and weigh his motives as well as his 
ideas in a direct personal encounter and through face-to-face 
discussion. (Bookchin 1971, p. 79, emphasis removed)
The anarchist reasons for localization are not confined to political ones. Political 
decentralization has for a long tune been linked by anarchists to the decentralization of 
the anarchist economy (Berkman 1964, p. 92). In anarchist communities, production 
takes place ‘where people live, in small factories and workshops in each village and 
neighbourhood’ (Pepper 1993, p. 178). Work is ‘meaningful and fulfilling’ aimed at 
providing ‘socially useful goods and services’ (Pepper 1993, p. 178). The ideological 
durability of anarchist ideas is again undeniable. Just as there has been continuity in 
ffee-market argmnentation so similarly the anarchist response to classical liberalism is 
nowadays formulated along with the logic that would have been recognized a century 
ago: already in 1901 Kropotkin in his Fields, Factories and Worhhops had called for 
economic self-reliance, ‘return to a state of affairs where com is grown, and 
manufactured goods are fabricated, for the use o f those very people who grow and 
produce them' and for ‘each nation [to have] her own agriculturalist and manufacturer’ 
(Kropotkin 1968 [1901], pp. 77, 24-25; emphasis in original). Analogous arguments can
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be identified in Mumford’s Technics and Civilization (1934) and throughout the 
contemporary works of Colin Ward, Murray Bookchin, and Graham Purchase (see for 
example Ward 1973; Bookchin 2005; Purchase 1993).
While anarchists reject national economic specialization, they also abhor professional 
specialization of individuals as preventing a versatile experience of life and leading to an 
elitist culture of experts that contradicts the ideal of individual and communal autonomy. 
Again, the argument linlcing economic self-reliance with the core concept of fieedom is 
well-established in anarchist ideology. Just as in 1901 Kropotkin affirmed that ‘the 
present tendency of civilised nations [is] each individual worldng in the field and in 
some industrial art; each individual combining scientific knowledge with the knowledge 
of handicraft’ (Kropotkin 1968 [1901], pp. 24-25) so, seventy years later, Bookchin 
warned that ‘[t]o separate the engineer from the soil, the thinker from the spade, and the 
farmer from the industrial plant promotes a degree of vocational overspecialization that 
leads to a dangerous measure of social control by specialists’ (Bookchin 1971, p. 80).
More generally, in its social philosophy, anarchism insists on the need for diversity and 
differentiation: ‘If the individual is a unit in a corporate mass, his life will be limited, 
dull and mechanical. If the individual is a unit on his own, with space and potentiality 
for separate action, then [...] he can expand and express himself (Read, in Bookchin 
1971, p. 77). The anarchist ideology emphasizes that individuals need a variety of life- 
experiences. The routine of everyday existence and labour under the capitalist system is 
repulsive to anarchism. This loathing of the sickening regularity of the industrial society
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is exemplified in George Woodcock’s brilliant description of ‘the tyranny of the clock’ 
(Woodcock 1972).
On the whole, according to the anarchist vision, decentralization is likely to create 
harmonious, sustainable and rounded communities in which politics is decided directly 
by the affected individuals, economic activities are based on cooperation and autonomy 
(so admired by Kropotldn among nineteenth century Swiss watclrmakers) and 
individuals are satisfied with the experience of the wholeness and diversity of life. The 
following section focuses more specifically on how the more detailed interpretations 
relating to the question of scale separate ecologism and anarchism into two distinct 
entities. I will argue that far from undeimining ideological distinctions or -  as some have 
argued -  maldng anarchism or ecologism post-ideological (Curran 2006), positions 
taken on ‘globalization’ combine with recognizable morphologies and are reliable as 
indicators of broader ideological worldviews.
Ecologism and anarchism on globalization: a comparison
Different cultures could be expected to have quite different views 
about what political foiins could best accomplish their bioregional 
goals, and (especially as we imagine this system on a global scale) 
those forms could be at quite some variance from the Western 
Enlightemnent-inspired ideal. And however much one might find the 
thought unpleasant, the divergence must be expected and -  if diversity 
is desirable -  respected. It is quite possible that an extraordinary 
variety of political systems would evolve witliin the bioregional 
constraints, and there is no reason to think that they would necessarily 
be compatible — or even, from someone else’s point of view, good. 
(Sale 1991, p. 108)
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Our anarchist communism aims at the overthrow of global industrial 
capitalism and the creation of a world human community [...] with 
human scale communities organising social reproduction in such a way 
that everyone has the opportunity to develop their creativity [...] yet 
also maintaining a real, conscious, global unity to ensure that people 
can travel and communicate as they please, that knowledge, ideas, 
insights and pleasures can be widely shared and that problems of a 
global nature can be discussed and resolved. (Anarchist Federation 
n.d., p. 40)
While ecologism and anarchism share a number of features, including their localist 
inclination, their respective motivations are different. A crucial distinction between 
anarchism and ecologism is the difference between the emphasis that the former places 
on society and the latter on nature. In other words, to bon ow a succinct phrase of David 
Pepper, ‘while anarchism does have positions on human and non-human “nature” it is 
not principally a philosophy of nature’ (Pepper 1993, p. 152). Consequently, while 
ecologism adjusts the idea of localization to its guiding principle of ecocentrism, the 
well-being of nature is for anarchists secondary to free, hannonious and egalitarian 
social relations. This does not imply that anarchism represents an arrogant technocratic 
version of anthropocentrism characteristic of other political ideologies. Anarchism is 
ecologically sensitive but, and this is of major significance, it formulates this sensitivity 
in anthropocentric terms, in a belief that ecological harmony is instrumental in providing 
for social well-being and vice-versa, that harmonious, egalitarian social relations 
generate respect for the rights of other species. This fundamental discrepancy between 
anarchism and ecologism determines their different views on other broad issues, such as 
modernity and globalization, and explains their different motivations and degrees of 
radicalism in advancing the case for localization.
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Hierarchy is the prism through which anarchists understand the cuiTent social as well as 
ecological problems. Their analysis is built upon an ontological postulation that nature 
cannot be inteipreted ‘from a hierarchical viewpoint’ (Bookchin 1980, pp. 270-271). 
From this metaphysical assumption stem more specific explanations, such as the 
following: ‘mass pollution and environmental destruction are inevitable consequences of 
a system based on dominating the rest of nature [...] This domination has its roots in tlie 
domination of people -  class society’ (Anarchist Federation n.d., p. 35). Analogously, 
the anarchist suggestion of the way out of the current ecological predicament takes off 
from the principles that inform anarchist solutions to other social problems: ‘as long as 
hierarchy persists, as long as humanity organizes itself around a system of elites, the 
project of dominating nature will continue to exist and inevitably lead our planet to 
ecological extinction’ (Bookchin, in Antliff 2005, p. 266).
Anarchism’s ‘soft anthropocentrism’ determines its view on other fundamental issues -  
like modernity and progress -  that put it at odds with ecologism. I have shown that in the 
case of ecologism modernity and progress are by definition responsible for the cmTent 
ecological disaster. As will become apparent as my argument proceeds, some curi'ents of 
ecologism are unashamedly backward looking in their advocacy of ‘“refeudalization” 
[...] of the world into ecologically defined political and economic units’ (Barry 1999, p. 
87) that they hope will thwart the modem project. The anarchist attitude to modernity is 
not as straightforward. Colin Ward maintains that there is no contradiction between 
modernity and community (Ward 1995, pp. 299-300) but it is a modernity that is
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understood in a particular way — as one devoid of hierarchy and domination. The 
anarchist interpretation of the idea of progress is also harder to pin down than in tlie case 
of ecologism. Richard Sonn, in his introduction to the subject, explains the position of 
anarchism as follows:
[TJhey were not reactionaries seeking to turn back the clock. Although 
they rejected the present, they were also critical about much of the past 
[...]. They therefore looked to the future, not to the past -  but their 
vision of the friture resembled the past more than the present: a past 
shorn of elites, domination, and religion, composed of free peasants 
and artisans reaping tlie fruits of their own labors. [...They] wished to 
“revolve” back to a more hannonious society and although their 
rejection of the contemporary society was nearly total, their proposed 
alternative fused elements of a remembered past with a vision of a 
utopian future. (Sonn 1992, pp. 2-3)
While anarchism does not display a wholesale antimodem stance, it is of course defined 
by its critique of the state, perhaps the most emblematic of all modem institutions. But 
here lies another distinction between anarchism and ecologism. On the one hand, the 
anarchist rejection of the state is congenial to most of ecologism. Usually, ecologists 
regard the state as representing ‘materialism, institutionalized violence, centralization 
and hierarchy’ (Porrit 1984, pp. 216-217) and thus as inimical to their vision. A typical 
ecologist would probably endorse a position which has been described, somewhat 
disrespectfully, as ‘naïve naturalism’ (Barry 1999, p. 79) and which asserts that 
communities are naturally superior to other social anangements in that they follow the 
patterns of nature. However, on the other hand, arguments in favour of the state are 
occasionally present in ecologist thought and some commentators have argued that the 
logic of green politics requires ‘the transformation rather than the abolition of the state’
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(Baiiy 1999, p. 79, emphasis in original). Thus, although for most ecologists the ‘green 
state’ is an oxymoron (Barry 1999, p. 78), the acceptance of the state does not provide a 
criterion of disqualification from the territory of ecologism.
An ecologist model: radical localization and political relativism
What is perhaps more telling from the perspective of the present comparative analysis is 
that while the majority of ecologists subscribe to the principal anarchist belief that 
statism should be replaced by a decentralized communal structure, the two ideologies are 
at variance when they embark on a more specific vindication of the benefits of the 
communal life, and especially when tliey debate the details of the political organization 
that they prescribe for their ideal communities. The ecologist rejection of the state 
consists primarily in an objection to its size as defying natural limits. At the same time a 
critique of authority per se does not have to be an ingredient of ecologist antistatism. 
Goldsmith’s antistatist declarations, for example, are not motivated by his desire to 
question the need for control as such; he opposes power only when it is exercised on a 
large scale over a necessarily heterogeneous social environment: ‘only an elaborate 
bureaucracy mn by a shameless autocrat can hope to control a mass of people deprived 
of a common culture and a sense of duty to their society’ (Goldsmith, in Barry 1999, p.
83). Furthermore, it seems that some ecologist interpretations cohere quite well with 
conservative, paternalistic, or even authoritarian ideas.'*’ Sale exemplifies this
Ecologism’s conservative aspects have been noted and discussed by a number of 
commentators. William Tucker provided an extensive analysis of ecologism’s
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unequivocally conservative tone in his reflection about the desired features of a 
bioregional society:
It is not change, then, and it is not novelty or rapidity that the 
bioregional society works toward but rather stability and adjustment; 
not revolution but evolution; not cataclysm but gradualism. The new is 
to be treated more with suspicion than, as in our time, instant acclaim 
and approbation -  the mutant being always more likely to cause 
problems than solve them -  and no particular virtue would adhere to 
originality or “modernity,” as it does in a society with no fixed and 
accepted standards, no repository of values from the past, to measure 
by. (Sale 1991, p. 119)
A possible explanation of the potentiality for a conservative, authoritarian tendency 
within ecologism may proceed from ecocentrism and the consequent overwhelming 
importance of localization in this way of thinking. Small-scale living is defined in 
ecologism as the way to accomplish the ultimate objective of pushing the evolution of
conservative leanings in his Progress and Privilege. According to Tucker: ‘the impulse 
to slow growtli, to suspect invention, and to place natural or agrarian values above 
material progress has been the consistent pattern of aristocratic politics wherever and 
whenever it has asserted itself (Tucker 1982, p. 42). In Tucker’s view, ecologism 
amounts to ‘the ideas of aristocratic conservatism translated onto a popular scale’ 
(Tucker 1982, p. 32). That conservative strains run through some areas of ecologism is a 
fact emphasized also by Anna Bramwell, who identified the first expressions of 
ecologism in the tiaditional Tory attitude combining nationalism with a rejection of 
industrialism (Bramwell 1989, pp. 104-105). In a similar vein David Pepper suggested 
that ecocentrism ‘may be a (middle) class response to contradictions in capitalism, 
essentially conservative, reactionary, “bourgeois” to the core and very much involving 
traditional political concerns’ (Pepper 1986, p. 187) while also noting elsewhere: 
‘aspects of the appeal to a “natural”, “organic” order, where people must model their 
society on “nature” have distinctly reactionary implications’ (Pepper 1993, p. 190). 
More recently, Derek Wall pointed out that localization may have oppressive upshots. 
From Wall’s left-wing perspective; ‘[sjmall may be necessary but it is not enough’ (Wall 
2005, pp. 67 and 82; see also Saward 1993).
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civilization away from its course of self-destruction in the direction of ecocentric values.
In the context of tiie project for changing the whole civilizational model traditional 
political questions may seem to be of lesser significance. Political and economic 
aiTangements of communities are evaluated mostly in terms of their conduciveness to 
the advancement of ecocentric attitudes and practices. Since localization is believed to 
be the certain way towards ecocentrism, ecologism refrains from guiding communities 
beyond that point. Such guidance would stand for a violation of the autonomy of 
localized communities which -  like natural systems -  regulate themselves optimally 
according to local circumstances. Ecologism is thus committed to the principle of 
plurality of political options within the wide orbit of localism:
Bioregional diversity [...] does not mean that every community [...] 
would construct itself along the same lines, evolve the same political 
forms. Most particularly it does not mean that every bioregion would 
be likely to heed the values of democracy, equality, liberty, freedom, 
justice, and the like [...] Truly autonomous bioregions would 
inevitably go in separate and not necessarily complementary ways, 
creating their own political systems according to their own 
enviromnental settings and their own ecological needs. (Sale 1991, p. 
108)
It follows that while ecologism emphasizes the ideal of diversity between local 
communities by accepting an unlimited number of political choices for individual 
groups, it may deny the diversity within some of them by maintaining that communities 
may choose to be run in an authoritarian manner. But while in the ecologist perspective 
democracy is but one option in a variety of alternatives, some ecologists go beyond 
relativism and display openly authoritarian predilections. Doubts have been expressed
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within ecologism as to whether democracy is actually an appropriate platform for the 
realization of ecocentric priorities and several ecologist thinkers have in its place 
advocated tightly integrated communities run on hierarchical lines according to the 
principle of ‘mutual coercion mutually agreed upon’ (Hardin 1968, p. 1247). Edward 
Goldsmith suggested despotic measures at least in the process of transition to the 
ecological society:
[T]he long transitional stage that we and our children must go through 
will impose a heavy burden on our moral courage and will require 
great restraint. Legislation and the operation of police forces and the 
courts will be necessary to reinforce this restraint. (Goldsmith et al. 
1972, p. 50)
Another ecologist thinlcer, William Ophuls went further down the authoritarian path and 
suggested that an ecological society would necessarily need ‘a class of ecological 
mandarins who possess the esoteric knowledge needed to run it well’ (Ophuls 1977, p. 
163). hi Ophuls’s opinion such a society:
[W]ill not only be more authoritarian and less democratic than the 
industrial society of today [...] it will also in all likeliliood be much 
more oligarchic as well, with only those possessing the ecological and 
other competences to make prudent decisions allowed full participation 
in the political process. (Ophuls 1977, p. 163)
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Ecologism may also interpret religion in a way that would not be possible to integrate 
within anarchism. Ecologism would typically place emphasis on immanent spirituality 
where the sacred is located in nature (for example Dodge 1981; Goldsmith 1988; 
Sessions 1987; Spretnack 1986). These mystical tendencies of ecologism are frowned 
upon by anarchists -  ‘the extent to which a society devolves into mysticism and 
eclecticism can be regarded as a measure of its culmral decline’ (Bookchin 2007, p. 72). 
Furthermore, some ecologists have a much more ‘pragmatic’ -  and at the same time 
objectionable from an anarchist point of view -  use for religion as a stabilizing factor
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To reiterate, all this is not to suggest that ecologism is inherently consei*vative, 
authoritarian or reactionary, but merely to argue that the very possibility of conservative 
or authoritarian ideas within the morphology of ecologism is a feature that requires 
attention as it places ecologism on a position that is distinct from that occupied by 
anarchism. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that in cases where localization 
becomes a primary method of realization of such an unconventional (in the sense of not 
featuring in the conceptual dictionaries of other ideologies) goal as an ecocentric society, 
this may encourage a flirtatious relationship with radically different positions at the 
same time. As Pepper puts it: ‘ecocentrism is politically most ambiguous and [...] has 
[...] distinctive and opposite political wings’ (Pepper 1986, p. 213).
An anarchist model: a confederation o f confederations
Anarchists reject the reactionary implications of some variants of green thought. From 
their point of view the idea of defending nature by authoritarian means is of course an 
anathema. Whereas for the ecologist decentralization along the lines of natural 
bioregions is to subdue humanity’s chaotic proliferation and to subject society to the 
laws and limits of nature, the anarchist endorses localization only as long as it
and a tool in exercising power. Robert Heilbroner, for example, insisted on the necessity 
of a regime combining ‘religious orientation with militaiy discipline’ (Heilbroner 1991, 
pp. 176-177; see also discussion of the views of a German ecologist Rudolph Bahro in 
Biehl 1996). Governments aie to be ‘monastic’; religion is to keep people in line and 
thus stop them from abusing the environment. In another notoriously authoritarian 
interpretation. Goldsmith approved of the Hindus’ caste system of stratification as 
‘ecologically friendly’ (Goldsmith 1978).
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contributes to a free and democratic society. From the anarchist perspective, the problem 
of the territorial scope of governance is important but derivative: the typical scale of the 
modem state increases the remoteness of the centre of authority and thus diminishes the 
possibility of public control over its exercise (Woodcock 1977, p. 21), but anarchists 
believe that ‘any power corrupts absolutely’ regaidless of the distance between the rulers 
and the ruled. Therefore, anarchism rejects all forms of authority, whether it is, to 
borrow Max Weber’s categories, ‘rational legal’ authority of the nation-state backed by 
a remote and faceless bureaucracy, a ‘traditional’ authority of a king, or even a local, 
‘charismatic’ power typical of small pre-industrial societies: ‘the Palaeolithic shaman in 
reindeer skin and horns is the predecessor of the Pharaoh and the Buddha and, in more 
recent times, of Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini’ (Bookchin, in Sonn 1992, p. 273).
In other words, while from an anarchist perspective, localization is a necessaiy 
prerequisite of freedom and democracy, there remains a question as to whether it is also 
a sufficient condition. Some anarchists conceptualize democracy as natural and thus 
dismiss any possibility of tension between localization and democracy. They assert that 
decentralized communities would automatically embrace the democratic perspective 
(Kropotkin 1902; Purchase 1997, p. 76). But others assume that although democracy 
requires localization, not all localized political arrangements would necessarily turn 
democratic. While the sceptics consent to the ecologist conviction that democracy is just 
one among many political paths that the communities may want to follow, they 
resolutely reject the relativist conclusion of ecologism to the effect that communities
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should be allowed to organize themselves in any, possibly authoritarian, way they 
choose.
Murray Bookchin exemplifies this strong anarchist insistence on local democracy. He 
emphasizes that diversity ‘never should be celebrated in a nationalistic sense of 
“apartness” from the general interests of humanity as a whole or else it will regress into 
the parochialism of folkdom and tribalism’ (Bookchin 2007, p. 50). He is concerned 
‘that neither decentralization nor self-sufficiency in itself is necessarily democratic’ and 
so he calls on anarchists to ‘counteract the tendency of decentralized communities to 
drift toward exclusivity and parochialism’ (Bookchin 1989a). Bookchin’s method ‘to 
foster a healthy interdependence, rather than an introverted, stultifying independence’ 
(Bookchin 2007, p. 49) consists in opening communities to cooperation within 
confederal structures whose various forms he discusses in his book The Rise o f  
Urbanization and the Decline o f Citizenship (1987).'*^
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Confederation, according to the Oxford Concise Dictionary o f Politics, ‘is less binding 
in its character than a federation. In principle, the states in a confederation would not 
lose their separate identity through confederation, and would retain the right of 
secession’ (McLean 1996, p. 98; see also Holterman 1995, p. 286 for an anarchist 
explanation along these lines). Thus, while anarchists tend to use the terms 
‘confederation’ and ‘federation’ interchangeably, the notion of confederation (in this 
case, of communities, not of states) is closer to the anarchist spirit and thus I will use this 
term in the following discussion.
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Confederalism renders anarchist localism less extreme than its ecologist counterpart. 
The green doctrine of bioregionalism is reluctant to accept cooperation between 
bioregions, and although Kirkpatrick Sale does contemplate the idea of morphoregions it 
is mostly for the organization of cultural enterprises, in other words, in areas that are not 
deemed essential for community survival. Furthermore, with reference to the transfer of 
knowledge and ideas. Sale assumes the irrelevance of any universal knowledge and 
limits the possibility of mutual openness and influence to only similar units:
[T]he flow of ideas possible in a bioregional world would be quite 
different from the sort that is regularized today. All that speaks of the 
global, or monocultural, or hemispheric would be really irrelevant to 
any self-regarding bioregion; what it would want would be information 
and experience specific to the kind of enviromnent it inliabited. This is 
not likely to come from the bioregion next door, which would have 
different characteristics, and it may not even come fi'om any other 
bioregion on that continent. But there are bound to be any number of 
places somewhere else in the world that have enough of the same 
ecological conditions to be ideal partners with which to share ideas. 
(Sale 1991, p. 79)
In contrast to these ecologist reservations, the profoundly humanist ideology of 
anarchism protests against imposing any baniers on the possibilities of cooperation and 
‘mutual aid’ between communities. Anarchism is thus forced to reconcile two of its 
main ideals: internationalism (or perhaps ‘ intercommunal ism ’ is a more appropriate 
word) and local autonomy based on decentralization: while anarchists encourage 
cooperation on all levels, up to the global level, they have, always been at pains to 
emphasize their coimnitment to localism.
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Models of confederation have been debated by anarchists in ways that provide another 
example of continuity. Proudhon had already insisted that ‘loose federations [...] would 
coordinate activities without usurping local autonomy’ (Sonn 1992, p. 27). Proudhon 
maintained that in ‘a federative contract [...] each commune, canton, province and 
region retains more power than it sunenders to the higher level’ (Carter 1971, p. 62). 
Proudhon’s ideal consisted o f ‘a confederation of confederations, in which the interest of 
the smallest province would have as much expression as that of the largest, and in which 
all affairs would be settled by mutual agreement, contract and arbitration’ (Woodcock 
2004, p. 119). In a similar vein but a less distant past. Woodcock described a confederal 
society as one:
[I]n which responsibility begins in the vital nuclei of social life, the 
workplace and the neighbourhoods where people live. In such a vision 
all matters of purely local concern -  matters by which no outside 
interests are affected -  should be decided locally by the people most 
directly involved [...]. Wliere neighbourhoods have interests in 
common, they should federate loosely to discuss co-operation and 
arbitrate differences, and so upwards, tlirough provinces to larger 
geographical entities, until, with all frontiers abolished, the whole 
world becomes a federation of federations of federations, bringing 
together every small community in a kind of symbiotic unity like a 
great structure of coral. (Woodcock 1977, pp. 25-26)
The anarchist notion of decenfralization is thus antliropocentric and anthropocentrism 
impacts on the radicalism of the anarchist version of localism. Nevertheless, 
confederalism does not disqualify anarchism from its claim to being a philosophy of 
decentralization and autonomy. Anarchists intend to begin ‘every kind of human activity 
[...] from what is local and immediate’ (Ward 1996 [1973], p. 58) and insist that ‘a
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federal body should be run from the bottom up, not from the top down’ (Pepper 1993, p. 
159) and that ‘the flow of power from the bottom up [should diminish] with the scope of 
the federal council ranging temtorially from localities to regions and from regions to 
ever-broader territorial aieas’ (Bookchin 1989b). In other words, in a confederal network 
no community is subjected to laws and regulations that it has had no share in deciding. 
In the context of what anarchists believe to be the central tendency of globalization, 
namely, the extension of the distance between the centres of decision making and the 
communities that are affected by those decisions, it is reasonable to agree with the 
assertion of Leopold Kolir, a prominent economist who considered himself an anarchist 
and who is still widely read in anarchist circles, that the principle defining any federation 
‘is one of division, not of union’ (Kohr 2001 [1957], p. 34) and thus anarchist 
confederalism can be treated as an antiglobalist project.
Ecologist and anarchist models o f economic localization
A demarcation line can also be drawn between ecologist and anarchist models of local 
economy and again the distinction between ecocentrism and anthropocentrism is the 
most consequential factor that distinguishes between the two variants. As noted earlier, 
from the ecologist perspective localization contributes crucially to the awareness of 
economic limits. A community which depends exclusively on its own resources is by 
necessity conscious of their scarcity. It would therefore use them frugally and in a 
sustainable manner, fulfilling the genuine needs of its members but ostracizing 
unnecessary consumption. What is more, in case even the basic needs exceeded the
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productive possibilities of nature, ecologism would have chosen to sacrifice human 
interests rather than compromise the principle of sustainability.
The impact of ecocentrism is clear with reference to the demographic aspect of the limits 
to growth thesis. In light of what Gaixett Hardin declared to be the ‘Eleventh 
Commandment of the ecologist’ -  ‘Thou shalt not transgress the canying capacity’ 
(Hardin 1995, p. 211) -  ecologism claims that the human population has already 
surpassed all limits and that ‘the cancerous growth of population’ (Peccei 1981, p. 30) 
must be reversed.'*'* What is more, in putting forward the case for demographic 
downsizing, some ecologists have asserted their indifference to the fate of humankind. 
Dave Foreman, for example, declared ‘the human race could go extinct, and I for one 
would not shed any tears’ (Foreman, in Bradford 1989, p. 1). Equally controversial are 
the more specific measures that have been put forward in some comers of ecologism. 
The suggestion of the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement that humankind should 
‘live long and die out’ (in Thiele 1999, p. 175) sounds restrained in comparison with 
other so-called ‘natural solutions’ that have been endorsed by some ecologists:
If radical environmentalists were to invent a disease to bring human 
populations back to sanity, it would probably be something like AIDS. 
As radical enviromiientalists, we can see AIDS not as a problem but as 
a necessary solution. (Miss Ann Tliropy 1987, p. 32)
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44 The cancer metaphor to describe human population growth can also be found in the
works of other so-called ‘survivalists’, for example in Ehrlich 1968, p. xi.
Anarchism and ecologism
The claim that the whole human population must scale down is consistent with 
ecocentric ontology and ethics. If it is assumed that growing population numbers 
threaten the well-being or even the survival of nature, then humankind must be ready to 
make ultimate sacrifices. At the end of the day, ecologism asserts, localism, scaling 
down and depopulation are the conditions of the continued existence of humanity itself. 
If the ‘boat’ on which humankind floats remains overcrowded, it will sink, drowning all 
its ‘passengers’ (Hardin 1974).'*  ^ It is this reasoning that, according to some ecologists, 
justifies enacting authoritarian, oppressive measures: ‘We must have population conbol 
at home, hopefully through a system of incentives and penalties, but by compulsion if 
voluntary methods fail’ (Ehrlich 1968, p. 11).
Anarchists reject such neo-Malthusian conclusions outright and articulate their concern 
with limits in the context of their analysis of domination and inequality. Accordingly, 
‘fewer people do not necessarily consume fewer resources’ (Anarchist Federation n.d., 
p. 10). Instead, ‘[t]he main cause of the ecological crisis is not “the population 
explosion” [...] but gross under-use of the world’s land resources’ (Hart 1993, p. 12). 
This debate continues an established controversy: the opposition to predictions of an 
imminent transgression of demographic limits was in the centre of the attack that 
Kropotkin launched on Malthus. Kropotkin identified the reason for malnutrition in
242
A  Finnish eco-radical, Pentti Linkola, also employed lifeboat metaphor to suggest 
culling humanldnd: ‘Those who hate life tiy to pull more people on board and drown 
everybody. Those who love and respect life use axes to chop off the extra hands hanging 
on the gunwale’ (in Huber 1999, p. 160).
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private land ownership that prevented maximization of agiicultural output. He was 
convinced that a combination of land redistribution and technological progress would 
solve the problem of famine (Pepper 1986, p. 189). Kropotkin thus advocated systemic 
and institutional change. This way of thinking is often absent ft om ecologism, in which 
‘capitalist institutions are barely looked at as the major peipetrators of enviromnental 
devastation’ (Bradford 1989, p. 12).
Anarchists concur with ecologists in their advocacy of self-reliance as promoting 
ecologically-sound attitudes: ‘a relatively self-sufficient community, visibly dependent 
on its environment for the means of life, would gain a new respect for tlie organic 
intenelationships that sustain it’ (Bookchin 1971, pp. 80-81). However, anarchists are 
unable to include wholesale localism among their conceptual options. While the most 
radical currents of ecologism may ignore human needs altogether or, at least, may define 
them in a naiTow sense, dismissing the ‘wants’ of today’s societies as abenations, 
anarchists are not as willing to accept all corollaries of a localized life. Despite their 
commitment to the breaking down of large-scale economic organisms and their 
promotion of self-reliant economies, anarchists compromise self-sufficiency in the name 
of social well-being:
[S]elf-sustaining communities cannot produce all the things they need 
unless it involves a return to a back-breaking way of village life that 
historically often prematurely aged its men and women with hard work 
and allowed them veiy little time for political life beyond the 
immediate confines of the community itself. (Bookchin 1989b)
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Anarchist localism tends to be moderated in the name of adequately fulfilling human 
needs at the present stage of civilizational development. From the anarchist perspective, 
an uncompromising insistence on self-sufficiency would inevitably imply neglecting 
vital human needs thus contradicting the freedom of individuals and limiting their ability 
to run community life in a responsible and democratic way.
The principle of self-sufficiency is also challenged by the inclination of some sections of 
anarchism to urban values and lifestyles. Not all of anarchism is urban; indeed some 
anarchist currents lean towards an anti-urban utopia of peasant community inspired by 
Lev Tolstoy, Gustav Landauer or Mohandas Gandhi. However the urban predilection of 
anarchism occurs regularly enough to justify treating it as one of the main distinctions 
between anarchism and ecologism, where the latter typically objects to the modem city 
as ‘an ecological parasite as it extracts its lifeblood from elsewhere and an ecological 
pathogen as it sends back its wastes’ (Sale 1991, p. 65).
The urban current of anarchism can be traced back to Kropotkin who was influenced by 
the ideal of the medieval urban community and who took the view that experiments in 
communal living should take place close to cities. Bookchin similarly argued that ‘some 
kind of urban community is not only the enviromnent of humanity: it is its destiny’ 
(Bookchin 1974, p. 2). The main proponent of contemporary urban anarchism, Graham 
Purchase, celebrates the city-based community as an optimal framework of social and 
economic life, ‘a midway point between the isolated nuclear family and the Nation-State
244
Anarchism and ecologism 245
avoiding the drawbacks of tribal or small-scale communal lifestyles of old’ 
(Purchase 1997, pp. 76-77). But Purchase’s claim that ‘small communities cannot, in 
our modem and complex world, ever hope to contain a sufficiently diverse skillbase’ 
(Purchase 1997, p. 85) contradicts the ‘small is beautiful’ principle. Further 
inconsistencies between urbanism and self-sufficiency are exemplified by Purchase’s 
difficulties in reconciling the idea of self-sufficiency with the anarchist pledge to deliver 
opportunities expected by modem individuals. Thus, on the one hand. Purchase asserts:
[T]he ideal conception of city-life would be one that has achieved total 
self-sufficiency. The goal would be to create a city that would function 
as a living entity, growing its own food, providing its own energy and 
recycling its wastes so efficiently that it effectively becomes an 
ecosystem in its own right. (Purchase 1997, p. 77)
While this statement is consistent with radical ecologist localism, the same does not 
apply to the concession that Purchase formulates just a few pages later:
Although cities must become considerably more integrated and 
economically self-sufiRcient than they are today, the need to maintain 
transport and communication links between cities [...] and the unequal 
distribution of universally scarce resources [...] requires powerful and 
extensive industrial and economic stractures whose proper and 
efficient functioning are of interregional and global interest and 
importance. (Purchase 1997, pp. 88-89)
This middle-ground, and somewhat inconsistent, perspective of Purchase has a long 
history in anarchist theory: the British anarchist philosopher Herbert Read insisted that 
‘there is no contradiction between anarchism and electric power, anarchism and air 
transport, anarchism and the division of labour, anarchism and industrial efficiency’
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(Read 1965, p. 135). In fact, efforts to reconcile decentralization with the requirements 
and benefits of modem civilization are aheady present in the writings of Kropotkin who 
advocated a situation where:
[E]very member of the community can enjoy the many benefits of 
civilization [...] and every member who is discontented with 
communal life can at any given moment return to the individualist life 
of the present society. One can, in such case, enjoy the intellectual, 
scientific, and artistic life of our civilization without necessarily 
abandoning the community. (Kropotkin 1895, p. 4)
From the radically antiglobalist perspective of ecologism, this position is a kind of ‘have 
your cake and eat if  wishful thinking but it is inevitable in an ideology for which the 
well-being of humankind is the highest priority. This position is also logical in the 
context of anarchism’s core concept of freedom: anarchism compromises economic 
localism in the name of economic welfare, a prerequisite for freedom and for the 
responsible and democratic running of the community life.
Real implications of conceptual distinctions
George Woodcock, an anarchist himself but also a historian of anarchism, once 
illustrated the continuity of this ideology by summing up new anarchist contributions as 
‘little more than Kropotkin plus electricity’ (Woodcock 1992, p. 118). It seems 
reasonable to say that examples given in this chapter demonstrate that contemporary 
anarchist ideas are, to paraphrase Woodcock, ‘little more than Kropotkin plus the 
internet’. In other words, this means that new theories and concepts, and notably the 
concept of globalization, have been integrated within the anarchist territory according to
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a predictable pattern, in ways contingent on the overall anarchist worldview. This is not 
to suggest that anarchist decontestations of globalization are always straightforward in 
their tone or logic. The point is rather that the potential areas of conceptual tension or 
incongruity between pre-existing conceptual patterns of anarchism and the new concept 
of globalization are solved, masked or evaded in ways that convey anarchist identity and 
temperament.
Whereas, in the words of Purchase, the ‘vision [of] diversity, decentralisation, 
complementarity, alternative teclinology, municipal socialism, self-sufficiency, direct 
democracy [was] fully elaborated in the works of the great anarchist thinkers of the past’ 
(Purchase 1993, p. 35), ecologism as a self-aware ideology is new. Nevertheless, 
ecologism has proven itself capable of constructing a worldview which in important 
respects is distinct from the ideological environments from which it originally 
developed. While anarchist ideas of decentralization played an important role in the 
crystallization of ecologism’s localist outlook, this outlook has now matured into a 
recognizable conceptual composite. Consequently, as this chapter has demonstrated, the 
anarchist and ecologist versions of localism are now distinct and the differences between 
them are rooted in the core concepts of the two currents.
To summarize: what counts for ecologism is conduciveness of a given form of society to 
the protection of nature and to the creation and maintenance of ecocentric communities. 
Ecologists are convinced that small-scale structures will fulfil these objectives. While
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ecologists demand localization of communities, they are not necessarily fussy about 
their political forms: a scaled-down autocracy guided by the principles of ecocentrism 
may be as legitimate a choice as democracy. Ecocentrism also dominates in the ecologist 
idea of economic localism. In the face of imminent threats to the very existence of the 
planet, human needs may be defined very narrowly, while in extreme cases humankind 
may be required to let some of its members perish in order to reverse demographic 
growth. The priorities of anarchism are different. The anarchist notion of political 
localization is anthropocentric and anthropocentrism is its limit. The anarchist ideology 
is particularly determined by its close attachment to the concept of freedom. The 
centrality of freedom in its conceptual structure prevents anarchism from inteipreting 
localization in terms matching the radicalism of ecologism. Anarchists are supportive of 
localization because, and as long as, local arrangements allow freedom and its 
concomitants: direct democracy and the fulfilment of human needs at the present stage 
of civilizational development. As a result, anarchism encourages communities to 
cooperate within confederations that are expected to mitigate the problems of localism -  
especially those that might thwart individual autonomy and social wellbeing -  while at 
the same time guaranteeing local autonomy against usurpations of control from above.
Ecologism and anarchism are neighbours on the ideological platform of radical 
opposition to globalization but they are sometimes thought to share more ground than 
they actually do. Wliile ideologies do not have sharp borders and the outgrowths of 
ecologism and anarchism may overlap and crossbreed, the core concepts of ecologism
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and anarchism separate them into two distinct visions. The descriptions presented in this 
chapter amount, inevitably, to ideal types, but the effects of the differences between the 
two options have been felt in the sphere of political action. The anarchist idea of 
freedom, and its concomitant concept of direct democracy, renders anarchism the main 
ideological framework for progiessive antiglobalist movements (Epstein 2001; Goaman 
2003; Graber 2002; Graeber 2004, p. 77; Rupert 2004, p. 132; Sheehan 2003; Starr 
2005, p. 117; Wall 2005, p. 124). At the same time, the attempts of a number of 
ecologists to come nearer to the anarchists have failed. The reactionary implications of 
some fonns of ecologist localism sparked the opposition of several anarchist groups 
which have widely publicized their withdrawal from actions sponsored by ecologists 
such as Edward Goldsmith (Fabel van den illegal 2000; see also Biehl and Staudenmaier 
1996). The case I have tried to make here is that the reasons for the tensions that are 
noticeable between ecologist and anarchist interpretations of globalization are not based 
solely on strategic or short-term priorities but are rooted deeply in the conceptual 
structures that constitute the two ideologies.
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The aim of this thesis has been to examine the impact of the concept of globalization on 
the patterns of political ideology. The dominant view in the debate surrounding this 
question asserts that traditional ideological structures have been thoroughly disrupted by 
the emergence of the new conceptual framework of what could be termed ‘the global 
imaginaiy’. From this perspective, it is no longer useful to think in conventional 
ideological teims, which were coined for the bygone era of national consciousness, and 
in their place a new typology is needed to make sense of a radically different ‘globalist’ 
reality. The analysis of selected representative variants of interpretations of globalization 
has led me to oppose this claim. The argument that I have tried to substantiate 
throughout this study is therefore that established political ideologies are still meaningful 
categories with which to map the political world. In making the case for the relevance of 
conventional ideological structures I have demonstrated the continuity of their 
traditional interpretations while at the same time identifying in their earlier expressions 
ideas anticipating concerns that are nowadays herded together under the conceptual 
mnbrella of ‘globalization’. But while my discussion has been emphatic of continuity, it 
should not have left an impression of ideology as a static construct. Indeed, I have 
identified within major ideologies important conceptual shifts that resulted from the rise 
of tlie idea of globalization. Yet, the argument that I have made posits that so far those 
changes have been internal to conventional belief systems and that the latter have 
therefore proved capable of rearticulating their tenets in light of the new circumstances.
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Not unexpectedly, the patterns of conceptual reconfigurations which have occurred 
under pressure of a new and all-pervasive concept were in the ideologies under 
discussion determined by their prior conceptual arrangements. Accordingly, it should 
not be surprising that traditionally universalist ideologies, such as classical liberalism or 
Marxism, have embraced globalization either in its present shape or, in the Marxist case, 
in principle, by postulating that while today’s world is unjust and oppressive, a fairer 
future will necessarily be global as well. From the point of view represented by 
neoliberals, the cunent form of globalization fulfils tlie long-term aspiration of classical 
liberalism, namely, the creation of worldwide market civilization with all that this 
achievement allegedly implies: the promotion of prosperity, peace and democracy. 
Marxists, on the other hand, have seen the progressing expansion of the capitalist system 
as integral in then* teleological vision of history moving ahead towards the inevitable 
revolutionary transformation.
Other ideological systems have challenged globalization more or less forcefully. Again, 
their opposing positions have been articulated in terms contingent on broader conceptual 
outlooks. In other words, the enemies of globalization have identified the process as 
synonymous with, or resulting fi'om, or aggiavating, the ills that they have always 
opposed. In national populism and fascism, for example, the emphasis on the right to 
one’s place, the acclamation of place-bound identities, and the insistence on the racial 
and/or cultural isolation that the preservation of identity allegedly necessitates, have 
combined to convey a consistently antiglobalist message. Ecologism has put equally
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strong emphasis on the territorial place but with different priorities in mind. From 
ecologism’s point of view, globalization is the culmination of the Western heritage of 
anthropocentrism, industrialism and modernity. Globalization therefore exacerbates the 
problems that have always been inherent in this civilizational paradigm and leaves 
humankind unable to see that there are limits to production, consumption and pollution. 
The path to an ecological recovery leads through radical relocalization of social life.
Other currents have been more unequivocal about globalization. Traditional social 
democracy, to take just one example, has been disinclined to accept the reality of 
globalization for it saw the idea as contradicting specific social democratic objectives 
and prescriptions focused on the concept of the state as mitigating the instabilities 
produced by the markets. But in this case, too, the concept of globalization has been 
integrated into the structure of social democratic ideology in a way that reinforces its 
overall implications: the crisis of the welfare state has been explained as the outcome of 
the paralyzing impact of the powerful myth of globalization and ideological mobilization 
has centred on the task of ‘demythologizing’ the concept. But alongside this traditional 
interpretation, alternative strands of social democratic ideology acknowledged the reality 
of globalization and insisted that it is precisely due to this process that the welfare state 
is necessary, while another, increasingly influential current, has put emphasis on raising 
social democratic principles to the global level.
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This telcgi aphic summaiy of some of the case studies points to a key assumption of this 
thesis, namely that the legacy of past conceptual arrangements is reflected in how the 
conventional clusters of interpretations have positioned themselves vis-à-vis 
globalization. While conceptual shifts have certainly occurred, new developments have 
not undermined the overall impression of ideological continuity. Wittgenstein’s 
metaphor of a rope is useful to explain the nature of this ideological change. A rope is 
made of multiple strands of which none runs from its one end to the other. 
Consequently, it is not any single thread but rather the overlapping of fibres that gives 
the rope its unity and strength (Clock 1996, p. 121). Ideological structures are like ropes: 
they do not usually disintegrate when one, or even several, of their conceptual strands 
break, or when a new configuration of conceptual ‘fibres’ materializes to absorb the 
impact of a specific issue emerging in political debate. This point is illustrated by the 
survival of ideologies which underwent periods of sweeping changes in the past. For 
example, the reform of capitalism and the emergence of the welfare state in the early 
twentieth century had a major impact on socialism within which there developed a new 
current of social democracy. Similarly, the evaporation of some traditional socio­
political forms, first of feudalism and then, arguably, of industrial capitalism, forced a 
new direction in the evolution within conservatism. Yet, conceptual developments have 
taken place within ideologies which have adjusted them to new ideational constraints 
and opportunities by eliminating or marginalizing the concepts that had become 
cumbersome, or by allowing new threads to complement prior conceptual sets, or by 
splitting some conceptual ‘ropes’ into distinct strands. To stick with the example of
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social democracy, its materialization did not mean that the longer-established tendencies 
within socialism (Marxism or democratic socialism) ceased to exist even tliough it 
forced them to take account of the challenge posed by the new relative. Likewise, the 
development of new forms of conseiwatism, such as Christian democracy or neo­
conservatism, did not mean that continuity of conservative thought was broken 
altogether. In fact the two new conservative currents developed distinct tendencies — 
paternalistic ‘one nation’ conservatism and liberal conservatism -  that had been present 
in this ideology before (Eccleshall 2003b). Similarly, as I have argued in this thesis, the 
post-Cold War historical transition has not (as yet) necessitated the abandomnent of 
conventional categories, at least when they are taken for what they are from the 
perspective tiiat I have adopted here, namely, constellations of concepts held together by
overlapping ideas combining into flexible but recognizably distinct conceptual entities.
* *  *
No study in social sciences can claim to be complete. Some questions are inevitably left 
unanswered. I would like to briefly point out two research areas which could fruitfully 
complement the analysis presented in this thesis. The first research avenue relates to the 
diachronic aspect of ideology and the possibility of updating the analysis presented here 
in the light of new developments. The thesis has provided an account of the state of 
ideology (or at least of some ideologies) at a particular point in time, that is to say, at the 
apparent climax of the changes following tlie Cold War era and grouped together under 
the tenn ‘globalization’. But I have not been able to catch up with the pace of new and 
dramatic developments that are taldng place at the time of writing. The global crisis.
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which began in 2007, has variously affected the key ideological positions. Most 
importantly, the crisis has apparently shaken the neoliberal hegemony and numerous 
commentators have debated ‘the end of neoliberalism’ (see for example Glinavos 2008; 
Harvey 2009; Stiglitz 2008). The key figures of the foregoing economic orthodoxy had 
to move to more defensive positions, with the former chaiiman of the Federal Reserve of 
the United States, and neoliberal ‘oracle’, Alan Greenspan, admitting that he had found 
‘a flaw’ in his free market doctiine (Lanman and Matthews 2008). Meanwhile, the 
reaction of the majority of governments has been interventionist to an extent unheard of 
in the two decades preceding the credit crunch. It suggested a more social democratic, 
Keynesian turn in economic policy and thus put the invisible hand of tlie market in doubt 
(Startton and Seager 2008). Marxism and socialism may have also begun to gain greater 
currency and the rise in their popularity has been noted by the press. For example, on 13 
June 2008, The Times announced that ‘the credit crunch is bringing Marxism back into 
fashion’ (Landesman 2008) while the BBC reported anecdotally that in Germany Das 
Kapital sold ahnost eight times better in 2008 than in previous years (BBC 2008). In a 
more tangible dimension of partisan politics, the far left German party Die Linke is 
expected (at the time of writing), to receive up to 14 per cent of the vote in the elections 
to take place at the end of September 2009 and thus to shake the political scene in 
Germany (Connolly 2009). The Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste in France also appears to 
be gaining ground (Reed 2008). Wliile this may mark a revival of left-wing politics in 
two major EU states, the development is matched by a further rise of popularity of
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extreme right parties in several European countries, including the Netherlands, Austria, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary (Traynor 2009).
Clearly, we do not live in a post-ideological age, as some have wrongly asserted. But 
from the point of view of the present study it would be interesting to see more precisely 
how the sudden disruption has affected the ideologies discussed here. While this is 
something that I intend to do in future, when the passage of time allows a little more 
critical distance, here I can only suggest that at first glance the debate has so far 
continued along familiar trajectories. For example, while the neoliberal voices have not 
been as confident as in the ‘roaring nineties’ (Stiglitz 2004) their diagnosis of the crisis 
as well as response to it mirror the claims that were made in the past (see for example 
Rosenbleeth 2009, p. 2). The reactions of the enemies of neoliberalism were articulated 
in similarly familiar terms.
To reiterate, the key assertion of this thesis is that conventional ideological currents have 
managed to absorb globalization rather than having been absorbed by it. The 
understanding of ideology-laden readings of globalization is consequently advanced 
when they are tested, at first instance at least, against those established, albeit 
continually evolving, ideological systems. Yet, while my objective here has been to 
defend the effectiveness of established categories, this does not mean that the number of 
ideological currents has to be limited to these time-honoured traditions. New additions, 
generated by particular circumstances and conveying fresh ideas, are always possible
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and their claim to the status of ideology is best arbitrated through a moiphological 
scrutiny. Consequently, next to the question of the impact exerted on established 
ideological patterns by the most recent developments within the capitalist system, 
another issue that could be fruitfully addressed refers to the occurrence of new 
ideologies and their potential role in shaping the debate on globalization. I have dealt at 
length with one proposition of a new ideological category and I deemed it 
unsatisfactory. But my rejection of ‘globalism’ as a candidate for the status of ideology 
does not entail that I assume the list of ideologies to be closed. The case I have been 
trying to make does not contradict the fact that there is always room for new ideologies 
to rise to prominence alongside the more entrenched ones, or conversely for particular 
ideologies to fall into decline and eventually disappear. Instead, what I have challenged 
are proposals of sweeping ideological realignments motivated by the rise of the concept 
of globalization.
There is, I believe, an important reason to oppose such claims: if each new buzzword 
was to bring about a reorganization of ideological categories then those categories would 
have become too ephemeral to provide the lenses through which individuals view 
themselves and their socio-political environments. They would have turned instead into 
a mere subject of scholastic exercise and conceptual hair-splitting with little relevance to 
social consciousness. I hope that this thesis has made a contribution to advancing a more 
generous view of the role of ideology in political life.
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